Mind and Brain

[Christina]

I want to lurk in a thread where scientists and philosophers (I think) discuss whether or not there is a mind that is somehow separate from or more than the sum of the parts of the brain. Does that even make sense so far? The subject fascinates me for personal reasons that don't really belong in an ID forum but I can't begin to discuss it at that level and I'm not sure how to frame the OP in a way that won't confuse everyone from the get-go if I use the wrong terminology or accidentally sound like I know what I'm talking about for a post or two.

Is there anyone that has a strong feeling about this that could take a position in an OP or at least help me start it so that what I'm asking makes sense to the people that discuss these things in depth? I don't want to head off to Science or Philosophy and end up making a confusing mess.

[Febble]

I want to lurk in a thread where scientists and philosophers (I think) discuss whether or not there is a mind that is somehow separate from or more than the sum of the parts of the brain. Does that even make sense so far? The subject fascinates me for personal reasons that don't really belong in an ID forum but I can't begin to discuss it at that level and I'm not sure how to frame the OP in a way that won't confuse everyone from the get-go if I use the wrong terminology or accidentally sound like I know what I'm talking about for a post or two.

Is there anyone that has a strong feeling about this that could take a position in an OP or at least help me start it so that what I'm asking makes sense to the people that discuss these things in depth? I don't want to head off to Science or Philosophy and end up making a confusing mess.

Do you want to write something and run it by me? Or David B would probably give you a similar take.

ETA: or RBH

[Christina]

Thanks Febble. It fascinates me when people talk about this concept of a mind that isn't just the result of the activities of the physiological components of a brain. It's hard for me to conceive of that because I see my thought processes and personality change on a regular basis based on whatever combination of meds I'm taking. If I have a mind that is separate from the hardware of my brain it appears to be awfully susceptible to chemical influences. I want to know why some people think that there's something intangible that is more than just brain chemistry. An OP of "I don't think that there is because it doesn't feel that way to me" isn't going to cut it in an ID forum.

[Preno]

It's hard for me to conceive of that because I see my thought processes and personality change on a regular basis based on whatever combination of meds I'm taking. If I have a mind that is separate from the hardware of my brain it appears to be awfully susceptible to chemical influences. I want to know why some people think that there's something intangible that is more than just brain chemistry.Well, you've pretty much solved the issue already.

[Christina]

I don't know. I've seen these mega-threads on less intellectual forums with few scientists where people debate it for weeks so that makes me doubt that it's as simple as my personal perception. The people that think that there is something else must have some arguments for it but maybe it's just all woo.

[Garrett]

The wikipedia article on philopsophy of mind (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind) seems to give a pretty good overview. There's an interesting graphic of some possible relationships between the body and mind here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DualismCausationViews.png).

Scholorpedia has a useful article here (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness) that details some models of consciousness.

discuss whether or not there is a mind that is somehow separate from or more than the sum of the parts of the brain
this concept of a mind that isn't just the result of the activities of the physiological components of a brain
Why can't it be that the mind is more than the sum of the parts of the brain yet is still the result of the activities of the physiological components of a brain? We know the brain affects the mind - what reason is there to suppose the mind doesn't affect the brain?

[Christina]

Thanks for that link. That's exactly the kind of thing that I was thinking of. It's going to take me all day to follow the links in there to try to understand what they're talking about which is partly why I want to lurk and read what those of you that are more fluent in philosophy and science think about it.

[Garrett]

It's hard for me to conceive of that because I see my thought processes and personality change on a regular basis based on whatever combination of meds I'm taking. If I have a mind that is separate from the hardware of my brain it appears to be awfully susceptible to chemical influences. I want to know why some people think that there's something intangible that is more than just brain chemistry.Well, you've pretty much solved the issue already.
lol If the issue is "does the brain affect the mind" then you have a point, but the issue is a lot deeper than that.

[Febble]

The wikipedia article on philopsophy of mind (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind) seems to give a pretty good overview. There's an interesting graphic of some possible relationships between the body and mind here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DualismCausationViews.png).

Scholorpedia has a useful article here (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness) that details some models of consciousness.

discuss whether or not there is a mind that is somehow separate from or more than the sum of the parts of the brain
this concept of a mind that isn't just the result of the activities of the physiological components of a brain
Why can't it be that the mind is more than the sum of the parts of the brain yet is still the result of the activities of the physiological components of a brain? We know the brain affects the mind - what reason is there to suppose the mind doesn't affect the brain?

It does - in the sense that if "mind" is the brain's output, there are loops by which the output is re-entered as input.

That's pretty much the key to consciousness IMO.

[Preno]

I don't know. I've seen these mega-threads on less intellectual forums with few scientists where people debate it for weeks so that makes me doubt that it's as simple as my personal perception. The people that think that there is something else must have some arguments for it but maybe it's just all woo.There have been megathreads over all sorts of non-sense. You should have more faith in your common sense imo.

[Garrett]

A key, perhaps. Your desktop computer has those loops too, but we don't claim a PC has a mind. So there must be other keys also.

I like the Global Workspace and sub-cortical models.

[Christina]

There have been megathreads over all sorts of non-sense. You should have more faith in your common sense imo.

I do, probably to a fault sometimes. There are times here when I read long WOT posts and discussions and think 'how the hell could anyone make anything so simple sound so complicated?". It's like they're going from A to B by way of Mars. That alone fascinates me and makes me wonder if I'm missing something major about how most people think and oversimplifying everything.

[Febble]

A key, perhaps. Your desktop computer has those loops too, but we don't claim a PC has a mind. So there must be other keys also.

I like the Global Workspace and sub-cortical models.

Well, they have to be the right loops. Any old loop won't do it.

And of course the loops are cortical-subcortical loops - they have to be.

What is it that you like about the Global Workspace model?

[Christina]

Does anyone object if I ask DMB to let me move this to Philosophy with a new title? Since I'm already googling terms it probably fits there now.

[Rilx]

Christina, in internet discussions some argumentation has religious background. Without separate mind there's no immortal soul, no heaven, no hell ... etc, so the separate mind must be assumed and all facts must be organized to conform to the assumption.

Philosophers and scientists who lived in the time when they could even have been burned because of atheism, were obliged to assume separate mind. Their works are often used to support separate mind argumentation. For instance, Rene Descartes, "father of the empiricism", lived in a constant fear of the fate of Galileo Galilei.

[Christina]

It does seem to me that when I'm reading about dualism that there is an underlying assumption that most reasonable people agree that there is some sort of supernatural entity that's somehow a part of them for the idea to hang together at all. From the Wiki article that Garret posted:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind)
The most frequently used argument in favour of dualism is that it appeals to the common-sense intuition that conscious experience is distinct from inanimate matter. If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible.

I guess I'm not average and have a different flavor of common sense because dualism is an unintelligible concept to me so far. It makes as much sense to me as auras and ghosts do.

This part made me laugh:
So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the hippocampus feels like.

If the names were changed to things like GABA and neurotransmitters I could more easily explain what that feels like than I could articulate what a burn feels like or what a blue sky looks like.

[Christina]

This thread has been moved from Miscellaneous Discussions.

[David B]

I found http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Am_a_Strange_Loop a useful intuition pump for such understanding as I have of the nature of mind.

I'd read GEB first, which helped. Also Dennett 'Freedom evolves'.

My thinking is pretty much influenced by a synthesis of these, and Pinker 'How the Mind Works'.

Cricket calls.

David

[Christina]

Thanks, David. I've got a load of tabs open as I wander through this stuff. It's interesting. At the moment I'm off on a tangent about artificial intelligence because it gets at that curiosity I have about breaking human thought down into it's most minute steps and I can grasp it far more easily from a programming perspective than a philosophical one.

[David B]

Thanks, David. I've got a load of tabs open as I wander through this stuff. It's interesting. At the moment I'm off on a tangent about artificial intelligence because it gets at that curiosity I have about breaking human thought down into it's most minute steps and I can grasp it far more easily from a programming perspective than a philosophical one.

There's a very good essay on decision making by Marvin Minsky somewhere on the net. Don't have a link to it, though.

David

[Febble]

Thanks, David. I've got a load of tabs open as I wander through this stuff. It's interesting. At the moment I'm off on a tangent about artificial intelligence because it gets at that curiosity I have about breaking human thought down into it's most minute steps and I can grasp it far more easily from a programming perspective than a philosophical one.

I think it's a good approach. A brain is a decision-making machine. Take it from there.

[Christina]

Yeah, it works better for me but my thinking is still so muddled about it that I can't get to the good parts. If I see my body as the hardware I'm not sure what the software is unless I consider my brain and neurotransmitters and all that stuff to be something other than my body. Whatever that separate mind is supposed to be seems more like output from software than software itself. So now I have some hardware and some output but no place to stick the software. If I bring it back to my initial reason to be curious, my meds act on my hardware and the result is some different output but where is the software? It only works for me if I think about my neurotransmitters as software instead of hardware but that might be an arbitrary distinction that I'm making because it would resolve my confusion easily.

[David B]

Yeah, it works better for me but my thinking is still so muddled about it that I can't get to the good parts. If I see my body as the hardware I'm not sure what the software is unless I consider my brain and neurotransmitters and all that stuff to be something other than my body. Whatever that separate mind is supposed to be seems more like output from software than software itself. So now I have some hardware and some output but no place to stick the software. If I bring it back to my initial reason to be curious, my meds act on my hardware and the result is some different output but where is the software? It only works for me if I think about my neurotransmitters as software instead of hardware but that might be an arbitrary distinction that I'm making because it would resolve my confusion easily.

When I was talking to Febble about stuff related to your question, I had to persuade her to read a couple of books.

viz - Freedom Evolves and I am a Strange Loop.

My hardware - and hence it's ouput - is being a bit changed now, being halfway down a bottle, so I'm finding it hard to get the clarity I want on what are difficult concepts.

But I'll try, anyway.

But have now deleted a lot of text, as failed.

The strange loop idea is, I think, important.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loophttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loop

See what you make of that.

David

[Febble]

Yeah, it works better for me but my thinking is still so muddled about it that I can't get to the good parts. If I see my body as the hardware I'm not sure what the software is unless I consider my brain and neurotransmitters and all that stuff to be something other than my body. Whatever that separate mind is supposed to be seems more like output from software than software itself. So now I have some hardware and some output but no place to stick the software. If I bring it back to my initial reason to be curious, my meds act on my hardware and the result is some different output but where is the software? It only works for me if I think about my neurotransmitters as software instead of hardware but that might be an arbitrary distinction that I'm making because it would resolve my confusion easily.

I don't think the hard-ware/software distinction works, really, when it comes to the brain - and I think that misunderstanding underlies some quasi-dualistic notions about mind and brain. The key concept is: "what fires together, wires together" (Hebb, allegedly). New synapses are being made all the time (and old ones cease to function), so your "hardware" is being constantly rewired. That's why we remember things. Your meds affect what fires together, so they also affect what wires together.

[Garrett]

Thanks, David. I've got a load of tabs open as I wander through this stuff. It's interesting. At the moment I'm off on a tangent about artificial intelligence because it gets at that curiosity I have about breaking human thought down into it's most minute steps and I can grasp it far more easily from a programming perspective than a philosophical one.

I think it's a good approach. A brain is a decision-making machine. Take it from there.
That might be overstating, since we understand machines. :)

[Garrett]

What is it that you like about the Global Workspace model?
Seriously, mainly because it's a widely-accepted model that allows the mind to affect the brain even though the mind isn't the brain. It just resonates with me.

[Febble]

What is it that you like about the Global Workspace model?
Seriously, mainly because it's a widely-accepted model that allows the mind to affect the brain even though the mind isn't the brain. It just resonates with me.

I meant: what, specifically, do you see as its essential features - i.e. not "why do you like it" but "what is it that you like about it"?

Could you summarise what you think it is?

[Garrett]

And of course the loops are cortical-subcortical loops - they have to be.

Why? Cortical activity is a given in normally-conscious people, but imo consciousness depends on sub-cortical activity. How do you know that sub-cortical loops don't produce what is necessary for subjective experience and cortical-subcortical activity (the loops you're thinking of) don't just enhance that existence?

[Febble]

And of course the loops are cortical-subcortical loops - they have to be.

Why? Cortical activity is a given in normally-conscious people, but imo consciousness depends on sub-cortical activity. How do you know that sub-cortical loops don't produce what is necessary for subjective experience and cortical-subcortical activity (the loops you're thinking of) don't just enhance that existence?

Well, I guess they don't have to be. But we know they are, from both anatomical and imaging studies.

Actually I'm not even sure what you are saying here. Are you saying that consciousness is possible without cortical involvement?

[Garrett]

What is it that you like about the Global Workspace model?
Seriously, mainly because it's a widely-accepted model that allows the mind to affect the brain even though the mind isn't the brain. It just resonates with me.

I meant: what, specifically, do you see as its essential features - i.e. not "why do you like it" but "what is it that you like about it"?

Could you summarise what you think it is?
Somehow, all the neuronic activity of a normally-functioning brain produces a consciousness. That fact gives us two end-points to work with. The GW model acknowledges both end-points. I'm just a lay-man but the GW theory is the first theory I've seen that actually incorporates both of those known end-points. So I fell in love!

I know that falling in love makes me foolish, but I can't help it. :dunno: :bang:

[Garrett]

Actually I'm not even sure what you are saying here. Are you saying that consciousness is possible without cortical involvement?
Consciousness, no; subjective experience, yes. Little tiny bugs have no cortex but I think they feel stuff.

[Febble]

Actually I'm not even sure what you are saying here. Are you saying that consciousness is possible without cortical involvement?
Consciousness, no; subjective experience, yes. Little tiny bugs have no cortex but I think they feel stuff.

OK.

[Febble]

What is it that you like about the Global Workspace model?
Seriously, mainly because it's a widely-accepted model that allows the mind to affect the brain even though the mind isn't the brain. It just resonates with me.

I meant: what, specifically, do you see as its essential features - i.e. not "why do you like it" but "what is it that you like about it"?

Could you summarise what you think it is?
Somehow, all the neuronic activity of a normally-functioning brain produces a consciousness. That fact gives us two end-points to work with. The GW model acknowledges both end-points. I'm just a lay-man but the GW theory is the first theory I've seen that actually incorporates both of those known end-points. So I fell in love!

I know that falling in love makes me foolish, but I can't help it. :dunno: :bang:

What two end-points?

[Garrett]

neuronic activity

consciousness

[Febble]

neuronic activity

consciousness

Well, I don't think that's unique to the GW model. I'd say it was a given for absolutely any model of consciousness.

I'm just not sure what the GW model has in particular to offer. It's supposed to be compatible with other models, but those other models make more sense to me. The GW model seems too embedded in "spotlight" models of attention. "Salience" models make more sense to me, and IMO map much better on to what we know about how the brain works.

[Garnet]

*blinks* I'm not smart enough for this thread.

[Febble]

*blinks* I'm not smart enough for this thread.

Sure you are. Sorry I didn't explain myself properly. My bad.

But it's getting late. I'll have another go tomorrow.

[Garrett]

neuronic activity

consciousness

Well, I don't think that's unique to the GW model. I'd say it was a given for absolutely any model of consciousness.
I'd think so, but so far the other options are always too fuzzy on one end.

I'm just not sure what the GW model has in particular to offer. It's supposed to be compatible with other models, but those other models make more sense to me. The GW model seems too embedded in "spotlight" models of attention. "Salience" models make more sense to me, and IMO map much better on to what we know about how the brain works.
Give me a specific example please. A quick google isn't helping.

[Garrett]

*blinks* I'm not smart enough for this thread.
lol I'm not smart Garnet, but I do like the subject.

Preno appealed to your common sense. Can you affect your own behaviors on purpose? Let's say you are confronted with a choice, and both options are favorable to you. Like chocolate vs vanilla. Is your choice up to you?

If so, then physics and chemistry and biology cannot explain what happened when you made your selection.

Something else is going on. Somehow, our opinions and desires and intentions affect our destiny. We do not know why or how. That is a fact.

[Garrett]

Btw me and Lizzie have wrestled a lot. There is a lot of backstory and this subject is huge and deep. I admit I smirked to myself when you said you needed a day to get up to speed.

[Garnet]

*blinks* I'm not smart enough for this thread.
lol I'm not smart Garnet, but I do like the subject.

:D

Preno appealed to your common sense. Can you affect your own behaviors on purpose? Let's say you are confronted with a choice, and both options are favorable to you. Like chocolate vs vanilla. Is your choice up to you?

Sure, I can choose. I make choices every day. Sometimes the choices are easy. I'll have chocolate. Sometimes they're not easy. Take this medicine that stops pain but makes me vomit or don't take the medicine and hurt like hell.

I can also effect some of my behaviors on purpose. Sometimes easily, sometimes not. Quitting smoking was something I did on purpose and boy-oh-boy, it was hard. I freely acknowledge that I'm not able to change all my behaviors, though, even when I know I should.

If so, then physics and chemistry and biology cannot explain what happened when you made your selection.

Something else is going on. Somehow, our opinions and desires and intentions affect our destiny. We do not know why or how. That is a fact.

Here's where I fall off the tater wagon. Physics and chemistry and biology cannot explain yet. But I don't understand what you mean when you say something else is going on. It could be that it really is a matter of physics and chemistry and biology, we just don't understand it yet.

Something else I don't get, and I'm not being snarky here, is destiny. Oh, I understand the concept but I don't think that I have any real destiny other than to die some day.

[Christina]

*blinks* I'm not smart enough for this thread.

Sure you are - we just don't speak their language. They don't speak ours either. I'm a bit lost as to what Garrett is saying. I think that I'm missing something because it sounds like he's arguing for the existence of an entity or construct that isn't the output of a physiological process but I'm not sure what that would be.

Garrett, I think that you're confusing me with Garnet because Preno made the common sense comment to me and I'm the one that started the thread.

[His Noodly Appendage]

In a box to the left of my knee is a lot of hardware. In that hardware is stored a lot of software. The CPU processes the software, turning numbers into other numbers.

Where in all of these is the game I was playing just now? I don't mean the program, I mean the thing-I-won.

I think that's the question people have trouble with.

[Christina]

In a box to the left of my knee is a lot of hardware. In that hardware is stored a lot of software. The CPU processes the software, turning numbers into other numbers.

Where in all of these is the game I was playing just now? I don't mean the program, I mean the thing-I-won.

I think that's the question people have trouble with.

Yeah.

What makes sense to me is that the thing-you-won is a name that you're giving to what your hardware and software has been doing for the last 20 minutes and mind is the name that Garret is using to describe what his stuff has been doing. It's not a tangible thing that exists separately from hardware and software. Where I'm losing the discussion is that it sounds to me like Garrett is saying that the name is a thing in itself.

[His Noodly Appendage]

I'm not lost at all. I think it's silly :p

[Christina]

Well, if he means that mind is a thing and not a name, I think that's silly but I'm still glad that I brought it up because it's given me interesting things to think about even if it was a silly question. It's all starting to feel like a word game now to some extent. I'm glad I tripped over AI in the process though because there's a mountain of nitpicking stuff about how thinking works in there.

[Garrett]

Here's where I fall off the tater wagon. Physics and chemistry and biology cannot explain yet. But I don't understand what you mean when you say something else is going on. It could be that it really is a matter of physics and chemistry and biology, we just don't understand it yet.
How is that not the atheist version of god of the gaps? For one thing, there are other sciences - including sciences which more directly address the question of how minds work! You fell off the tater wagon way too soon.

Physics can't ever explain how the mind works, since minds don't exist at the level examined by physics. Same with chemistry.

Something else I don't get, and I'm not being snarky here, is destiny. Oh, I understand the concept but I don't think that I have any real destiny other than to die some day.
You just admitted a destiny even as you implied it didn't exist. Also, if you were paying attention, you'd have noticed I claim our futures are NOT destined.

[Garrett]

Sure you are - we just don't speak their language. They don't speak ours either.
So you aren't into science and critical thinking. :rolleyes:

[Garrett]

In a box to the left of my knee is a lot of hardware. In that hardware is stored a lot of software. The CPU processes the software, turning numbers into other numbers.

Where in all of these is the game I was playing just now? I don't mean the program, I mean the thing-I-won.

I think that's the question people have trouble with.

Yeah.

What makes sense to me is that the thing-you-won is a name that you're giving to what your hardware and software has been doing for the last 20 minutes and mind is the name that Garret is using to describe what his stuff has been doing. It's not a tangible thing that exists separately from hardware and software. Where I'm losing the discussion is that it sounds to me like Garrett is saying that the name is a thing in itself.
Things do stuff. That doesn't mean the thing was conscious.

Who the fuck said consciousness exists separately from the brain? There's a mystery here but you'd rather build a strawman.

[Christina]

No, I meant that we aren't familiar with the terminology and references used in philosophy without looking them up. I'm not sure what the snarky eyeroll is about or why you decided to interpret my comment that way. I think that you're getting a bit too heated and emotional about it for me to want to keep going here. It's fun to think about but not to get all upset about.

[Garrett]

I'm not lost at all. I think it's silly :p
I agree. Arguing as if a computer game was conscious. That is very silly!

[Garrett]

No, I meant that we aren't familiar with the terminology and references used in philosophy without looking them up. I'm not sure what the snarky eyeroll is about or why you decided to interpret my comment that way. I think that you're getting a bit too heated and emotional about it for me to want to keep going here. It's fun to think about but not to get all upset about.
hm

I guess you're right, since your post seemed to say I (and Febble!) were speaking some foreign language, as if we weren't speaking about reality or something. Yeah, I'm getting too emotional. I'll back off and leave, don't you dare leave your own thread. See you later okay?

[Garnet]

Here's where I fall off the tater wagon. Physics and chemistry and biology cannot explain yet. But I don't understand what you mean when you say something else is going on. It could be that it really is a matter of physics and chemistry and biology, we just don't understand it yet.
How is that not the atheist version of god of the gaps? For one thing, there are other sciences - including sciences which more directly address the question of how minds work! You fell off the tater wagon way too soon.

Physics can't ever explain how the mind works, since minds don't exist at the level examined by physics. Same with chemistry.

It isn't god of the gaps to say, "I don't know, it could be x or y." God of the gaps would be, "Since this hasn't been explained or completely understood, goddidit."

I don't know if physics can't ever be used to help understand how the mind works. I suspect that biology and chemistry certainly can be used to help understand it. Regardless, my default position is, "I don't know," coupled with "We may figure it out some day," hence my use of the word yet.

Something else I don't get, and I'm not being snarky here, is destiny. Oh, I understand the concept but I don't think that I have any real destiny other than to die some day.
You just admitted a destiny even as you implied it didn't exist. Also, if you were paying attention, you'd have noticed I claim our futures are NOT destined.

*puzzled puppy look* I didn't say that you claimed futures are destined. What I said is that the only destiny I understand to be real is death

[Christina]

hm

I guess you're right, since your post seemed to say I (and Febble!) were speaking some foreign language, as if we weren't speaking about reality or something. Yeah, I'm getting too emotional. I'll back off and leave, don't you dare leave your own thread. See you later okay?

OK let's both stay : ).

I'm not trying to create a strawman of your position because I'm still trying to understand what it is and what you mean by the word mind. That stuff between you and Febble about cortical and sub-cortical interaction went right over my head along with the references to cognitive models. I think that I'm all tangled up in the meanings of mind and consciousness. I've been thinking about this since first thing this morning and my brain hurts. I don't even know what my question was anymore.

I'm going to go read Calvin and Hobbes. I get that.

[Garrett]

OK let's both stay : ).
okay, thx

now I'm inhibited goddamn it tho

I love Calvin and Hobbes.

[Garrett]

... the word mind.
No one understands mind. That's why there is a controversy.

[Garrett]

I admit I get agitated when people act as if there were no mystery here. Hell any of you could be a goddamn computer AI program with no sensibility at all. Would C3-PO feel anything? I do not know. Sure, he fusses when abused, but I can teach my pc to do that.

[Febble]

I admit I get agitated when people act as if there were no mystery here. Hell any of you could be a goddamn computer AI program with no sensibility at all. Would C3-PO feel anything? I do not know. Sure, he fusses when abused, but I can teach my pc to do that.

I don't think we understand exactly how mind works, but I don't think there is a big unsolved mystery. I think that's what Garnet meant by "god-of-the-gaps". I don't think it's right to say: we don't understand everything therefore there's a big piece of the puzzle missing. I think we essentially understand how the brain produces mind. I don't think there is some mysterious ingredient that brains have that computers don't or can't. I don't see any reason in principle why, one day, we couldn't build a computer that could "feel" in your terms. We already have computers that can sense. The difference between feeling and sensing is probably what is at stake here.

That's why I come back to the formulation: the brain is a decision making machine. Specifically, I'd say, it's a machine for deciding how to act, given sensory inputs, and how it acts will, in itself determine the next set of sensory inputs.

I think it's helpful to think about the human visual attention system, which is a beautiful, and fairly well-understood, feedback system in which input strongly determines where we look next, and what we see next determines where we look next.

Then scale that up by orders of magnitude in complexity to get the whole mind.

[Eudaimonist]

Here is one of my favorite philosophical essays on the mind-body relation, and it is fairly close to my view. I hope you find it interesting, Christina.

A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem, by Roger E. Bissell.
http://www.rogerbissell.com/id11aaa.html


eudaimonia,

Mark

[Christina]

Thanks - I do. I'm still working my way through it slowly and thinking about it but it feels mentally satisfying as an explanation so far. This makes sense to me:

A mental process and the physical brain process correlated with it are one and the same brain process, as viewed from different cognitive perspectives; i.e., the mental and the physical are but two distinct aspects of one and the same process, as viewed through two different cognitive modes.

[Febble]

Thanks - I do. I'm still working my way through it slowly and thinking about it but it feels mentally satisfying as an explanation so far. This makes sense to me:

A mental process and the physical brain process correlated with it are one and the same brain process, as viewed from different cognitive perspectives; i.e., the mental and the physical are but two distinct aspects of one and the same process, as viewed through two different cognitive modes.

Yup.

[David B]

Thanks - I do. I'm still working my way through it slowly and thinking about it but it feels mentally satisfying as an explanation so far. This makes sense to me:

A mental process and the physical brain process correlated with it are one and the same brain process, as viewed from different cognitive perspectives; i.e., the mental and the physical are but two distinct aspects of one and the same process, as viewed through two different cognitive modes.

Yup.

Indeed - and very much what Hofstadter is driving at.

David

[Preno]

Yes, kind of like the process of writing down stuff on a piece of paper and the process of computing 2874 x 3921, or the process of playing chess and the process of moving your hand, or the process of explaining something on the internet and the process of typing. What is puzzling is not the general relationship between the mental processes and the physical processes (although the psycho/neurological details, of course, may be very intricate), but rather the fact that people for some reason focus on this particular relationship as if it were somehow unique.

[Christina]

What is puzzling is not the general relationship between the mental processes and the physical processes (although the psycho/neurological details, of course, may be very intricate), but rather the fact that people for some reason focus on this particular relationship as if it were somehow unique.

Maybe that comes back to what Rilx said earlier in the thread.

Christina, in internet discussions some argumentation has religious background. Without separate mind there's no immortal soul, no heaven, no hell ... etc, so the separate mind must be assumed and all facts must be organized to conform to the assumption.
This particular relationship is loaded with the baggage of a deep belief system that must have a supernatural entity like a soul to make any sense whatsoever.

[Christina]

I don't think there is some mysterious ingredient that brains have that computers don't or can't. I don't see any reason in principle why, one day, we couldn't build a computer that could "feel" in your terms. We already have computers that can sense. The difference between feeling and sensing is probably what is at stake here.

That's why I come back to the formulation: the brain is a decision making machine. Specifically, I'd say, it's a machine for deciding how to act, given sensory inputs, and how it acts will, in itself determine the next set of sensory inputs...Then scale that up by orders of magnitude in complexity to get the whole mind.

This is how I got off on the AI tangent. It seems like I could back into the idea by looking at what significant challenges the technology faces that don't boil down to hardware limitations and the impracticality of making the vast amount of information that humans have available to process. I'm not sure what if anything is left after that but by eliminating everything that isn't at least theoretically reproducible I can focus on what I can't eliminate.

[Febble]

I don't think there is some mysterious ingredient that brains have that computers don't or can't. I don't see any reason in principle why, one day, we couldn't build a computer that could "feel" in your terms. We already have computers that can sense. The difference between feeling and sensing is probably what is at stake here.

That's why I come back to the formulation: the brain is a decision making machine. Specifically, I'd say, it's a machine for deciding how to act, given sensory inputs, and how it acts will, in itself determine the next set of sensory inputs...Then scale that up by orders of magnitude in complexity to get the whole mind.

This is how I got off on the AI tangent. It seems like I could back into the idea by looking at what significant challenges the technology faces that don't boil down to hardware limitations and the impracticality of making the vast amount of information that humans have available to process. I'm not sure what if anything is left after that but by eliminating everything that isn't at least theoretically reproducible I can focus on what I can't eliminate.

I don't think AI is a tangent. I think it's the right approach. But I think the best approach to AI is to think in terms of systems that will move in an environment (virtual or real). In particular, systems that have to juggle conflicting requirements of seeking out energy, and avoiding becoming energy for some other system!

So, if you want to program it, build in hunger and danger. Then you are on your way :)

[Christina]

I'm getting stuck every few sentences with assumptions that they're making that I don't quite get. Like this one:

Human beings solve most of their problems using fast, intuitive judgments rather than the conscious, step-by-step deduction that early AI research was able to model. AI has made some progress at imitating this kind of "sub-symbolic" problem solving: embodied approaches emphasize the importance of sensorimotor skills to higher reasoning; neural net research attempts to simulate the structures inside human and animal brains that gives rise to this skill.
How do we know that it isn't unimaginably fast step by step deduction rather than intuition? I'm not even sure what intuition is other than everything I know coming together so quickly that I'm not consciously aware of the sequence of thoughts but I get there just the same. Intuition as something other than that makes no sense to me yet. They seem to be saying that artificial neural networks can simulate the structures that give rise to this skill that they call intuition so what part can't AI model? I guess I have to figure out what sub-symbolic problem solving is.

Artificial neural networks may either be used to gain an understanding of biological neural networks, or for solving artificial intelligence problems without necessarily creating a model of a real biological system. The real, biological nervous system is highly complex and includes some features that may seem superfluous based on an understanding of artificial networks.

This sounds like the parts that they can't model are the platform and not the processes.

[Febble]

I'm getting stuck every few sentences with assumptions that they're making that I don't quite get. Like this one:

Human beings solve most of their problems using fast, intuitive judgments rather than the conscious, step-by-step deduction that early AI research was able to model. AI has made some progress at imitating this kind of "sub-symbolic" problem solving: embodied approaches emphasize the importance of sensorimotor skills to higher reasoning; neural net research attempts to simulate the structures inside human and animal brains that gives rise to this skill.
How do we know that it isn't unimaginably fast step by step deduction rather than intuition? I'm not even sure what intuition is other than everything I know coming together so quickly that I'm not consciously aware of the sequence of thoughts but I get there just the same. Intuition as something other than that makes no sense to me yet. They seem to be saying that artificial neural networks can simulate the structures that give rise to this skill that they call intuition so what part can't AI model? I guess I have to figure out what sub-symbolic problem solving is.

Well, one useful way to model it (IMO) is in terms of competing solutions, each inhibiting the others - the stronger each one gets, the greater its inhibitory influence on the competition, so that as soon as one gets ahead start, it zooms into the lead.

[Christina]

I'm not sure what you mean. Is your post above referring to intuition or sub-symbolic processing? I think that I've read enough to understand what they mean by the latter one but intuition is still sounding fuzzy to me.

# In psychology, intuition may mean:

* Intuition (knowledge) - understanding without apparent effort, quick and ready insight seemingly independent of previous experiences or empirical knowledge.
* Intuition is one of the four axes of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, opposite sensing.

# In AI Research:

* Intuition - an incompletely founded concept or perception formed from associations to similar models, contexts, or scenarios, in humans frequently below the level of conscious iteration.

I think that my simplest question is if scientists have proven these things or not and if I should be taking them as a given. Do we know that sub-symbolic processing goes on or is it just a theory? Words like 'apparent' and 'incompletely founded' and 'seemingly' sound kind of soft.