Split from Consciousness explanation

[Febble]

Well, I'll try to give you my take, but many would dispute it.

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.

[BWE]

Well, I'll try to give you my take, but many would dispute it.

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.

I think that is pretty uncontroversial isn't it? Or do you mean that thoughts are god-breathed or something as an alternative?

[Febble]

Well, I'll try to give you my take, but many would dispute it.

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.

I think that is pretty uncontroversial isn't it? Or do you mean that thoughts are god-breathed or something as an alternative?

Not so much controversial as deemed insufficient.

[dug_down_deep]

Thoughts are actions? If I think of what a pumpkin seed looks like, what action has failed to be executed?

[Febble]

Thoughts are actions? If I think of what a pumpkin seed looks like, what action has failed to be executed?

The action of looking at pumpkin seed.

[dug_down_deep]

Okay. What if I think through the solution to the Pythagorean equation for a given set of values?

[BWE]

Okay. What if I think through the solution to the Pythagorean equation for a given set of values?

did you solve it?

[dug_down_deep]

Is that an action? Maybe if I write it down.

[BWE]

Is that an action? Maybe if I write it down.

how is it not an action?

[Febble]

Okay. What if I think through the solution to the Pythagorean equation for a given set of values?

Well, the more abstract the thought processes, the more attenuated will be the connection with programs for action, and the more complex they will be. Figuring out an equation will be more complex than thinking about eating a peach.

But I suggest that the kinds of programs for action that you will use might include programs for making gestures and eye movements of of certain magnitude, programs to do with balance (right angles, particularly between horizontals and verticals, seem to be finely attuned to our sense of balance and stability), motor programs related to the enunciation of digits and times tables, programs associated with where you were and what you were doing when you learned Pythagoras's theorem etc.

[dug_down_deep]

Is that an action? Maybe if I write it down.

how is it not an action?
Action typically refers to physically enacted behaviors. You can go deep and talk about neural activity as those behaviors, but then you've obscured the distinction between the "circuitry that prepares us for action" and the action itself.

[dug_down_deep]

Well, the more abstract the thought processes, the more attenuated will be the connection with programs for action, and the more complex they will be. Figuring out an equation will be more complex than thinking about eating a peach.

But I suggest that the kinds of programs for action that you will use might include programs for making gestures and eye movements of of certain magnitude, programs to do with balance (right angles, particularly between horizontals and verticals, seem to be finely attuned to our sense of balance and stability), motor programs related to the enunciation of digits and times tables, programs associated with where you were and what you were doing when you learned Pythagoras's theorem etc.
Okay. I probably believe this.

[BWE]

Is that an action? Maybe if I write it down.

how is it not an action?
Action typically refers to physically enacted behaviors. You can go deep and talk about neural activity as those behaviors, but then you've obscured the distinction between the "circuitry that prepares us for action" and the action itself.

Hmmm. The reference was to consciousness as action. I personally think it's important to have a word, whether consciousness or some other word, to use as the emergent phenomenon of the actions in aggregate which febble refers to in her consciousness as a verb concept. I would use the word mind.

The one thing that explicitely doesn't work for me is trying to do away with the idea of a word for that emergent thing as a thing. All things are, at their core, emergent states. And while a living thing is alive, it has the emergent thing I called mind. If that word doesn't work for neuroscience, cool. I need a word for that.

The problem for me is what I see as a bizarre fixation on the idea of dualism. It is self-evident that organisms are machines and that what they do or states they are in are a result of the functioning of their parts. Dennett threw me for a loop because he spent the bulk of consciousness explained battling the demon of dualism in a way that made it totally obscure what he meant by dualism. What he meant was that in the old days before we knew about oxygen, their was an idea that doesn't fit with observation. Well, there were several.

Beginning with the understanding that life is the result of the functioning of the mechanics of the organism is really a given if you want to be consistent with observation. Dualism in the sense of a platonic soul or something like that apparently must have some educated adherents or people wouldn't get so excited about it but I think it's severely disruptive to the study of neuroscience or AI or any related topic to use so much caution to avoid dualistic language because it makes it impossible to see mind and brain as separate when clearly, a dead brain doesn't have mind.

But, I am pretty sure that I'm missing a central argument for platonic or maybe Cartesian dualism because I can't imagine a single element of it which could prove useful in investigating the mind or the brain. It seems like an impediment to creating a useful language for the study of the system. I've read Descartes many times and I see perfectly appropriate language for his time. We now have more data and the general schematic has been revised accordingly.

[BWE]

Maybe this is more concise. A computer doesn't have a word for the state of being 'on'. That is because it has the possibility of intermediate states of 'off'. Brains, assuming them to be very complex computers of some sort (which I have found no evidence to refute the idea so I'm going with it till contrary evidence arrives), do not turn 'off' more than once. They may hibernate or come very close to turning off but off itself is a one time deal.

Since 'on' is pretty much the only state brains have which generates mind or consciousness, that state is important enough to give the top level of the schematic. The description of the state of 'on' has a lot of variety between species or even within species. For that reason, since 'on' produces different results in different organisms, the schematic needs to build a slightly individual set of mechanics for each 'on' state individually based on a more general schematic of what is involved in being 'on'.

[dug_down_deep]

Hmmm. The reference was to consciousness as action.
The statement I was responding to was "thoughts are [...] unexecuted actions".

I personally think it's important to have a word, whether consciousness or some other word, to use as the emergent phenomenon of the actions in aggregate which febble refers to in her consciousness as a verb concept. I would use the word mind.

The one thing that explicitely doesn't work for me is trying to do away with the idea of a word for that emergent thing as a thing. All things are, at their core, emergent states. And while a living thing is alive, it has the emergent thing I called mind. If that word doesn't work for neuroscience, cool. I need a word for that.

The problem for me is what I see as a bizarre fixation on the idea of dualism. It is self-evident that organisms are machines and that what they do or states they are in are a result of the functioning of their parts. Dennett threw me for a loop because he spent the bulk of consciousness explained battling the demon of dualism in a way that made it totally obscure what he meant by dualism. What he meant was that in the old days before we knew about oxygen, their was an idea that doesn't fit with observation. Well, there were several.

Beginning with the understanding that life is the result of the functioning of the mechanics of the organism is really a given if you want to be consistent with observation. Dualism in the sense of a platonic soul or something like that apparently must have some educated adherents or people wouldn't get so excited about it but I think it's severely disruptive to the study of neuroscience or AI or any related topic to use so much caution to avoid dualistic language because it makes it impossible to see mind and brain as separate when clearly, a dead brain doesn't have mind.

But, I am pretty sure that I'm missing a central argument for platonic or maybe Cartesian dualism because I can't imagine a single element of it which could prove useful in investigating the mind or the brain. It seems like an impediment to creating a useful language for the study of the system. I've read Descartes many times and I see perfectly appropriate language for his time. We now have more data and the general schematic has been revised accordingly.
I can't imagine why a scientist would give a shit about philosophy at all, in the context of their research. Except maybe as a way of refining their questions and cutting out as many assumptions from their conclusions as possible. I think when a scientist approaches philosophy of mind, they tend to want to first just agree on a common metaphysics, and then leave the rest to them. Which isn't philosophy, I think, though it is probably a highly useful way of doing science.

[Febble]

Is that an action? Maybe if I write it down.

how is it not an action?
Action typically refers to physically enacted behaviors. You can go deep and talk about neural activity as those behaviors, but then you've obscured the distinction between the "circuitry that prepares us for action" and the action itself.

Well, not really. The "circuitry that prepares us for action" is, generally, the same circuitry (or includes the same circuitry) that triggers the action itself, just at a lower amplitude (e.g smaller population of neurons). When activity in the circuitry reaches a threshold (either size of population or duration) you get outflow to the muscles and start to an EMG signal if you have stuck appropriate electrodes on.

Below that threshold you might get competing programs laterally inhibiting each other, and keeping each other below execution threshold.

[dug_down_deep]

That's interesting, and I mean really interesting, but I still think that there's a blurring of the line between action and (this time) that which triggers action. I mean you can smear the whole thing together if you like - it's no problem with me, but it makes it a little unclear what you mean by the term 'action' then.

[BWE]

That's interesting, and I mean really interesting, but I still think that there's a blurring of the line between action and (this time) that which triggers action. I mean you can smear the whole thing together if you like - it's no problem with me, but it makes it a little unclear what you mean by the term 'action' then.

or 'thing'.

[Febble]

That's interesting, and I mean really interesting, but I still think that there's a blurring of the line between action and (this time) that which triggers action. I mean you can smear the whole thing together if you like - it's no problem with me, but it makes it a little unclear what you mean by the term 'action' then.

I mean doing something with your muscles.

I guess that I could stretch it a bit, or add to it: initiate physiological change. But that would still be a kind of preparation for action. To be specific, I think that the autonomic nervous system is crucial here, and although much of what it does is keep us going without our being conscious of it, much of what we are conscious of involves tuning the autonomic nervous system, and preparing us for "fight or flight" or "rest and digest".

[Garrett]

You could also try the following web page:

http://evanlouissheehan.home.comcast.net/~evanlouissheehan/Simplifying_Consciousness.htm


hmmm. I think there's a problem with this essay. Anyone else spot it?
The second paragraph made my eyes glaze over and my interest in Shehan's view subside. I have so many problems with that paragraph! He claims consciousness doesn't exist, then backpedals in an ambiguous and unenlightening fashion. Then he writes a blatantly false sentence (since there is overwhelming evidence that we have freedom of will). And he wraps up by implying that consciousness doesn't really exist ...because we have beliefs! As if beliefs weren't something known only to happen to conscious things.

[Garrett]

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.
Both requirements met by your personal computer.

Though, unexecuted actions aren't actions, so maybe I don't understand what you are trying to get at. But do you mean something like "the thought of doing something isn't the doing of that something"?

That would be true, but that thought itself is a bunch of (neurological) actions.

Why did those actions produce a conscious experience? That's the hard problem.

[BWE]

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.
Both requirements met by your personal computer.

Though, unexecuted actions aren't actions, so maybe I don't understand what you are trying to get at. But do you mean something like "the thought of doing something isn't the doing of that something"?

That would be true, but that thought itself is a bunch of (neurological) actions.

Why did those actions produce a conscious experience? That's the hard problem.

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.

Beyond that is all mental masturbation and religion so far. I have a feeling a new model will emerge as a framework to describe the discrete processes in the near future. though.:evil:

[premjan]

Maybe a computer has conscious experience. It doesn't make sense to assume that conscious experience includes volition for autonomous actions.

[BWE]

Maybe a computer has conscious experience. It doesn't make sense to assume that conscious experience includes volition for autonomous actions.

I'm thinking that you used a lot of ten dollar words there premjan. :)

Although I know each of the words individually, I can't put the predicate together with the subject in that sentence.

[premjan]

I mean, maybe the computer just behaves like a person in a coma - it is conscious but it can't tell us.

[Sam Hunter]

I mean, maybe the computer just behaves like a person in a coma - it is conscious but it can't tell us.

Perhaps I'm being thick, but what are you basing that on? And how would you test it?

[premjan]

On what are you basing the converse? Computers do information processing, and so do brains. The architecture is somewhat different. What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness? My guess is that it is nothing too special, though identifying exactly what facet it is may be tough. A computer has potentially the power of an insect brain though not the same connectivity.

[Sam Hunter]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

[BWE]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...
recursivity and loops. Read strange loop.

[premjan]

My personal opinion: consciousness is just what happens (is experienced) when you have information feedback. Perhaps if the feedback is composed of many self-similar parts it reinforces better (Hofstadter's strange loop idea). The feedback creates a persistent neural "state" which is known as "mind". It probably occurs in a very rudimentary form in very simple animals and a richer form in animals with large brains. In plants the feedback is perhaps not usually quick enough to perhaps maintain a state. In a computer, the consciousness is probably quite partitioned because of the way a CPU runs as opposed to a neuronal net. But some sort of computing network with information channels more resembling a brain would have comparable feeling of consciousness.

This is assuming that there isn't some woo or very extreme science involved like quantum computation.

Maybe a thermostat is a rudimentary consciousness. It is able to maintain state on the current ambient temperature and takes an action (turns a circuit on or off) if a threshold is crossed. It is sort of like a neuron in that respect. This is assuming some sort of energy is being expended in maintaining the temperature as an ambient state. If it is just a bimetallic strip that is bending I would not venture to call it conscious.

[Sam Hunter]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...
recursivity and loops. Read strange loop.

Yeah, gonna have to. Like my Amazon bill isn't large enough already... :)

[Sam Hunter]

My personal opinion: consciousness is just what happens (is experienced) when you have information feedback. Perhaps if the feedback is composed of many self-similar parts it reinforces better (Hofstadter's strange loop idea). The feedback creates a persistent neural "state" which is known as "mind". It probably occurs in a very rudimentary form in very simple animals and a richer form in animals with large brains. In plants the feedback is perhaps not usually quick enough to perhaps maintain a state. In a computer, the consciousness is probably quite partitioned because of the way a CPU runs as opposed to a neuronal net. But some sort of computing network with information channels more resembling a brain would have comparable feeling of consciousness.

This is assuming that there isn't some woo or very extreme science involved like quantum computation.

Maybe a thermostat is a rudimentary consciousness. It is able to maintain state on the current ambient temperature and takes an action (turns a circuit on or off) if a threshold is crossed. It is sort of like a neuron in that respect.

Ok...

Not sure that the speed of feedback would determine consciousness though. If Being A's thoughts are slow compared to Being B, then both would be conscious but they'd probably perceive time differently. I think... Hmm...

Wouldn't memory be more important, the ability to remember yesterday and learn by experience?

[premjan]

I think it isn't speed, but probably the ability to preserve live (and probably regularly refreshed) state - every time state is refreshed, there is a sensation of consciousness probably. If it is stateless, then it is just a bundle of instincts (a zombie?) rather than a mind. Yes, if it maintained state but reacted slowly it would just be a slow thinker. Memory would be pretty central. Though it doesn't have to be linear memory of the past, it could just be a cumulative state which is influenced by the past and the present. I think learning would be the next layer of behaviors. There's probably different ways to build up a creature - it could be an autonomous evolutionary agent like a person, or it could be maybe a passive problem-solving computer agent.

[Garrett]

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.
Both requirements met by your personal computer.

Though, unexecuted actions aren't actions, so maybe I don't understand what you are trying to get at. But do you mean something like "the thought of doing something isn't the doing of that something"?

That would be true, but that thought itself is a bunch of (neurological) actions.

Why did those actions produce a conscious experience? That's the hard problem.

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.
Our sun is full of recursivity and loops. So is our solar system, so is our ecosystem, so is any atom (or anything else!) in an environment.

Beyond that is all mental masturbation and religion so far.
You lost me. If the hard problem is resolved by invoking 'loops', then everything is conscious, and at every level (from atoms to galaxies and further in both directions), and (if that's the case then) that's just a brutal fact of reality. But that's not what you meant.

I have a feeling a new model will emerge as a framework to describe the discrete processes in the near future. though.:evil:
I hope so.

When it comes to explaining the existence of subjective experience, theistic models fail; so do materialistic models. We need a Rosetta Stone.

[Garrett]

Wouldn't memory be more important, the ability to remember yesterday and learn by experience?
You highlight the difference between the easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem.
Feedback loops produce 'consciousness' only if the potential for consciousness were present already. I bet you don't think your pc is conscious even though it's full of feedback loops and loaded with memory!

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

I used scare quotes because the word "consciousness' can refer either to the higher-level self-awareness I think you are meaning, or also to the basic awareness that I'm trying to talk about.

We have no idea why basic awareness (aka subjective experience) exists. That's why there's any issue at all.

[Rilx]

You could also try the following web page:
http://evanlouissheehan.home.comcast.net/~evanlouissheehan/Simplifying_Consciousness.htm

The links after the article tell that the author is a hardcore determinist with quite a curious worldview. I wouldn't strain my brains with his ideas.

[Febble]

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

Can you support this statement with a link or citation?

[Rilx]

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.
IMO, Chalmers' description of the hard problem is old and based on too general concepts, at least in the light of our present knowledge. It's no use to search "neural correlates of consciousness" as an interface between brains and mind. Though the interface definitionally exists, it is technically useless because it works only in the level of whole brains and whole mind.

Still I think that the "hard problem of consciousness" is a useful concept. We just must draw the borderline to another place. Garrett's distinction between basic awereness and high-level self-awareness points a good candidate, IMO.

I like a certain clear PC metaphor. First, brains and mind cannot be seen as hardware and software; brains is both, we cannot distinguish any hard-and software. Second, computers haven't evolved, they are designed and programmed, they are unconscious tools of their conscious programmers. So, there's the hard problem, between a computer and it's programmer. What it is and how the combination evolved?

The metaphor also points a couple of fallacies. Is the programmer a homunculus? If it is, then where it actually is? Or, are we born ready programmed? Are we just unconscious toys, Kens and Barbies of some Intelligent Designer? :)

[Febble]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self", and again, I'd say, that representation would take the form of programs for action.

But this is why I think it's important that we think in terms of "what is [whatever it is] conscious of?" Not only that, but "what is [whatever it is] conscious of NOW?"

That's why I like Susan Blackmore's image of the light-in-the-fridge. We tend to think of "self-conciousness" as a continuing property, rather than as a state. I think that's why there seems to be a Hard Problem. I don't think there is a Hard Problem, because if goes away if we frame the question the terms I suggest. And, pace Garrett, it doesn't leave anything out, because the "subjective" element is right there in the loop (not any loop, but the right loop).

[premjan]

You highlight the difference between the easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem.
Feedback loops produce 'consciousness' only if the potential for consciousness were present already. I bet you don't think your pc is conscious even though it's full of feedback loops and loaded with memory!
I don't know what the "potential for consciousness" is. Probably just one's imagination. Consciousness is probably episodic but repeatable. As it is mediated by the flow of ions in our brain it can't be entirely continuous.

[BWE]

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.
IMO, Chalmers' description of the hard problem is old and based on too general concepts, at least in the light of our present knowledge. It's no use to search "neural correlates of consciousness" as an interface between brains and mind. Though the interface definitionally exists, it is technically useless because it works only in the level of whole brains and whole mind.

Still I think that the "hard problem of consciousness" is a useful concept. We just must draw the borderline to another place. Garrett's distinction between basic awereness and high-level self-awareness points a good candidate, IMO.
I like the computer analogy sinc3e brains compute and, although the boundary between soft and hardware is more difficult to determine at this point, the idea of symbol use and various levels of programming are excellent metaphors. In this case, I think you framed this exactly right. The hard problem is at a certain programming language level. You can't know what your software is if you're looking at machine language.

I think the hard problem is linked to lower resolution functions of the brain, or a higher level view if you want to call it that. Or perhaps a higher recursive level.

I like a certain clear PC metaphor. First, brains and mind cannot be seen as hardware and software; brains is both, we cannot distinguish any hard-and software. Second, computers haven't evolved, they are designed and programmed, they are unconscious tools of their conscious programmers. So, there's the hard problem, between a computer and it's programmer. What it is and how the combination evolved?

The metaphor also points a couple of fallacies. Is the programmer a homunculus? If it is, then where it actually is? Or, are we born ready programmed? Are we just unconscious toys, Kens and Barbies of some Intelligent Designer? :)
You already said the programmer is evolution. According to Dembski, evolution fits the requirements for an intelligent designer. (Ask Febble for the link if you don't have it.)

[BWE]

I think that consciousness arises from the circuitry that prepares us for action. I think thoughts are, at their simplest, unexecuted actions that get recycled as input for further processing.
Both requirements met by your personal computer.

Though, unexecuted actions aren't actions, so maybe I don't understand what you are trying to get at. But do you mean something like "the thought of doing something isn't the doing of that something"?

That would be true, but that thought itself is a bunch of (neurological) actions.

Why did those actions produce a conscious experience? That's the hard problem.

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.
Our sun is full of recursivity and loops. So is our solar system, so is our ecosystem, so is any atom (or anything else!) in an environment.Ok. Entropy causes systems looking for stasis to loop eventually in the processes of energy input and output. Any system seeking stasis certainly has looping. The human organism is pretty well studied considering that science has only been around for a few hundred years. So far, all we can really talk about in terms of consciousness is organisms since that's all we've really studied.

Beyond that is all mental masturbation and religion so far.
You lost me. If the hard problem is resolved by invoking 'loops', then everything is conscious, and at every level (from atoms to galaxies and further in both directions), and (if that's the case then) that's just a brutal fact of reality. But that's not what you meant. Well. I suspect that there is something pretty important in the nature of computing itself, and that brains compute. but... er... I can't tell you if atoms or galaxies are conscious. From my level they aren't. Of course, an atom in my brain may not think of it's surroundings as part of a conscious entity either. We can't get too much outside our particular level of size before the big patterns are outside of normal observation.

I have a feeling a new model will emerge as a framework to describe the discrete processes in the near future. though.:evil:
I hope so.

When it comes to explaining the existence of subjective experience, theistic models fail; so do materialistic models. We need a Rosetta Stone.

I think materialistic models are still in their infancy but so far they have succeeded brilliantly. That's like saying materialistic models have failed to prolong human life to five hundred years on average. As of now, the machine language is being deciphered. That's a bloody hard way to figure out what the software is doing. But the advances are real. Self writing software that learns is tricky stuff. Impatience will have to wait in line with everyone else. :)

[dug_down_deep]

http://www.amazon.com/Blackwell-Companion-Consciousness-Max-Velmans/dp/1405160004

[Garrett]

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

Can you support this statement with a link or citation?
No. That isn't the sort of question tackled by neuroscience studies. My claim is based on logic and reason.

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?

[Garrett]

I think the hard problem as framed here is a moot point. It's probably a legitimate issue but in terms of what we actually can determine through observation, loops and recursivity seem to be enough to keep on truckin. :) i.e., they can account for the hard problem for the most part.
IMO, Chalmers' description of the hard problem is old and based on too general concepts, at least in the light of our present knowledge. It's no use to search "neural correlates of consciousness" as an interface between brains and mind. Though the interface definitionally exists, it is technically useless because it works only in the level of whole brains and whole mind.
Why does that make it 'technically useless'? Whole brains and whole minds exist and are somehow interconnected. I don't understand your objection.

[Garrett]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self", and again, I'd say, that representation would take the form of programs for action.
Easily programmed into your pc.

Despite lots of give and take, I don't know how you'd answer this: is your pc aware or conscious?

[premjan]

Impossible to confirm that any other individual is conscious.

[Garrett]

You highlight the difference between the easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem.
Feedback loops produce 'consciousness' only if the potential for consciousness were present already. I bet you don't think your pc is conscious even though it's full of feedback loops and loaded with memory!
I don't know what the "potential for consciousness" is. Probably just one's imagination. Consciousness is probably episodic but repeatable. As it is mediated by the flow of ions in our brain it can't be entirely continuous.
The phrase isn't complicated. I have no idea what your point is, nor how it relates to anything else. Your last sentence is especially puzzling. Just because a reductive approach eventually implicates a lack of continuity doesn't imply reality is non-continuous. And even if reality is skip-stepping around, that doesn't imply that self-awareness doesn't require awareness!

[Garrett]

Impossible to confirm that any other individual is conscious.
Bingo. We have no idea how to confirm whether bugs or stars feel anything. All neuroscientific studies are concerned only with higher-order self-awareness, we don't have any clue about how to stab at the hard problem of consciousness.

[Garrett]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self",...
Clearly you are talking about self-awareness. But that's not the hard problem, Lizzie.

We can learn everything about self-awareness and still have no clue why some clumps of matter are aware.

[BWE]

Impossible to confirm that any other individual is conscious.

heterophenomenology isn't a bad place to start though. And, you could always ask it. If you built the computer, you would know if it was programmed to trick you.

[Garrett]

So far, all we can really talk about in terms of consciousness is organisms since that's all we've really studied.
We have no idea how to tell whether other things are aware. That's why we haven't applied science to the question.

I think materialistic models are still in their infancy but so far they have succeeded brilliantly. That's like saying materialistic models have failed to prolong human life to five hundred years on average.
I agree with the first sentence, but the second sentence is illogical. Materialism has no coherent suggestion as to why some clumps of matter experience stuff. None. Even the most non-theistic totally-materialistic view can't say if bugs or stars feel anything. And we've studied bugs and stars a lot!

As of now, the machine language is being deciphered. That's a bloody hard way to figure out what the software is doing. But the advances are real. Self writing software that learns is tricky stuff. Impatience will have to wait in line with everyone else. :)
You're a bit of a geek, aren't you. :)

I'm okay with the idea that machine consciousness is possible. But apparently the best we can do is assume they are conscious, the more they act like us.

[BWE]

So far, all we can really talk about in terms of consciousness is organisms since that's all we've really studied.
We have no idea how to tell whether other things are aware. That's why we haven't applied science to the question.biology isn't doing something like that? Or by aware, do you mean aware.

I think materialistic models are still in their infancy but so far they have succeeded brilliantly. That's like saying materialistic models have failed to prolong human life to five hundred years on average.
I agree with the first sentence, but the second sentence is illogical. Materialism has no coherent suggestion as to why some clumps of matter experience stuff. None. Even the most non-theistic totally-materialistic view can't say if bugs or stars feel anything. And we've studied bugs and stars a lot!I'm thinking you are going to chase recursive levels or resolutions up to infinity. We are trapped in a universe which is defined by how much slower we move than light. The thermostat senses. How deep do you want to go? (are you relating that to the hard problem of why are we able to judge quality of awareness?)

As of now, the machine language is being deciphered. That's a bloody hard way to figure out what the software is doing. But the advances are real. Self writing software that learns is tricky stuff. Impatience will have to wait in line with everyone else. :)
You're a bit of a geek, aren't you. :)

I'm okay with the idea that machine consciousness is possible. But apparently the best we can do is assume they are conscious, the more they act like us.
I don't know if I'm a geek. I suppose that means I am. I really believe that we are close to a new schematic which will make the problem easier to pin down. As it is, it's very ephemeral. My belief is that once the question is asked correctly, the answer will be easy to see.

[Garrett]

So far, all we can really talk about in terms of consciousness is organisms since that's all we've really studied.
We have no idea how to tell whether other things are aware. That's why we haven't applied science to the question.biology isn't doing something like that?
Correct, but you knew that.

Or by aware, do you mean aware.
Italics affect emphasis, not definitions. I think. I wonder what you meant.

I don't know if I'm a geek. I suppose that means I am.
I didn't mean insult. On the contrary.

I really believe that we are close to a new schematic which will make the problem easier to pin down. As it is, it's very ephemeral. My belief is that once the question is asked correctly, the answer will be easy to see.
Why am I aware of my existence?

What else feels?

How can I ask those questions so that the answer is easy to see?

[BWE]

My suspicion is that those questions reflect a category error or two. But give research time to catch up. It will.

The italics were for emphasis not meaning. Aware is a thermostat. Aware of aware is a recursive loop. But I think both of those are asking the question from a fundamentally flawed position. I'm not exactly sure why I think that.

[Garrett]

My suspicion is that those questions reflect a category error or two. But give research time to catch up. It will.

The italics were for emphasis not meaning. Aware is a thermostat. Aware of aware is a recursive loop. But I think both of those are asking the question from a fundamentally flawed position. I'm not exactly sure why I think that.
You are a pantheist. Own it.

[BWE]

My suspicion is that those questions reflect a category error or two. But give research time to catch up. It will.

The italics were for emphasis not meaning. Aware is a thermostat. Aware of aware is a recursive loop. But I think both of those are asking the question from a fundamentally flawed position. I'm not exactly sure why I think that.
You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.

[Garrett]

My suspicion is that those questions reflect a category error or two. But give research time to catch up. It will.

The italics were for emphasis not meaning. Aware is a thermostat. Aware of aware is a recursive loop. But I think both of those are asking the question from a fundamentally flawed position. I'm not exactly sure why I think that.
You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.

[BWE]

You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.
I'm not sure of that. I think Dennett/hofstadter et. al. resolved it as stated. But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.

[Febble]

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

Can you support this statement with a link or citation?
No. That isn't the sort of question tackled by neuroscience studies. My claim is based on logic and reason.

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?

Well, I meant your claim that neuroscience assumes that subjective experience "already exists". Neuroscientists do not assume this, in my experience. They assume it has a findable neural substrate.



Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?

No indeed. But self-awareness is an additional winding of the loop - I'd say that representation of the self in relation to the landscape is the beginning of subjective experience, whether the self is recognised as a feature of that landscape or not.

[Febble]

Impossible to confirm that any other individual is conscious.

I don't think so. I think it is quite possible, although one could make errors when motor control is extremely limited.

[Febble]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self",...
Clearly you are talking about self-awareness. But that's not the hard problem, Lizzie.

We can learn everything about self-awareness and still have no clue why some clumps of matter are aware.

Well, as you know, Garrett, I disagree with you on that. I think we have some extremely good "clues" about why some clumps of matter are aware. And, as I've said before, we get the first clue when we ask "what is this clump of matter aware of?"

[Garrett]

You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.
I'm not sure of that. I think Dennett/hofstadter et. al. resolved it as stated. But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.
Bah.

Not relevant, but I just started Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Because I'm bored and the book was available. Since I'm the choir I hope to see a bit deeper into his points. I think Dennett is a jerk but that doesn't make his points wrong.

Anyway. No one has resolved the hard problem, so don't say otherwise without giving details. Please?

[Garrett]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self",...
Clearly you are talking about self-awareness. But that's not the hard problem, Lizzie.

We can learn everything about self-awareness and still have no clue why some clumps of matter are aware.

Well, as you know, Garrett, I disagree with you on that. I think we have some extremely good "clues" about why some clumps of matter are aware. And, as I've said before, we get the first clue when we ask "what is this clump of matter aware of?"
Your question presumes the very thing I claimed, and the very thing you just disagreed with.

[Garrett]

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

Can you support this statement with a link or citation?
No. That isn't the sort of question tackled by neuroscience studies. My claim is based on logic and reason.

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?

Well, I meant your claim that neuroscience assumes that subjective experience "already exists". Neuroscientists do not assume this, in my experience. They assume it has a findable neural substrate.
Citations? I think they look for substrates of higher-order consciousness. For example, think of the neuroscience involved in the Schiavo case.

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?
No indeed.
You just agreed that awareness can exist without self-awareness.

But self-awareness is an additional winding of the loop - I'd say that representation of the self in relation to the landscape is the beginning of subjective experience, whether the self is recognised as a feature of that landscape or not.
You just claimed that awareness cannot exist without self-awareness.

Citations?

[Valheru]

I would like to ask the question of whether there really is a difference between awareness and self-awareness?

If it is possible to state that, say, a slug is aware, then (as previously asked) what is it aware of?

If a slug's awareness is a function of internal stimuli reacting to external stimuli (and vice versa), then how does that differ from self-awareness? The slug is hungry, for example, and seeks food. Or the slug senses food, and consumes it because at some level it may have evolved to react in this manner because food might be scarce in future.

It's merely interconnected action and reaction, and the awareness of the slug is nothing but internal self-indulgence, if I could call it that. It's self-awareness.

Further up the complexity scale you have, say, a reindeer that flees from wolves. Why does it do this? It's obviously aware, and that awareness results in action that preserves the individual. That's self-awareness.

We are defining self-awareness as "the ability to recognise and think about self". That's perhaps a mistake, because the line between that and what the reindeer does, isn't clear at all. I personally think there's no difference, because I don't ascribe anything magical to consciousness, or mind or intelligence - it's biochemical in humans just like it is in slugs. It's just the complexity of the information processing that differs, and there can be no arbitrary line drawn because the complexity of information-processing follows a gradient all the way from bacteria to slugs to reindeer to humans.

At one stage I was tempted to ascribe it to the ability to store acquired information, i.e. memory. But even cats and dogs have memory (and there's evidence that much simpler creatures learn), and so the definition of mind and intelligence is blurred once again.

[Febble]

What is it about the brain that gives it consciousness?

I don't know. That's why I started this thread. I want to know how consciousness evolved.

Why do you think that computers could have coma consciousness? Is consciousness a matter of brain sophistication? If so, what's the minimum level of complexity required? Is that last question even valid? At what point does consciousness become self-awareness?

I have lots of questions, as you can see...

Well, I'm not sure there's a clear-cut "point" but it must begin, I'd say, by definition, with a representation of "self",...
Clearly you are talking about self-awareness. But that's not the hard problem, Lizzie.

We can learn everything about self-awareness and still have no clue why some clumps of matter are aware.

Well, as you know, Garrett, I disagree with you on that. I think we have some extremely good "clues" about why some clumps of matter are aware. And, as I've said before, we get the first clue when we ask "what is this clump of matter aware of?"
Your question presumes the very thing I claimed, and the very thing you just disagreed with.

I disagree that we have no clue as to why some clumps of matter are aware.

What assumptions have I made there? And no, I don't disagree with it. I agree with it. That's why I said it.

[Febble]

Neuroscience, which is strongly multi-disciplinary, has a lot to say about how 'consciousness' arises - but only by assuming subjective experience already exists!

Can you support this statement with a link or citation?
No. That isn't the sort of question tackled by neuroscience studies. My claim is based on logic and reason.

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?

Well, I meant your claim that neuroscience assumes that subjective experience "already exists". Neuroscientists do not assume this, in my experience. They assume it has a findable neural substrate.
Citations? I think they look for substrates of higher-order consciousness. For example, think of the neuroscience involved in the Schiavo case.

Well, there wasn't a lot of neuroscience there, just some good clinical neurology. I'm talking about research into the neural substrates of both awareness and higher order consciousness (I agree with you that there are different levels of awareness).

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?
No indeed.
You just agreed that awareness can exist without self-awareness.

Yes, I know I did. I agree with myself.

But self-awareness is an additional winding of the loop - I'd say that representation of the self in relation to the landscape is the beginning of subjective experience, whether the self is recognised as a feature of that landscape or not.
You just claimed that awareness cannot exist without self-awareness.

Citations?

Um, no, I didn't.

[Febble]

Ah, I think I see the problem. I mentioned "representation of self" as an important ingredient in awareness. I meant a neural representation. A thing can be represented neurally without us being aware of it. Our brains habitually represent things we are not aware of, at least in the sense I am using the word "represent" which is in terms of a neural firing pattern, mostly, I would argue, patterns that form programs-for-action.

[Notta]

This thread was split from Consciousness explanation found here (http://www.secularcafe.org/showthread.php?t=3283).

[Rilx]

I like the computer analogy since brains compute and, although the boundary between soft and hardware is more difficult to determine at this point, the idea of symbol use and various levels of programming are excellent metaphors. In this case, I think you framed this exactly right. The hard problem is at a certain programming language level. You can't know what your software is if you're looking at machine language.

I think the hard problem is linked to lower resolution functions of the brain, or a higher level view if you want to call it that. Or perhaps a higher recursive level.
Programming language levels are a sound metaphor to see the problem but how those "levels" emerged? They are neither recursive nor hierarchical, we can only say that they belong to different categories of meaning. I don't know any kind of analogy or metaphor to describe the relation of those categories. So, that makes a hard problem.
You already said the programmer is evolution.
Not really, sorry I wasn't clear enough. I meant that our brains contains hardware+software+programmer in an indistinguishable way. Brains are not a computer, they are a computer plus it's programmer, if that kind of metaphor makes sense any more.

[BWE]

I like the computer analogy since brains compute and, although the boundary between soft and hardware is more difficult to determine at this point, the idea of symbol use and various levels of programming are excellent metaphors. In this case, I think you framed this exactly right. The hard problem is at a certain programming language level. You can't know what your software is if you're looking at machine language.

I think the hard problem is linked to lower resolution functions of the brain, or a higher level view if you want to call it that. Or perhaps a higher recursive level.
Programming language levels are a sound metaphor to see the problem but how those "levels" emerged? They are neither recursive nor hierarchical, we can only say that they belong to different categories of meaning.
Wait, symbolic language isn't recursive? First, what are you defining as levels? I was talking about using symbols to manipulate information in a computer. Word is recursively within windows. In our brain, the operating system is petty well hard wired. We receive sense data and regulate our bodily functions right from the get go. Yes it can be improved but what levels do we have that aren't recursive, and I would probably add "And self referential."?


I don't know any kind of analogy or metaphor to describe the relation of those categories. So, that makes a hard problem.
You already said the programmer is evolution.
Not really, sorry I wasn't clear enough. I meant that our brains contains hardware+software+programmer in an indistinguishable way. Brains are not a computer, they are a computer plus it's programmer, if that kind of metaphor makes sense any more.
Not true. They are a computer programmed by evolution to learn.

[Rilx]

what levels do we have that aren't recursive, and I would probably add "And self referential."?
Metalevels; higher levels create representations of lower level representations. To describe the relation simply: higher level understands what lower level has learned. More about object and metalanguages here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/#ObjLanMet

I meant that our brains contains hardware+software+programmer in an indistinguishable way. Brains are not a computer, they are a computer plus it's programmer, if that kind of metaphor makes sense any more.
Not true. They are a computers programmed by evolution to learn :rolleyes:

Psst. Learning isn't our most amazing mental property. It's understanding. Have you tried to program understanding? ;)

[BWE]

what levels do we have that aren't recursive, and I would probably add "And self referential."?
Metalevels; higher levels create representations of lower level representations. To describe the relation simply: higher level understands what lower level has learned. More about object and metalanguages here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/#ObjLanMet

I meant that our brains contains hardware+software+programmer in an indistinguishable way. Brains are not a computer, they are a computer plus it's programmer, if that kind of metaphor makes sense any more.
Not true. They are a computers programmed by evolution to learn :rolleyes:

Psst. Learning isn't our most amazing mental property. It's understanding. Have you tried to program understanding? ;)
I'm not sure. I have programmed various modeling functions. My programming experience is pretty limited. I'm also pretty sure that I'm not understanding what you mean by understand. I would abstractly call that a function of creating symbols for lower level phenomena in reference to your link above. I think that's recursive. And self-referential. But I probably am missing your point.

[Garrett]

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?
No indeed.
You just agreed that awareness can exist without self-awareness.

Yes, I know I did. I agree with myself.
You agreed with me.

But self-awareness is an additional winding of the loop - I'd say that representation of the self in relation to the landscape is the beginning of subjective experience, whether the self is recognised as a feature of that landscape or not.
You just claimed that awareness cannot exist without self-awareness.

Um, no, I didn't.
You clearly said subjective experience begins when "that representation of the self in relation to the landscape" happens.

What the hell else would it be in relation to? The environment, of course (that's what the 'landscape' is!). You just said subjective experience requires self-awareness.

Clear as a bell you said that. And then you deny it. Weird.

[Garrett]

You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.
I'm not sure of that. I think Dennett/hofstadter et. al. resolved it as stated. But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.
I hadn't heard, glad you pointed it out. This is huge! So when do they get their Noble prizes?

We can tell now whether a bug or a star has feelings, thanks to Dennett/hofstadter et. al. !!! I am very excited. Point to the proof or just tell me: when you step on a bug does it experience pain? What sort of feelings does a star experience? What is it like to be an atom that collides with another atom or that loses an electron?

Why hasn't Dennett/hofstadter et. al.'s fantastic wonderful resolution made the news yet?

[Garrett]

Ah, I think I see the problem. I mentioned "representation of self" as an important ingredient in awareness.
Yeah you did.

I meant a neural representation. A thing can be represented neurally without us being aware of it.
Of course.

So now your view appears to be that although awareness can exist without self-awareness, there must be neural representation of "the self" in order for basic awareness to exist - but that neural representation of "the self" doesn't need to enter into the entity's awareness.

I'd ask for citations, but I know you have none.

Under your scheme, plants cannot feel anything since they have no neural feedback arrangement that would allow them to ever be aware of anything.

But a book containing a picture of that very book meets your requirement! Except it isn't made of neurons.


Febble, you show that the materialistic outlook when applied to the philosophy and science of mind doesn't make sense when looked at closely. Why is it so hard for materialists to accept that we haven't any idea why some clumps of matter are aware? We don't even have any idea whether only some clumps of matter are aware!

[Garrett]

But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.Why is chocolate purple?

There, I restated it and sure enough we get a different answer.

:p

I'm saying that squirming doesn't become you, you're better than that. Either you know of a solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness or you don't.

You don't, so just admit it. What are you afraid of, Mr christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic.

Would you lose your credentials?

[Febble]

Would you say that it is possible for an entity to have higher-order consciousness when it doesn't have subjective experiences? That is, can self-awareness be possible when awareness doesn't exist?
No indeed.
You just agreed that awareness can exist without self-awareness.

Yes, I know I did. I agree with myself.
You agreed with me.

But self-awareness is an additional winding of the loop - I'd say that representation of the self in relation to the landscape is the beginning of subjective experience, whether the self is recognised as a feature of that landscape or not.
You just claimed that awareness cannot exist without self-awareness.

Um, no, I didn't.
You clearly said subjective experience begins when "that representation of the self in relation to the landscape" happens.

What the hell else would it be in relation to? The environment, of course (that's what the 'landscape' is!). You just said subjective experience requires self-awareness.

Clear as a bell you said that. And then you deny it. Weird.

No, I didn't, as I explained in this post (http://secularcafe.org/showthread.php?p=69204&#post69204).

I am not using the word "representation" as a synonym for "awareness". I am talking about a neural representation, e.g. as part of a motor program.

[Febble]

Ah, I think I see the problem. I mentioned "representation of self" as an important ingredient in awareness.
Yeah you did.

I meant a neural representation. A thing can be represented neurally without us being aware of it.
Of course.

Ah, you did see that post. OK.

So now your view appears to be that although awareness can exist without self-awareness, there must be neural representation of "the self" in order for basic awareness to exist - but that neural representation of "the self" doesn't need to enter into the entity's awareness.

I'd ask for citations, but I know you have none.

I could give you any number of citations from the literature on body-centred reference frames. I think the problem here is that you think I am saying something more complicated than I am. Any organism that can steer itself must have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented. And, IMO, that is the beginning of awareness.

Under your scheme, plants cannot feel anything since they have no neural feedback arrangement that would allow them to ever be aware of anything.

Right.

But a book containing a picture of that very book meets your requirement! Except it isn't made of neurons.

Well, there isn't any feedback, in that example, is there? But it's an interesting example (one that Hofstadter likes to play with).

Febble, you show that the materialistic outlook when applied to the philosophy and science of mind doesn't make sense when looked at closely. Why is it so hard for materialists to accept that we haven't any idea why some clumps of matter are aware? We don't even have any idea whether only some clumps of matter are aware!

Because we do have lots of ideas! Why is it so hard for you to accept that we do?

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775). You may disagree with it (have you read it?) but to say that we have "no idea" is simply false. The neuroscience literature is full of "ideas", and very fruitful they have been too.

[Garrett]

Any organism that can steer itself must have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented. And, IMO, that is the beginning of awareness.
Guided missiles meet your requirement, except they aren't organisms. Do guided missiles have subjective experiences? If not, why not?

Single-celled organisms might use their flagella to steer themselves towards food - do they have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented?

Anyway, it still looks your opinion is that awareness can't exist until self-awareness happens. I realize you say the "representation of space in which the organism itself is represented" doesn't (iyo) have to enter into awareness - but that confirms my claim that the neuroscientific view of consciousness explains consciousness by assuming the existence of subjective experience!

The mere fact that an entity somehow includes a representation of itself doesn't imply that entity has subjective experiences. So how do you make the leap?


Under your scheme, plants cannot feel anything since they have no neural feedback arrangement that would allow them to ever be aware of anything.
Right.
It looks like you're saying that only entities with neurons can ever be aware. That rules out machine consciousness.

But a book containing a picture of that very book meets your requirement! Except it isn't made of neurons.

Well, there isn't any feedback, in that example, is there? But it's an interesting example (one that Hofstadter likes to play with).
Okay. So point a video camera at a mirror and feed the output to a larger screen behind the mirror. (I know Hofsadter played with video feedback a lot, I bet he did something like that already.)

So now the entity is a system including both feedback and a representation of self. Subjective experience ensues?

Febble, you show that the materialistic outlook when applied to the philosophy and science of mind doesn't make sense when looked at closely. Why is it so hard for materialists to accept that we haven't any idea why some clumps of matter are aware? We don't even have any idea whether only some clumps of matter are aware!

Because we do have lots of ideas! Why is it so hard for you to accept that we do?
Okay, I'll tighten it up a bit. Neither neuroscience nor science in general nor materialism has any idea that has been confirmed to explain the existence of subjective experience.

I know we have lots of ideas about it. But even if we limit ourselves to studying brains (cns) (which we KNOW can produce awareness and consciousness), all we have is a bunch of ideas (models of consciousness (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness)).

We've learned a lot about how consciousness works, but all that knowledge depends on the assumption that somehow the neural clumps produce awareness. Science doesn't try to explain why or how subjective experience exists because we have no idea how to tackle the question - the best we can do right now is try to understand the 'mechanisms' which we know are intimately associated with consciousness.

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775).
Haven't read that book. If the title were accurate, that is if the authors demonstrate how matter becomes imagination, the authors would get rewarded for solving the hardest problem ever conceived.

You're confirming my points! Science is silent here, the best we can do is get philosophical and wonder.

[Febble]

Any organism that can steer itself must have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented. And, IMO, that is the beginning of awareness.
Guided missiles meet your requirement, except they aren't organisms. Do guided missiles have subjective experiences? If not, why not?

Single-celled organisms might use their flagella to steer themselves towards food - do they have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented?

Anyway, it still looks your opinion is that awareness can't exist until self-awareness happens. I realize you say the "representation of space in which the organism itself is represented" doesn't (iyo) have to enter into awareness - but that confirms my claim that the neuroscientific view of consciousness explains consciousness by assuming the existence of subjective experience!

Well, no, it doesn't. I said nothing about anything "enter into awareness". I don't think "awareness" is something you, or anything "enter[s] into". I think it emerges.

The mere fact that an entity somehow includes a representation of itself doesn't imply that entity has subjective experiences. So how do you make the leap?

No, indeed. I said that was where we should start. I don't think "awareness", or "subjective experience" are binary states. I think they are emerge from processes, and fall on a continuum.

Under your scheme, plants cannot feel anything since they have no neural feedback arrangement that would allow them to ever be aware of anything.
Right.
It looks like you're saying that only entities with neurons can ever be aware. That rules out machine consciousness.

Well, the feedback needn't be actual neurons as found in terrestrial animals. Other systems might do the same trick, e.g. digital neurons.

But a book containing a picture of that very book meets your requirement! Except it isn't made of neurons.

Well, there isn't any feedback, in that example, is there? But it's an interesting example (one that Hofstadter likes to play with).
Okay. So point a video camera at a mirror and feed the output to a larger screen behind the mirror. (I know Hofsadter played with video feedback a lot, I bet he did something like that already.)

So now the entity is a system including both feedback and a representation of self. Subjective experience ensues?

Well, nothing that I'd want to give that term to. As I said, I think the important component is programs for action.

Febble, you show that the materialistic outlook when applied to the philosophy and science of mind doesn't make sense when looked at closely. Why is it so hard for materialists to accept that we haven't any idea why some clumps of matter are aware? We don't even have any idea whether [i]only some clumps of matter are aware!

Because we do have lots of ideas! Why is it so hard for you to accept that we do?
Okay, I'll tighten it up a bit. Neither neuroscience nor science in general nor materialism has any idea that has been confirmed to explain the existence of subjective experience.

Well, depends what you mean by "confirmed". Lots of confirmatory experiments have been done. But, as you know, all conclusions in science are provisional.

I know we have lots of ideas about it. But even if we limit ourselves to studying brains (cns) (which we KNOW can produce awareness and consciousness), all we have is a bunch of ideas (models of consciousness (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness)).

Well, we can make testable predictions from those ideas.

We've learned a lot about how consciousness works, but all that knowledge depends on the assumption that somehow the neural clumps produce awareness. Science doesn't try to explain why or how subjective experience exists because we have no idea how to tackle the question - the best we can do right now is try to understand the 'mechanisms' which we know are intimately associated with consciousness.

Yes, "science" does "try to explain why or how subjective experience exists". Rather successfully, IMO.

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775).
Haven't read that book. If the title were accurate, that is if the authors demonstrate how matter becomes imagination, the authors would get rewarded for solving the hardest problem ever conceived.

Well, that's not really how science works. The only reward we work for is publications. There are plenty of publications. Of course there is always the odd Nobel Prize, but Edelman already has one of those.

You're confirming my points! Science is silent here, the best we can do is get philosophical and wonder.

How on earth does citing a book in which "science" speaks on the subject, "confirm" that "science is silent"?

Perhaps you should read it :)

[Febble]

Incidentally, I'm not quite sure why this got split out to Philosophy. I'm not talking about philosophy, I'm talking about science, specifically, in Edelman's case, evolutionary science.

[BWE]

You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.
I'm not sure of that. I think Dennett/hofstadter et. al. resolved it as stated. But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.
I hadn't heard, glad you pointed it out. This is huge! So when do they get their Noble prizes?

We can tell now whether a bug or a star has feelings, thanks to Dennett/hofstadter et. al. !!! I am very excited. Point to the proof or just tell me: when you step on a bug does it experience pain? What sort of feelings does a star experience? What is it like to be an atom that collides with another atom or that loses an electron?

Why hasn't Dennett/hofstadter et. al.'s fantastic wonderful resolution made the news yet?
:) Hmmm. Well, In terms of the resolution offered by Hofstadter, the answer is pretty profound in itself but I'm not sure about nobels. The model of loops that a brain creates and integrates does have the hypothetical power to create a consciousness with a state of awareness which could resolve the hard problem described as subjective experience. It's kind of a letdown as a big thing though.

That's why I said that I think the question is poorly framed. The question of subjective experience is pretty much only definable for humans at scales close to ours, time and size scales that is. I think that the question is either cosmic in scale or one which needs to refer to patterns within the process that we call consciousness.

The Bayesian model which I think febble mentioned offers a unique way of going backward from a state and for designing ways to test various predictions of a looping model. Same too for me with Baars global workspace spotlight model although I think febble might not agree there.

At any rate, experiment and hypothesis need to agree. The problem of subjective awareness is confounded by the issue dennettt tried to address with heterophenomenology. Definitions go all to hell.

I am not arguing for or against a particular position BTW. Just that, in my current opinion, informed by some research but by no means exhaustive, the hard problem is a category error. I do think that we are very close to a new model which will allow the background shift necessary to reframe the hard problem into one that will make more sense. But that is my own opinion and I don't know if experts in the field would agree.

[BWE]

But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.Why is chocolate purple?

There, I restated it and sure enough we get a different answer.

:p

I'm saying that squirming doesn't become you, you're better than that. Either you know of a solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness or you don't.

You don't, so just admit it. What are you afraid of, Mr christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic.

Would you lose your credentials?
My credentials are in no danger since I issued them myself. I think the reason we have subjective experiences is because we have systems designed to monitor the outside world and systems designed to monitor those systems. That's pretty much it.

I think the larger question of what does monitoring the outside world at all mean is one which will provide a much richer answer than the hard problem.

[Garrett]

But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.Why is chocolate purple?

There, I restated it and sure enough we get a different answer.

:p

I'm saying that squirming doesn't become you, you're better than that. Either you know of a solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness or you don't.

You don't, so just admit it. What are you afraid of, Mr christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic.

Would you lose your credentials?
My credentials are in no danger since I issued them myself.
:)

I think the reason we have subjective experiences is because we have systems designed to monitor the outside world and systems designed to monitor those systems. That's pretty much it.
Then guided missiles have feelings.

People don't, since we weren't designed.

I think the larger question of what does monitoring the outside world at all mean is one which will provide a much richer answer than the hard problem.
Everything that exists monitors the outside world. You haven't a clue either, despite your self-contradictory self-labeling.

[Garrett]

You are a pantheist. Own it.

Where did I disown it? Labels would be great if people used them as approximations. I'm a christian/buddhist/atheist/materialist/pantheist/realist/dualist/monist/hopeless romantic. None of those conflict as long as you are willing to accept that evidence trumps assumptions.
You win.

The hard problem still stands though. As you know.
I'm not sure of that. I think Dennett/hofstadter et. al. resolved it as stated. But I think it could be restated in a way that forced a different answer.
I hadn't heard, glad you pointed it out. This is huge! So when do they get their Noble prizes?

We can tell now whether a bug or a star has feelings, thanks to Dennett/hofstadter et. al. !!! I am very excited. Point to the proof or just tell me: when you step on a bug does it experience pain? What sort of feelings does a star experience? What is it like to be an atom that collides with another atom or that loses an electron?

Why hasn't Dennett/hofstadter et. al.'s fantastic wonderful resolution made the news yet?
:) Hmmm. Well, In terms of the resolution offered by Hofstadter, the answer is pretty profound in itself but I'm not sure about nobels. The model of loops that a brain creates and integrates does have the hypothetical power to create a consciousness with a state of awareness which could resolve the hard problem described as subjective experience. It's kind of a letdown as a big thing though.
... oh sorry, I dozed off. Brains create loops therefore the hard problem is resolved? It's all so clear now, thx.

That's why I said that I think the question is poorly framed.
So frame it correctly already.

The question of subjective experience is pretty much only definable for humans at scales close to ours, time and size scales that is. I think that the question is either cosmic in scale or one which needs to refer to patterns within the process that we call consciousness.
Your first point is anthropomorphic, so it gets rejected. I guess your second point can't be rejected since it's so ambiguous.

The Bayesian model which I think febble mentioned offers a unique way of going backward from a state and for designing ways to test various predictions of a looping model. Same too for me with Baars global workspace spotlight model although I think febble might not agree there.
I'm just not up to your speed. I could talk with Yeshi if I wanted to feel too stupid to understand english anymore.

At any rate, experiment and hypothesis need to agree. The problem of subjective awareness is confounded by the issue dennettt tried to address with heterophenomenology. Definitions go all to hell.
Your last sentence is entirely unsupported.

Heterophenomenology is an obviously useful and obviously limited approach.

Your first sentence actually makes sense to me! I'm not at a dead stop maybe!

I am not arguing for or against a particular position BTW. Just that, in my current opinion, informed by some research but by no means exhaustive, the hard problem is a category error.
SO FUCKING IDENTIFY THAT CATEGORY ERROR.

I do think that we are very close to a new model which will allow the background shift necessary to reframe the hard problem into one that will make more sense. But that is my own opinion and I don't know if experts in the field would agree.
SO GIVE THE (approximate!) REFRAMING.

For some reason you are giving your salads to those who say there is a hard problem of consciousness but not to those who say there isn't, so I'm not buying your "I am not arguing for or against" bullshit. Take a stand and make a case, already.

[BWE]

jesus garrett. you are the one that posted the link to models of consciousness.

[Febble]

Any organism that can steer itself must have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented. And, IMO, that is the beginning of awareness.
Guided missiles meet your requirement, except they aren't organisms. Do guided missiles have subjective experiences? If not, why not?

Single-celled organisms might use their flagella to steer themselves towards food - do they have some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented?

Sorry, Garrett, I overlooked this part of your post.

Yes, single-celled organisms do have "some kind of representation of space in which the organism itself is represented". That's the beginning. I started a series in TR (http://www.talkrational.org/showthread.php?p=533848#post533848) (which, I'm ashamed to say, is still languishing) of critters that I suggested were one the road to awareness, and asked people to say when they thought one could reasonable say the critter was aware. I should continue it, but I'll post them here, as far as I got (this is why I wish this thread was still in the evolution section):

Crittera

OK, I'm going to do this in very short steps.

I'm starting from the idea that brains are decision-making machines, and that consciousness is about decision-making. We talk about making "a conscious decision", right?

First candidate for a decision-maker is piece of seaweed in a tidal estuary.

If the tide is coming in, it bends to the east. If the tide is going out, it bends to the west.

Is it making a decision about which way to bend? If not, why not?


Critterb

Or the point where we discover consciousness :DWe'll see :).

:)

Well, no, because sometimes the thermostat will be switched on at 23 degrees, and sometimes off. How does it decide/what decides it?Hysteresis would be one possibility. I'd need to know more about the on/off patterns of thermostats.

Sounds a bit complicated. My guess is that the biggest factor will be whether the temperature is rising or falling - it will probably tend to stay in ( "remember"?) it's current state until it hits the next threshold, plus there will be some randomness (let's stick with Newtonian randomness for now) to do with vibrations, passing cats, dust, etc.

So, a few more "degrees of freedom" in a sense - more inputs will determine whether it switches the heating on or off. The problem is that most of them are trivial - it doesn't matter to the switch whether it is on or off. Or not much. I guess it's possible that a thermostat that is mostly off might last longer than one that is mostly off.

But I wouldn't grant it much decision-making power. It's not much of an agent, just a middleman that translates an input (temperature) pretty direcly into an output.

OK, next candidate is a lot more complicated. It's a made-up organism, let's call it a one-celled organism. It needs food, and it needs to avoid being eaten.

It has a mechanism by which, if certain chemicals emanating from its predators permeates its membranes it wiggles its flagellum to the left to turn itself away; and, if a different chemical emanating from a food source permeates its membrane, it swims towards the source.

However, this organism is very well understood. Scientists know exactly what the chemical pathways are that trigger a left kick from the flagellum, and the chemical pathway that trigger a full-steam-ahead (I am making this up, I'd better remind you).

In fact, you could probably build one of these yourself.

So, does it decide to swim away from the predator and towards food? Or not?

Critterc

^Well, I'm going to keep going, because the whole point is to try to figure out when we reach the point at which we think the critter is "aware" of making a decision.

If we dismiss a priori systems that we think aren't "aware" then we won't find the point at which "awareness" starts to appear.

OK, here's my next candidate.

It is also a critter who needs to eat and avoid being eaten (a crucial and overlooked fundamental when it comes to thinking about the origins of consciousness, IMO).

However, evolution has ensured that it now has a mechanism by which it only responds to the chemicals from food that trigger forward movement if its energy stores are low. And so, if there are predator chemical inputs AND food chemical inputs, which way it waves its flagella will be depend on its energy levels. If its energy store is really low, then even if there are chemical inputs from predator sources, it will still swim towards food if there is food chemical input. So there are three variables that will determine its direction: strength of predator chemical input, tending to make it turn; strength of food chemical input, tending to make it carry on in the same direction; strength of energy stores, which modulates the second variable.

And we can now put this in higher-level terms.

If our critter isn't hungry, it will flee from a predator, and the nearer the predator, the faster it will flee, even if it can smell food. However, if it is really hungry, and it smells food, it will aim for the food, even if it can smell predators.

Is our critter making a decision? The output now depends not only on externa inputs but on an internal signal from its energy store.


Critterd



Is our critter making a decision? The output now depends not only on external inputs but on an internal signal from its energy store.I'd say critterc is making a decision if;

a) it is a calculated risk (element of uncertainty)
b) other such critters in the area choose differently (indicative of individuality)

I'm not sure if critterc meets those criteria. We'll see if critterd does.

OK, here is critterd

This critter has photosensitive cells, and they are arranged in a slight dish-shaped depression on the "front" of the critter, and its tail is at the back.

Because the light sensitive cells are in a slight depression, light from above will activate the lower cells, and from below will activate the higher cells; from the left will activate its right cells, and from the right will activate its left cells.

This means that the critter has advanced information (or "information" if you prefer) about what it may be about to meet - how large it is, and whether it is approaching or receding.

Like critterc, its "neurons" (this one is multicellular) are arranged in such a way that the hungrier it is, the more the neurons that react to signals that indicate a predator are inhibited by neurons that react to the proximity of food.

And the signals for both food and predator are now quite complex, which means that the network of neurons behave as a kind of Bayesian probability filter. A large approaching shape will trigger N shape neurons; if these are triggered, chemical "predator" signals will also be primed to trigger if "predator" chemicals arrive. However, if "predator" chemicals arrive but no large approaching shape is signalled, the "predator" chemical receptors don't fire.

And so on. I won't attempt to design the whole archecture, but, essentially, predator-fleeing activity in the tail is only initiated if a combination of signals are all incoming and reach some threshold, and that threshold is itself modulated by the degree of activity in the hunger-detectors, and by the degree of activity in the food detectors. A lot of the time, the critter has its tail neurons fluctuating below action threshold, depending on various signals including predator chemicals and shadows.

So again to put this in higher level terms: if the critter "sees" a shape that looks and sounds like it might be a predator, it may or may not flee, depending on how hungry it is, and whether it thinks it is "worth" exploring the food source it can detect in the offing. If it doesn't flee, it may remain "alert", with its tail just below flip threshold, ready to flee if the shadow gets any larger or darker.

Is this critter "aware" of "danger" in that state? Does it "experience" hunger? Does it "fear" a predator? Can it "desire" food so much it will "risk" danger to get it?

[Rilx]

Learning isn't our most amazing mental property. It's understanding. Have you tried to program understanding? ;)
I'm not sure. I have programmed various modeling functions. My programming experience is pretty limited. I'm also pretty sure that I'm not understanding what you mean by understand. I would abstractly call that a function of creating symbols for lower level phenomena in reference to your link above. I think that's recursive. And self-referential. But I probably am missing your point.
Take a well-known phrase "he can't see the forest for the trees". How "seeing" (in the sense of understanding) the forest emerges from "seeing" (in the sense of experiencing) trees? The phrase definitely implies that forest is not the sum of the trees but something else which cannot be produced by logic (e.g. by recursion or self-reference). That's why I think brains are not a computer. Even though brains do computing, something more is necessary.

[Rilx]

IMO, Chalmers' description of the hard problem is old and based on too general concepts, at least in the light of our present knowledge. It's no use to search "neural correlates of consciousness" as an interface between brains and mind. Though the interface definitionally exists, it is technically useless because it works only in the level of whole brains and whole mind.
Why does that make it 'technically useless'? Whole brains and whole minds exist and are somehow interconnected. I don't understand your objection.
I mean that brain-interface-mind model is a fruitless premise. Since Descartes and his pineal gland interface people have wasted much time trying to fit empirical data in the model. It's more burden than help.

When HPoC is some day solved, the interface can be defined - if someone is still interested.

[Rilx]

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775).
Haven't read that book. If the title were accurate, that is if the authors demonstrate how matter becomes imagination, the authors would get rewarded for solving the hardest problem ever conceived.
I've read the book and I really recommend it to you - I mean especially to you, Garrett. I think you'd like their style. They definitely don't claim they had solved the HPoC. And the Dynamic Core Hypothesis which they have developed to explain consciousness is throughout the book considered a hypothesis, not a theory.

[Febble]

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775).
Haven't read that book. If the title were accurate, that is if the authors demonstrate how matter becomes imagination, the authors would get rewarded for solving the hardest problem ever conceived.
I've read the book and I really recommend it to you - I mean especially to you, Garrett. I think you'd like their style. They definitely don't claim they had solved the HPoC. And the Dynamic Core Hypothesis which they have developed to explain consciousness is throughout the book considered a hypothesis, not a theory.

Well, no, they don't claimed to have solved the "HPoC". What they have done is to demonstrate how conciousness might arise. In other words, render the HPoC not H.

If we insist that it is H, we won't "solve" it. But we are in a double bind here because any proposed solution is claimed to be merely the solution to the Easy problem. But if a solution to the Easy problem exists, then the problem is no longer Hard. Even if the solution isn't entirely correct.

[Febble]

Take Edelman and Tononi's book title: A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775).
Haven't read that book. If the title were accurate, that is if the authors demonstrate how matter becomes imagination, the authors would get rewarded for solving the hardest problem ever conceived.
I've read the book and I really recommend it to you - I mean especially to you, Garrett. I think you'd like their style. They definitely don't claim they had solved the HPoC. And the Dynamic Core Hypothesis which they have developed to explain consciousness is throughout the book considered a hypothesis, not a theory.

Well, theory and hypothesis have overlapping meanings. I'd call theirs a theory, but from it we can derive testable hypotheses, which are currently being tested.

[Rilx]

If we insist that it is H, we won't "solve" it.
It's a question of definition, IMO. If you define "Hard" as "insoluble", yes, then the solution is definitonally excluded. I don't think that way - I've used "hard" and "easy" only as classifications - problems may belong to "hard" or "easy" classes but all are soluble.

HPoC may be insoluble if it must be solved by Chalmers' expectations. If that was the rule, most problems would be insoluble.

[BWE]

I am not arguing for or against a particular position BTW. Just that, in my current opinion, informed by some research but by no means exhaustive, the hard problem is a category error.
SO FUCKING IDENTIFY THAT CATEGORY ERROR. We are trying to use the idea of the computer and the idea of the on state as equivalent.

[dug_down_deep]

If you accept that objective description is a subset of subjective experience, the hard problem resolves into a merely technical problem. In my view, it is this dualist assumption that there is a god's-point-of-view separate from subjective experience that causes most of the confusion. If a process can be described whereby being conscious is dependent upon some system of physical states and structures, then we're done. Philosophy be damned.

Chalmers is a closet materialist, is what I'm trying to say. Idealism ftw.

[BWE]

If you accept that objective description is a subset of subjective experience, the hard problem resolves into a merely technical problem. Merely? I think this is where the really interesting beginning of E.O. Wilson's idea of consilience will happen. This is where the science will get brand new.

In my view, it is this dualist assumption that there is a god's-point-of-view separate from subjective experience that causes most of the confusion. If a process can be described whereby being conscious is dependent upon some system of physical states and structures, then we're done. Philosophy be damned.

Chalmers is a closet materialist, is what I'm trying to say. Idealism ftw.

Is that what the dualist assumption is? I honestly can't figure out what it is. It bothers me some too because I think that the dennett style refutation of dualism inexplicably closes the door on the idea of being able to describe the state separately from the machine. IMO, that is the only reason that the hard problem (subjective experience) is even a question. The emergent state of the functioning system is not the system and trying to equate the two allows for stupid things like the idea of Cartesian dualism. I can't imagine an educated position that could actually make use of Cartesian dualism.

But to equate the 'on' state with the 'computer' state is simply confounding.

[dug_down_deep]

I don't think it's that easy. Consciousness is special. There is no other state of any other type of machine that is exclusively known to the machine.

[BWE]

I don't think it's that easy. Consciousness is special. There is no other state of any other type of machine that is exclusively known to the machine.

I don't think that is easy. And I don't think it is known to the machine.

[dug_down_deep]

Merely?
Not a metaphysical question, is what I mean. ...is what anyone means when they refer to the 'easy' problems. No one thinks they're truly easy, or uninteresting.

[dug_down_deep]

I don't think it's that easy. Consciousness is special. There is no other state of any other type of machine that is exclusively known to the machine.

I don't think that is easy. And I don't think it is known to the machine.
You lost me. I know how the flower smells to me. You don't. Probe me all you want, and you still won't. That's what I meant.

[BWE]

I don't think it's that easy. Consciousness is special. There is no other state of any other type of machine that is exclusively known to the machine.

I don't think that is easy. And I don't think it is known to the machine.
You lost me. I know how the flower smells to me. You don't. Probe me all you want, and you still won't. That's what I meant.

I will, however, be able to probe you and see which receptors in your olfactory system align with which particles and which neurons are triggered. Which, if the hard problem is meaningful at all, means that the individual descriptions aren't really differences so much as poor data.

[dug_down_deep]

Yeah, but it's not like you can get that data if you use a better tool.

[BWE]

Yeah, but it's not like you can get that data if you use a better tool.

Which leads to what I suspect is a category error when we use the word 'self'.

[dug_down_deep]

How so?

[BWE]

You aren't asking the machine, you are asking the state 'on'.

[dug_down_deep]

Yeah, but we're always asking the state 'on'. About everything. Birds, bees, the sky, the trees...

[BWE]

Well, you can't ask a city a question, nor an anthill. Maybe because the language is unknown. Regardless, assuming that the hard problem is a hard problem assumes that the state 'computer' is equivalent to the state 'on'.

[dug_down_deep]

I still don't see how. The property dualist says that there is the computer in the state of 'on', and there is the experience of being on. And that there is no way to get from one to the other. I think it is a false criticism to say that they see the two as the same thing.

They may have expectations that are unrealistic, though. I can see that.

[BWE]

I still don't see how. The property dualist says that there is the computer in the state of 'on', and there is the experience of being on. And that there is no way to get from one to the other. I think it is a false criticism to say that they see the two as the same thing.

They may have expectations that are unrealistic, though. I can see that.

I have read an awful lot of crap regarding dualism by its critics but I have yet to read anything consistent with observation by a proponent so I'm not sure what use the idea has at all. AFAICT, Dennett's critique is of a strawman that hasn't much existed for over a hundred years.

In terms of unrealistic expectations, that's exactly what I mean. I think there is a state of 'computer' and a state of 'computer on'. I think that the idea of loops does just fine with why the state 'computer on' has the experience of 'computer on'.

But the serious monist camp appears to refute the idea that what we call the state 'computer' is different qualitatively from what we call the state of 'computer on'. They are not the same, they certainly loop and there is a definite recursion but they are not the same thing. It's as if the idea of slow action is real in that it is concrete and fast action is not because we can't see it or touch it.

[dug_down_deep]

I have read an awful lot of crap regarding dualism by its critics but I have yet to read anything consistent with observation by a proponent so I'm not sure what use the idea has at all.
Have you read the Chalmers book yet? It's not fair to ask what use the idea has, though. It doesn't need to have a use. It's an idea about what is.

AFAICT, Dennett's critique is of a strawman that hasn't much existed for over a hundred years.
Yes, I think that materialists don't get the question, for the most part. So they mistake it for another question.

In terms of unrealistic expectations, that's exactly what I mean. I think there is a state of 'computer' and a state of 'computer on'. I think that the idea of loops does just fine with why the state 'computer on' has the experience of 'computer on'.
Because awareness of awareness constitutes experience? Maybe, but we need a whole theory to expand upon this. It's not something you can shrug off just by introducing the idea of loops. Because there are lots of loops in nature. Only a special variety is producing consciousness.

But the serious monist camp appears to refute the idea that what we call the state 'computer' is different qualitatively from what we call the state of 'computer on'. They are not the same, they certainly loop and there is a definite recursion but they are not the same thing. It's as if the idea of slow action is real in that it is concrete and fast action is not because we can't see it or touch it.
That's the eliminative reductionist camp I think you're referring to. That may be a strawman, too, though. It's funny how the bad guys are always characterized as obsolete thinkers.

[BWE]

I have not read chalmers' book. I have read quite a few essays by chalmers on the topic though and I've read several critiques.

This essay seemed to be enough that I thought I understood what he was getting at:
http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

I had to laugh when I read the eliminative reductionist camp

too many titles and each idea bleeds a bit into others.

But the reason I think it's a category error, and why loops is enough as Chalmers explains it in the essay I linked above, is that it asks why experience is experience. The reason it seems like a question is because it's allowing us to slip back and forth between the 'computer' state and the 'computer on' state. Neuroscience is trying to figure out what is involved when the 'computer' state produces the 'computer on' state. To ask neuroscience to provide higher level answers about the 'computer on' state is making a category error.

I think there will be a reframing of the question in the near future, as soon as neuroscience catches up with a mapping of brain function, which will make it a scientific question and one whose experimental tests probe into a more complicated question than chalmers' but one which is probably getting at the same issue without the category error. At this point, I'd run off into speculationville so I'll leave it there.

[dug_down_deep]

I think we were already there. If the basic question doesn't have an answer yet, then we shouldn't fool ourselves that we're doing anything but speculating.

[BWE]

Well, we're already there if I'm wrong.

Which, admittedly is a tough thing to prove, one way or the other.

[Valheru]

Comparisons between computers and biological neural nets are flawed from the outset.

Computers process data in a fixed way, that is constrained by the design of the software. Sure, processing can (and is) modified by the data that is being processed, but there is still a limit on this variability that is a based on a fundamental constraint of how the system is programmed.

That's the difference between hardware and meatware - In hardware, there is a wall that separates logic and data. The wall may be semi-permeable depending on how cleverly the system is written, but with meatware, this distinction is almost removed. In a brain, the data IS the the logic, and the logic IS the data. Modifying the data means modifying the fundamental "algorithm" (it's a bad term to substitute with but it's the best I can come up with).

Most AI research revolves around removing this barrier and emulating combined data + logic with the actual architecture underlying the system being abstracted. Neural networks, for instance. The disadvantage of this approach though, lies in our limited current tech that puts a constraint on the complexity of the network. That's not to say it's impossible, but developing anything like an emergent collective in hardware simply won't happen unless we fundamentally redesign the way we build processing networks.

If you have a thousand overlapping nodes (neurons) interconnected with each other with, say, 5 edges (dendrites) each, you have a network of (1000^5 + 1000^4 + 1000^3 + 1000^2 + 1000) possible interactions for any single neural pulse. Emulating a cascade of pulses with even a vector supercomputer is simply intractable. Meatware simply develops this from conception and by virtue of the processing being represented by a physical structure, there is no constraint on the speed or complexity of the cascade beyond the physical chemical limits imposed by neurotransmission and the number of neurons available.

The magic of meatware is how it's both feedforward and feedback-based, how it's able to appropriate (or discard) extra pathways, and how different functionality is able to emerge from seemingly identical collections of nodes. Neural plasticity is built-in, and it just works without us having any idea how.

Magic.

[RexT]

critterd
Is this critter "aware" of "danger" in that state? Does it "experience" hunger? Does it "fear" a predator? Can it "desire" food so much it will "risk" danger to get it?

As I was reading your description of critterd I kept being reminded of little "thermostats" being triggered (or near the tipping point). Then I thought of how those same kind of "thermostats" get activated in me.

In a rudimentary sense, it is reasonable to speak of the collective of "thermostats" as "micro decisions". But do I think that critterd is conscious? Not quite. Not if it means conscious as I am conscious. But I know that you will keep increasing the complexity of critters until at last you get to critterhuman, at which point I'll have no choice but to agree that it is conscious.

So you are talking about degrees of consciousness rather than emergence of consciousness, I think. I suspect that degrees over a spectrum of consciousness is a more accurate description than consciousness as something that suddenly bursts into being or emerges. Emergence seems to better describe something that is unique and unpredictable.