Supererogation

[Danhalen]

Supererogatory acts are those acts which are morally good to do, but we are not obligated to do. Heroism, saintliness, favors and forgiveness are all forms of supererogation. We intuitively accept such acts as things which do exist, but on closer inspection how can these acts be accounted for?

The primary problem for supererogatory acts is in classical ethical theories there is no place for them. In deontic ethics we are obligated to do what is good, and so if it is good to do supererogatory acts then we are obligated to do them. For example: in the field of battle a grenade lands in the midst of a group of soldiers. One of the soldiers jumps on the grenade and saves all of his brothers at arms in doing so. We would say the soldier who sacrificed his life went above and beyond the call of duty. Yet from a deontological point of view, if it is good to sacrifice your life for the sake of others then it is your duty to sacrifice your life for the sake of others. That is, if an act is good we are obligated to commit to doing it. Then there is the consequentialist view of ethics. In consequentialism an act is good insofar as its outcome provides the greatest amount of good. So, since our soldier knows that in sacrificing his life more of his comrades will survive, he is obligated to jump on the grenade. Once again we have squeezed out the possibility of supererogation. Other ethical systems, such as virtue ethics or care ethics, suffer the same types of problems.

Given the idea of supererogation and the problems it causes for contemporary understanding of ethics, should we throw out the idea or the systems we use to justify morality? Should we modify the idea of supererogation or should we modify our ethical theories?

[Danhalen]

*crickets*

I thought this was a cool topic.

[Redshirt]

We're still quite young as a discussion board. Wait till we get more people and we'll hopefully have more philosophy buffs here. :)

[Brother Daniel]

It's a damn good question.

I've left it alone, not because it's not interesting, but because I simply have nothing intelligent to say about it.

("That never stopped you before, Daniel," they cry. Yeah, yeah, I know. Shut up.)

[Eudaimonist]

One solution to this problem is simply to say that there are no supererogatory acts. You really are obligated to perform those acts that most people would think of as above and beyond the call of duty.

Another approach is to question the premise "if an act is good, you are obligated to commit to doing it". Once you accept this premise, there is no escape from the conclusion that supererogatory acts are morally required.

Another approach is to question your model of the good. Perhaps it is not good to jump on that handgrenade or be saintly. It may be good for others, but not for oneself. Intuition may fail one here.

Actually, there are many approaches to dealing with issue. I've not covered all that are in mind right now.

From my perspective, I think that ethics is very personal -- not something impersonal that applies equally to all individuals. I don't think that one can say that if the right thing to do for one soldier is to jump on that hand grenade, then it is right for all soldiers to do the same. This may depend on that soldier's conviction in the moral rightness of the war effort, or his love or feelings of brotherhood for his fellow troops.

Also, we must consider the personal context of the moral agent. If someone is not "ready" for moral greatness, can we really demand it of him? "Ought implies can." If someone does not have the virtue needed for a great act, then we can't demand it of him. Ethics can demand that he grow in virtue, but not that he have virtue that he cannot have in the moment.


eudaimonia,

Mark

[Barbarian]

If it is such a widespread opinion that no one in his right mind would jump on a grenade without having serious body armor, then maybe no one really does? Cognitive malfunction as an explanation?

[Danhalen]

One solution to this problem is simply to say that there are no supererogatory acts. You really are obligated to perform those acts that most people would think of as above and beyond the call of duty.From what I have read, this is the most common way of solving the problem.

Another approach is to question the premise "if an act is good, you are obligated to commit to doing it". Once you accept this premise, there is no escape from the conclusion that supererogatory acts are morally required.Yet morality is the practice of doing what is good. Ethical systems determine what ought to be done through the determination of what is good. If something is not good, then we ought not to do it. I think a more fruitful approach would be to determine if the cost of the ought is too great to the agent to carry out. Of course this does not necessarily make an ought disappear.

Another approach is to question your model of the good. Perhaps it is not good to jump on that handgrenade or be saintly. It may be good for others, but not for oneself. Intuition may fail one here.I think this would be very difficult to argue. If we phrase the conception of good in such a way as to make it relative to an individual, as opposed the the ethical system being employed, then we admit the endeavor of building a workable system of ethics is fruitless (since ethics is the pursuit of determining what it is that is good to do).

Actually, there are many approaches to dealing with issue. I've not covered all that are in mind right now.I'd be very interested in reading them. I'm spending this entire semester on the subject.

From my perspective, I think that ethics is very personal -- not something impersonal that applies equally to all individuals. I don't think that one can say that if the right thing to do for one soldier is to jump on that hand grenade, then it is right for all soldiers to do the same. This may depend on that soldier's conviction in the moral rightness of the war effort, or his love or feelings of brotherhood for his fellow troops.

Also, we must consider the personal context of the moral agent. If someone is not "ready" for moral greatness, can we really demand it of him? "Ought implies can." If someone does not have the virtue needed for a great act, then we can't demand it of him. Ethics can demand that he grow in virtue, but not that he have virtue that he cannot have in the moment.This exact issue is dealt with by Elizabeth Pybus. She holds there is no such thing as supererogation because if we see moral goodness in an action, then we are committed to the ideaof the action. That is, if we think what the soldier did is good then we must develop the virtues employed by that soldier to be able to do what the soldier did in that situation. To state it more clearly, it is not only the act we see as good, it is the ability to act which is good. We may never be able to develop our own virtues in such a way that we will be able to do the supererogatory, but if we value a particular act, as long as we attempt to learn how to compel ourselves to do such an act we are doing what is good.

I hope that makes sense. It's really late and I'm still writing about fuckin' Wittgenstein.

[Danhalen]

If it is such a widespread opinion that no one in his right mind would jump on a grenade without having serious body armor, then maybe no one really does? Cognitive malfunction as an explanation?I'm sure we can think of an example which is not so extravagant. I only used the example of the soldier and grenade because it is typical of these arguments. All that is necessary is that the scenario be logically possible.

[David B]

There is something nagging at me.

I get the impression that there is an implicit platonism in the way morality is being discussed here. An implicit view that morality is some sort of thing, out there, to be discovered.

Perhaps I'm wrong about that.

But in any case, I don't think that morality is a Platonic thing.

I see morality as an emerged, evolved, and still emerging and evolving, part of the extended phenotype of social animals like us, rather as the nests of bower birds are part of their extended phenotype.

Within such a view, I suspect that many abstruse questions as the one in the OP simply disappear.

But work calls....

David

[Danhalen]

There is something nagging at me.

I get the impression that there is an implicit platonism in the way morality is being discussed here. An implicit view that morality is some sort of thing, out there, to be discovered.

Perhaps I'm wrong about that.

But in any case, I don't think that morality is a Platonic thing.The pursuit of an ethical system could very well be thought of as a theory of ethics which describes how we determine what is good. I am pretty much an anti-Platonist. I can see where you would get the impression philosophers are searching for the proper ethical theory, but I actually think looking for the best description is more appropriate.

I see morality as an emerged, evolved, and still emerging and evolving, part of the extended phenotype of social animals like us, rather as the nests of bower birds are part of their extended phenotype.

Within such a view, I suspect that many abstruse questions as the one in the OP simply disappear.As a Humean endeavor, I think your assertion does not go unchallenged. The fact that social animals do express behavior as a result of evolution does not change the facts of observed behaviors nor does it curtail our desire of submitting them to subsequent theoretical modeling.

[Barbarian]

I'm sure we can think of an example which is not so extravagant. I only used the example of the soldier and grenade because it is typical of these arguments. All that is necessary is that the scenario be logically possible.OK then, hear my theory of ethics: people seek their own good, unless overridden by evolutionary heritage or failure to assess the consequences. It may happen that someone makes rational decisions based on faulty premises; the fictitious altruistic killer of babies who sacrifices his own salvation in order to ensure the babies get into Heaven on account of not having had enough chance to sin would be a case of rational goodwill rooted in irrational beliefs. But no theory of ethics will be able to accommodate the temporary failure of the human mind to correctly consider consequences.

In short, I don't think there is a problem. Humans aren't always functional.

Incidentally, I think the baby killer referenced above does in fact commit a supererogatory act. Also, there should be similar problems affixed to the other end of the spectrum, concerning unnecessarily cruel acts, like boys being told to do away with the dog and then said boys torturing the dog for hours instead of just killing it swiftly (I have observed this up close, unlike the good acts the OP talks about). We are happy to say that such acts are due to repressed aggression or whatever, i.e. emotions running amok; so why is the overdoing of goodness not explained the same way, essentially as a malfunction?

[Eudaimonist]

I think this would be very difficult to argue. If we phrase the conception of good in such a way as to make it relative to an individual, as opposed the the ethical system being employed, then we admit the endeavor of building a workable system of ethics is fruitless (since ethics is the pursuit of determining what it is that is good to do).

Keep in mind here that I'm suggesting that while an ethical system may provide a framework for understanding what is good for human beings in the abstract, it nevertheless may acknowledge that person A's good is not identical to person B's good. The ethical principles may apply the same in an abstract way to person A and person B, and yet the differences between their goods may require differences in the way in which they apply those ethical principles in concrete situations.

This is possible because "practical wisdom" (by which I mean phronesis, as Aristotle discusses in his Nicomachean Ethics), is a necessary aspect of one's ability to live ethically. One must always deliberate with data personal to one's unique life, such as one's dreams, loves, resources, etc. Ethical principles can help one to evaluate one's values -- to see if they really are good, and how much -- and yet acknowledge that you are a unique individual. Such principles are very useful in guiding one in ethical behavior, but cannot be followed mindlessly, as if those principles could simply tell you what to do as if they were the voice of God.

If one does want ethical principles to provide very simple and obvious rules of behavior that one can follow by rote, this approach may be unsatisfying. However, why should one want this?

This exact issue is dealt with by Elizabeth Pybus.

Cool, I may have to read her sometime.


eudaimonia,

Mark

[Danhalen]

...so why is the overdoing of goodness not explained the same way, essentially as a malfunction?I think the argument could be made. There is a consequentialist argument which basically makes the claim supererogatory acts are irrational, and that's alright.

I do like where you seem to be going with the good and bad aspect as well. There's an article by Roderick Chisholm which argues for the existence of offences (which are negative moral value but permissible). I have written a synopsis if you are interested.

[Danhalen]

Keep in mind here that I'm suggesting that while an ethical system may provide a framework for understanding what is good for human beings in the abstract, it nevertheless may acknowledge that person A's good is not identical to person B's good. The ethical principles may apply the same in an abstract way to person A and person B, and yet the differences between their goods may require differences in the way in which they apply those ethical principles in concrete situations.

This is possible because "practical wisdom" (by which I mean phronesis, as Aristotle discusses in his Nicomachean Ethics), is a necessary aspect of one's ability to live ethically. One must always deliberate with data personal to one's unique life, such as one's dreams, loves, resources, etc. Ethical principles can help one to evaluate one's values -- to see if they really are good, and how much -- and yet acknowledge that you are a unique individual. Such principles are very useful in guiding one in ethical behavior, but cannot be followed mindlessly, as if those principles could simply tell you what to do as if they were the voice of God.
I see. I take this as the Kantian approach to deontology: our motive of duty is what determines the good, but our sense of duty is not necessarily the same as another person's. That is to say: our understanding of ethics is not meant to be a yardstick by which we measure the goodness of another, but it is a pretty good tool to help each individual decide what is good for their self to do.


If one does want ethical principles to provide very simple and obvious rules of behavior that one can follow by rote, this approach may be unsatisfying. However, why should one want this?That's my gut feeling for strict consequentialism.

I'm still trying to figure out an ethical theory I like for me.

[Eudaimonist]

I take this as the Kantian approach to deontology: our motive of duty is what determines the good, but our sense of duty is not necessarily the same as another person's. That is to say: our understanding of ethics is not meant to be a yardstick by which we measure the goodness of another, but it is a pretty good tool to help each individual decide what is good for their self to do.

That's a good attempt to interpret what I had meant (you aren't too far off), but there isn't much that is Kantian to my way of thinking about ethics. I'm in the virtue ethics tradition, although my ethics isn't based on a strict consequentialism, and does have a deontological flavor at a particular level.

The good for me is the fulfillment, or actualization, of the life of the individual -- what is often called personal flourishing. The good isn't created through one's sense of duty, but is only respected by it. The good is something desirable, not merely desired.

The flourishing of one person isn't identical to another's, although flourishing may be considered the same in the abstract since we are all human beings who share certain ethically relevant needs and capacities.

I don't know about you, but when I was a teen pondering what career to embark on, I considered a number of details relevant to my life. I knew that I was bright, analytical, mathematically talented, liked science and philosophy, and enjoyed programming my Apple 2+ computer. I easily narrowed my choice of careers down to just a small handful, and I chose computer programming. In hindsight, this was a good choice, because it let me actualize my talents in a enjoyable, energizing, and healthy way.

My flourishing simply won't be the same as for someone who is highly artistically inclined. For such a person, becoming a painter or graphic artist or architect might be far more appropriate.

Other people might flourish better as actors, or as accountants, or as atheletes.

Goods differ from individual to individual because of what and who they are. However, ethics is not rendered impossible, because as human beings, we all need to be rational, to have integrity, to have friendships, etc.

For this reason, we will have to weight goods differently than each other. We will have to develop "recipes" to include the goods that we will integrate into a personal pattern of living. We might even bring a sense of personal style to the way in which we practice virtuous behavior, since we will naturally have different ways of looking at the world, even if we are both equally rational. This isn't a situation of "anything goes", since the natural standard of the good for you still means that you may aim relatively well or poorly at your personal good. You might be skillful or not so skillful at flourishing.

So you are correct that one's personal understanding of one's own good might be misleading when attempting to understand the good of another, but will be a good tool for making decisions for oneself. My father was a little disappointed that I didn't become a research scientist like he is, because he loves and values science so much, which isn't surprising because that was the right choice for him.

I'm still trying to figure out an ethical theory I like for me.

It's not easy. I wish you well in your search. :)


eudaimonia,

Mark

[Barbarian]

I do like where you seem to be going with the good and bad aspect as well. There's an article by Roderick Chisholm which argues for the existence of offences (which are negative moral value but permissible). I have written a synopsis if you are interested.Yes, thanks, just point me to the text. Will I understand it? I appear to have been vaccinated against comprehending philosophical language, mind you.

[Danhalen]

Yes, thanks, just point me to the text. Will I understand it? I appear to have been vaccinated against comprehending philosophical language, mind you.
I think it should be really accessible. I prefer not to use unnecessary language. I thought I'd be able to upload it here. Apparently not. I'll post it.

[Danhalen]

Chisholm begins his exercise by building up to his categories for moral action. To do this, he begins with the traditional three class system: acts which we are required to do (obligatory), acts which we are forbidden from doing and acts which are neither required nor forbidden. The last category is able to be broken down further into ‘permitted’ and ‘non-obligatory (Chisholm p. 1).’ An act which is obligatory may be done, but can never be forbidden. Likewise, an act which is forbidden need not be done, but can never be required. Some acts may be both permitted and non-obligatory while also being neither obligatory nor forbidden, and these acts might be called morally indifferent (Chisholm p. 2). If it is the case that these classes cover all actions then there is no room for supererogation because an act of supererogation is both permitted and non-obligatory, yet it is certainly not morally indifferent; it is praiseworthy. Chisholm takes the distinction one step further and claims there also is the flip-side of supererogatory acts, offences, and these acts are both permitted and non-obligatory while also holding negative moral worth (Chisholm p. 2). Having shown the three class system to be inadequate, Chisholm moves on to describing what non-obligatory and permissible actions of moral content consist of.
Chisholm makes sure to examine how to determine what an act of supererogation is. He gives four examples of morally praiseworthy acts: keeping a promise to return a book or sacrificing one’s life in the line of duty, doing a favor by lending a book and sacrificing one’s life in a non-obligatory rescue. The first two acts are acts of obligation; the second two acts are supererogatory. It is clear the second and fourth acts are more morally praiseworthy than the first and third acts. So we cannot say supererogatory acts are more praiseworthy than acts of obligation. That is, an act of supererogation can be a trivial thing, and an act of duty can be of great worth. It stands to reason that the person sacrificing their life in the line of duty is more praiseworthy than the person who selflessly lends a book, and so it is not possible to judge an act by its moral worth (Chisholm pp. 3-4). He goes on to say it is not possible to infer certain virtues of character from a person who performs an act of supererogation. The best that can be said of such a person is he or she has the virtue of being of the disposition to perform the act of supererogation (Chisholm p. 4). Finally, he determines it is not possible for an act to be called supererogatory based on the fulfillment of an imperfect duty. That is, if I have an obligation to give someone five dollars, but no one in specific, I am still bound by obligation to give my five dollars away. Therefore I have not done something good which was not required of me (Chisholm pp. 4-5). Chisholm concludes supererogatory acts are advisable, but not required. At this point he asks if there are actions we may do but should not (Chisholm p. 5).
Offences are what Chisholm calls acts which are permissible but offensive. As supererogatory acts cannot be exclusively identified as heroic and saintly, or by the magnitude and profundity of an act, offences cannot be conversely identified (Chisholm p. 5). He offers the example of someone passing information to another person’s employer in order to get them fired as an example of a heinous, yet permissible act. Compare this to his example of the trifling act of not returning a handkerchief (Chisholm p. 5). Basically, Chisholm states offences are similar to acting outside the law to get what a person wants by “’… not observing the mode of reason which the law intends (Chisholm p. 6).’” It is to be clear that offences are not the failure to commit a supererogatory act, and vice versa. Having illustrated the acts thus far, Chisholm moves on to present an alternative to the traditional three-fold classification.
Chisholm presents Alexius Meinong’s scheme to represent the type of actions available to take: the meritorious, the required, the excusable and the reprehensible. The meritorious and the required are related like the supererogatory and the obligatory. The excusable and the reprehensible are similarly related to the relationship between the offensive and the forbidden. Chisholm draws the conclusion that there is also a distinction of indifferent acts based on Meinong’s classifications. These are the permitted, which are not reprehensible, and the non-obligatory, which are not required (Chisholm pp. 6-7). These classes are related in a continuum of good to bad. “Whatever is either meritorious or required is good: whatever is excusable or reprehensible is bad; the meritorious is better than the required, the required is better than the excusable, and the excusable is better than the reprehensible (Chisholm p. 7).” Ernst Schwarz places Meinong’s categories on a new continuum along with the old. Meinong’s good categories must also never be blamed, while his bad categories must never be praised. The nexus of the categories is, presumably, neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy (Chisholm p. 7). Chisholm expresses Meinong’s ‘law of omission’ as such:
For any act A, committing A is meritorious if and only if omitting A is excusable, omitting A is meritorious if and only if committing A is excusable, committing A is required if and only if omitting A is inexcusable (reprehensible), and omitting A is required if and only if omitting A is inexcusable (Chisholm pp. 7-8).
At this point, Chisholm identifies problems with the classification system to date.
If we are to follow Meinong’s view, then we cannot say the person who sacrifices their life in the line of duty did something better than the person who lends another a book. Nor can we say the person who purposefully passed on information which resulted in the loss of another person’s job is worse than willfully neglecting to return someone else’s handkerchief. Schwarz’s view is no less problematic because we do not want to give praise to a trivial act of supererogation, and we do not want to claim a trifling and forbidden act is worse than a heinous offence. As for Meinong’s ‘law of omission,’ Chisholm states we can claim omission of an obligatory act is commission of a forbidden act, but we cannot say omission of a supererogatory act is the commission of an offence. Nor can we say the reverse holds for each act type respectively (Chisholm p. 8). Clearly there is still a problem with the descriptions thus far, and Chisholm addresses it.
Chisholm uses the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to illustrate where he intends to make room for supererogation and offence. ‘Good’ is that which is good to do, and ‘bad’ is that which is bad to do. The terms refer only to the action itself, and not the agent or consequences of the act. With these descriptors we can say that every act is good, bad or indifferent. Furthermore, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are equally applicable to both commission and omission of an act. That it is good to commit an act does not imply that it is bad to omit the act. With the addition of obligatory and forbidden acts, we do get the concept that the omission of one entails the commission of the other. That is, an act is obligatory if and only if its omission is forbidden and an act is forbidden if and only its omission is obligatory (Chisholm p. 10). Supererogatory action is now an act which is good to do, but neither bad nor good not to do. Supererogatory inaction is something which would be good not to do, but neither good nor bad to do. Offensive action and inaction are determined likewise (Chisholm pp. 10-11). An indifferent act is an act which is neither good nor bad and its commission and omission do not matter. Now offences and supererogatory actions can be separated from the morally indifferent (Chisholm p. 11). Chisholm is now left with two additional categories. These categories cover an act which is good to either commit or omit, and an act which is bad to commit or omit. He defines the first as totally supererogatory and the latter as totally offensive (Chisholm p. 11). To determine the moral status of any given act Chisholm has stated we must first determine whether its performance is good, bad or neither, and whether its nonperformance is good, bad or neither. By using the letter ‘g’ to represent ‘good,’ ‘b’ to represent ‘bad,’ and ‘n’ to represent neutral Chisholm presents a nine category of moral action:
1. b, b totally offensive
2. b, n offense of commission
3. b, g forbidden
4. n, b offense of omission
5. n, n totally indifferent
6. n, g supererogatory omission
7. g, b obligatory
8. g, n supererogatory commission
9. g, g totally supererogatory (Chisholm p. 12).








Works Cited
Chisholm, Roderick M. "Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics." Ratio 5 (1963): 1-14.

[Barbarian]

Thanks, Danhalen, it sounds understandable indeed. I'm saving it for the coming weekend, though, when I'll have more time energy to pay proper attention.

[Barbarian]

I haven't forgotten about this thread, solid evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. I plan to reply on the weekend, unless the by now traditional March 15 riots become severe, in which case I'll sit in front of the TV getting my dose of morbid entertainment.

[nygreenguy]

It seems to me the problem with the op is ignoring biology.

[Danhalen]

It seems to me the problem with the op is ignoring biology.Incredibly insightful. Care to explain your position?

[nygreenguy]

Well, lets do some examples.

The soldier jumps on the grenade. Now, if the soldier has kids how will this affect the children? Yes, they no longer have a father but they do get the glory of having a hero father. They very well might actually be better off because of the sacrifice. So, if there is a biological component to that behavior, it is possible it was passed on to his children, and through his sacrifice he may have increased the fitness of his children and thusly the genes responsible for such a behavior allowing it to become more frequent in the population.

The other possibilities are there is no genetic component, or he doesnt have children then its irrelevant if its genetic or not and we have the possibility it is genetic and inherited but is actually maladaptive causing such behavior to disappear from the population.

I often find people overlook biology when dealing with human behavior. People have a multitude of behaviors which are very "involuntary", even some which we think we are deciding ourselves.

[Danhalen]

I often find people overlook biology when dealing with human behavior. People have a multitude of behaviors which are very "involuntary", even some which we think we are deciding ourselves.Then perhaps someone ought to come up with a biological theory of ethics. And while I do agree human behavior is not entirely voluntary I am not convinced it is so biologically predisposed we have no choice in the matter. I guess I'm not a fatalist.

[nygreenguy]

Then perhaps someone ought to come up with a biological theory of ethics. And while I do agree human behavior is not entirely voluntary I am not convinced it is so biologically predisposed we have no choice in the matter. I guess I'm not a fatalist.

Im not arguing that it is all biological either. Problem is, you cant com up with a workable theory unless you can really understand all the parts which make it up and we are not even close.

[Danhalen]

Except this is a discussion about philosophy. If there is room for behavior outside of biology then we can answer that part of the equation. It's not complete, but it helps.

[nygreenguy]

Except this is a discussion about philosophy. If there is room for behavior outside of biology then we can answer that part of the equation. It's not complete, but it helps.


Only if you can specifically separate which traits are nature and which are nurture.

[Danhalen]

Only if you can specifically separate which traits are nature and which are nurture.That seems rather myopic. Why should I wait until there can be a perfect distinction before I have any philosophical discussion?

Why should I bother pondering anything at all if it is not of scientific nature? Should science explain all it can before I move on?

[nygreenguy]

That seems rather myopic. Why should I wait until there can be a perfect distinction before I have any philosophical discussion?

Why should I bother pondering anything at all if it is not of scientific nature? Should science explain all it can before I move on?

Sorry, Ive been very sick and drugged up the past few days so perhaps my points are not coming across clear. I thought you were trying to come up with some explanation/theory to the basis of ethics/specific acts.

I think it would hard to explain such acts unless they could individually be identified as biological vs. social in nature. I think the individual basics need to be understood before the broader question can be addressed.