Defend your Metaethics

[Danhalen]

Many of us use the moral terms 'good' and 'bad' without thinking about what we mean when we use them. I would like to discuss one of the more basic problems of metaethics: the epistemology of morality. If you have an answer to any of the following questions, please provide it along with your justification for believing as you do. If you can think of any other questions, please ask them as well.

Are we describing a quality in the thing we are speaking about when we use the terms 'good' or 'bad'? Is the use of either term prescriptive of how we want others to act when presented with a certain state of affairs? Can moral language be analyzed in terms of truth or falsity? Are moral qualities natural or non-natural? Is it possible to have a coherent analysis of moral language without having an answer to these questions?

[Pandora]

Tough questions, but I'll give it a go.

First some background: when I discuss morality, I'm discussing actions. Any particular object or thing has no specific moral value, it is how it is used that determines the effect. I might on occasion use shorthand and refer to a person as being immoral... but in truth I actually mean that the net balance of their actions are immoral. I also generally think of morality in terms of a prohibited-permitted scale; very little, if anything, is obligatory. I tend to take the view that actions are permitted unless specifically prohibited. I also tend to have a very limited set of prohibited actions, and those actions are by my standards absolute in their moral value. I view morality as being something like a number scale. Immoral actions are on the negative side of the scale. Everything else is on the positive side. But the reasons and the circumstances surrounding the decision to act affect the value of the action, and can conceivably bring an immoral act to a net value of zero in some cases. So murder is negative - it's immoral. Murdering a child at random might get a value of -100, as there's no good reason or extenuating circumstances for the act. Murdering Hitler, however, might bring you up to 0 ;).

With that in mind.... I don't think I'm ever describing a quality of a thing when I use the terms good or bad. I'm generally describing the effect of the outcome of an action. Furthermore, I'm describing the usual outcome. As mentioned, extenuating circumstances might negate a fair bit of the immorality of an act, but if the act usually results in negative net outcomes, it is immoral.

I view the terms as generally being either prohibitive or recommended. Very little is prescriptive in my view.

I don't know if truth of falsity really come in to play in discussions of morality. I suppose if you approached it just right, they might work. I'm not too clear on where you're going with this - care to expand on it?

[Danhalen]

The background information was very useful. It certainly makes my follow up questions easier to ask.

With that in mind.... I don't think I'm ever describing a quality of a thing when I use the terms good or bad. I'm generally describing the effect of the outcome of an action. Furthermore, I'm describing the usual outcome. As mentioned, extenuating circumstances might negate a fair bit of the immorality of an act, but if the act usually results in negative net outcomes, it is immoral.I used the term 'thing' becuse it is metaphysically neutral. Effects are things for the purposes of this discussion. What do you define as an "... effect of the outcome of an action"? I'm curious because I need to know how you can be aware of it.

I view the terms as generally being either prohibitive or recommended. Very little is prescriptive in my view.If you are prohibiting or recommending, then you are prescribing. At the very least, you are expressing desirable outcomes.

I don't know if truth of falsity really come in to play in discussions of morality. I suppose if you approached it just right, they might work. I'm not too clear on where you're going with this - care to expand on it?I'm asking whether moral language is subject to logical anaysis (e.g. is "deception is bad" either true or false as a moral claim).

[Pandora]

The background information was very useful. It certainly makes my follow up questions easier to ask.

With that in mind.... I don't think I'm ever describing a quality of a thing when I use the terms good or bad. I'm generally describing the effect of the outcome of an action. Furthermore, I'm describing the usual outcome. As mentioned, extenuating circumstances might negate a fair bit of the immorality of an act, but if the act usually results in negative net outcomes, it is immoral.I used the term 'thing' becuse it is metaphysically neutral. Effects are things for the purposes of this discussion. What do you define as an "... effect of the outcome of an action"? I'm curious because I need to know how you can be aware of it.
As a general thing, Murder is immoral - the net impact of murder to all players is bad - it reduces trust, reduces social cohesion, erodes connections, etc. It directly causes harm to both the individual who was murdered and to other actors in that social group. I tend to approach it form a more tribal, kind of evolutionary viewpoint. Does that help?


I view the terms as generally being either prohibitive or recommended. Very little is prescriptive in my view.If you are prohibiting or recommending, then you are prescribing. At the very least, you are expressing desirable outcomes.
I suppose I was reading "prescriptive" as defining what one must do - in other words obligatory actions.

I don't know if truth of falsity really come in to play in discussions of morality. I suppose if you approached it just right, they might work. I'm not too clear on where you're going with this - care to expand on it?I'm asking whether moral language is subject to logical anaysis (e.g. is "deception is bad" either true or false as a moral claim).
Under my view of morality, you can use logical analysis on the "sign" of the action. Murder is bad, Theft is bad, Fraud is bad, Violence as used by the aggressor is bad. It's a fairly short list. Circumstances can mediate the magnitude of it, and at best negate it.

I understand, however, that most other people don't view morality in the same sort of vector format that I do, so most of them won't agree on this point ;).

[His Noodly Appendage]

As far is I can see, good, bad, should and shouldn't refer simply to the approval of the speaker.

Some speakers base that approval around least-harm, some around virtue ethics, some around divine command, some are just plain fucked up. But I think it would be missing the point entirely to state that those heuristics themselves are morality.

[David B]

Many of us use the moral terms 'good' and 'bad' without thinking about what we mean when we use them. I would like to discuss one of the more basic problems of metaethics: the epistemology of morality. If you have an answer to any of the following questions, please provide it along with your justification for believing as you do. If you can think of any other questions, please ask them as well.

Well, I'm half way down the bottle, with corresponding lack of inhibition, so I'll have a go:)

Are we describing a quality in the thing we are speaking about when we use the terms 'good' or 'bad'?

Depends what is meant by 'quality in a thing', for a start. Secondly, I see the terms 'good' and 'bad' as being inherently fuzzy, though not so fuzzy as to render them meaningless.

Is the use of either term prescriptive of how we want others to act when presented with a certain state of affairs?

Not necessarily. When faced with a moral dilemma, I'd suggest that we can see both good and bad potential results of a number of potential ways of deciding how one should react to a situation, and, by extension, how one thinks other people should react to a situation.

Can moral language be analyzed in terms of truth or falsity?

Examples, please.

Are moral qualities natural or non-natural?

Natural, in my metaphysics, in which there is nothing supernatural.

Is it possible to have a coherent analysis of moral language without having an answer to these questions?

Without having clear answers, yes.

Except, I think, for those people who view morals as being god given absolutes from scripture, what I see most people as doing when they make morals decisions is to subconsciously assess, more or less well, what is a sort of linear programming best decision faced with conflicting desiderata and conflicting possible courses of action.

'Good' in the context of making a moral decision is some fuzzy quality that is somewhere around a linear programming type optimum response faced with conflicting desiderata, 'Bad' something far away from such an optimum.

David

[Preno]

My metaethics is basically negative: there is nothing particularly special about moral language and there is no need to have a special position on it (the fact/value dichotomy is overstated). So my position on ethics is essentially the same as my philosophy of language in general: epistemologically antifoundationalist (no set of basic principles from which we derive all others, everything potentially subject to local revision), semantically inferentialist (meaning is determined by the norms of use - rather than, say, reference or reference in 'possible worlds' - specifically by the broadly inferential norms). It's also pluralist in that it seems possible to rationally disagree about morality.

The fact that this sort of framework applies doesn't require some sort of unnatural ad hoc modifications when it comes to morality is imo evidence in support of this type of account.
Are we describing a quality in the thing we are speaking about when we use the terms 'good' or 'bad'?Don't understand the question. I suppose the answer hinges on the definition of "quality", which I'm not really concerned with.
Is the use of either term prescriptive of how we want others to act when presented with a certain state of affairs?You're conflating different things now. "Prescriptive of how we want others to act" makes no sense. It may be descriptive of how we want others to act or prescriptive of how others should act (it could also be prescriptive of how we should want others to act, but I assume you have the second alternative in mind).
Can moral language be analyzed in terms of truth or falsity?Insofar as the rest of language can, yes. Since asserting that a statement is true is the same asserting the statement itself, this isn't really a philosophical problem. If you mean whether they act truth-functionally under composition, they do so no more and no less than other statements.
Are moral qualities natural or non-natural?Don't understand the term, don't think it's meaningful (except, I guess, when it means something like "mythological" vs. "non-mythological").
Is it possible to have a coherent analysis of moral language without having an answer to these questions?It would be difficult to have an analysis of moral language without settling on the role of truth in our account. Other than that, sure.

[Danhalen]

As a general thing, Murder is immoral - the net impact of murder to all players is bad - it reduces trust, reduces social cohesion, erodes connections, etc. It directly causes harm to both the individual who was murdered and to other actors in that social group. I tend to approach it form a more tribal, kind of evolutionary viewpoint. Does that help?Am I correct in claiming that, for you, good is that which is beneficial in a social and evolutionary context, and bad is that which is harmful in a social and evolutionary context?

I suppose I was reading "prescriptive" as defining what one must do - in other words obligatory actions.I suppose I should be more clear. I was referring to A. J. Ayer's prescriptivism in moral language. His basic contention was that to say something is good is to say "I like this and you really ought to as well." There is an obligation implied by the speaker, but the listener may not feel the obligation.

Under my view of morality, you can use logical analysis on the "sign" of the action. Murder is bad, Theft is bad, Fraud is bad, Violence as used by the aggressor is bad. It's a fairly short list. Circumstances can mediate the magnitude of it, and at best negate it.I am going to try and paraphrase your position. Whether or not it is true or false that moral action X is good is contingent upon a complete contextual analysis of the given state of affairs. Moral facts do exist in some sense under your metaethics.

I understand, however, that most other people don't view morality in the same sort of vector format that I do, so most of them won't agree on this point ;).I think a lot more people share your beliefs than you think.

[Danhalen]

As far is I can see, good, bad, should and shouldn't refer simply to the approval of the speaker.

Some speakers base that approval around least-harm, some around virtue ethics, some around divine command, some are just plain fucked up. But I think it would be missing the point entirely to state that those heuristics themselves are morality.I am looking more for the assumptions we use to justify our first order ethics: consequentialism, deontology, virtue et al. For example, I may say that the good is defined in terms of that which causes the least harm, but how do I determine that it is good?

[Danhalen]

Depends what is meant by 'quality in a thing', for a start. Secondly, I see the terms 'good' and 'bad' as being inherently fuzzy, though not so fuzzy as to render them meaningless.I think I should have said "quality of a thing." The question is really whether or not moral qualities are properly used as predicates.

Not necessarily. When faced with a moral dilemma, I'd suggest that we can see both good and bad potential results of a number of potential ways of deciding how one should react to a situation, and, by extension, how one thinks other people should react to a situation.I am falling prey to my own sloppy use of language. What I mean by prescriptive use of moral language is that 'good' means 'I think you ought to want to do this because I think it should be done.'

Examples, please.The question is whether or not moral arguments are factual.

Natural, in my metaphysics, in which there is nothing supernatural.If moral qualities are simply linguistic devices we use to describe the world in moral terms then they don't really exist and are neither natural nor supernatural. Or is your position that of the reductionist?

Without having clear answers, yes.

Except, I think, for those people who view morals as being god given absolutes from scripture, what I see most people as doing when they make morals decisions is to subconsciously assess, more or less well, what is a sort of linear programming best decision faced with conflicting desiderata and conflicting possible courses of action.

'Good' in the context of making a moral decision is some fuzzy quality that is somewhere around a linear programming type optimum response faced with conflicting desiderata, 'Bad' something far away from such an optimum.How do you account for those who do see good and bad in terms of absolutes?

[Danhalen]

My metaethics is basically negative: there is nothing particularly special about moral language and there is no need to have a special position on it (the fact/value dichotomy is overstated). So my position on ethics is essentially the same as my philosophy of language in general: epistemologically antifoundationalist (no set of basic principles from which we derive all others, everything potentially subject to local revision), semantically inferentialist (meaning is determined by the norms of use - rather than, say, reference or reference in 'possible worlds' - specifically by the broadly inferential norms). It's also pluralist in that it seems possible to rationally disagree about morality.

The fact that this sort of framework applies doesn't require some sort of unnatural ad hoc modifications when it comes to morality is imo evidence in support of this type of account.It looks like you are a fan of Ayer. I have to agree that the tradition of metaethics that followed from Ayer seems to be the most plausible to me.

Don't understand the question. I suppose the answer hinges on the definition of "quality", which I'm not really concerned with.If you treat moral language no differently than language in general, then it seems to matter. Is it inconsequential to say that X is morally good, or does that statement having meaning?

You're conflating different things now. "Prescriptive of how we want others to act" makes no sense. It may be descriptive of how we want others to act or prescriptive of how others should act (it could also be prescriptive of how we should want others to act, but I assume you have the second alternative in mind).As I have confessed, my language was sloppy. I meant to say that it is prescriptive of how I think others ought to act because I think I ought to act in the same way.

Insofar as the rest of language can, yes. Since asserting that a statement is true is the same asserting the statement itself, this isn't really a philosophical problem. If you mean whether they act truth-functionally under composition, they do so no more and no less than other statements.I don't mean in the sense that the T-schema applies to all statements. I'm not sure that moral language actually pertains to real states of affairs, and if it does not, then moral language is not truth apt.

Don't understand the term, don't think it's meaningful (except, I guess, when it means something like "mythological" vs. "non-mythological").I mean: are moral qualities a subset of, or reducible to, natural qualities or are they mind dependent and irreducible?

It would be difficult to have an analysis of moral language without settling on the role of truth in our account. Other than that, sure.I agree with you on that. Considering contemporary metaethics is between between varying cognitive and non-cognitive systems vying for dominance in their own camps, I'd say that most metaethicists agree as well.

[Pandora]

Am I correct in claiming that, for you, good is that which is beneficial in a social and evolutionary context, and bad is that which is harmful in a social and evolutionary context?
Generally speaking, yes. I say "generally speaking" because it's a very seat-of-the-pants sort of thing. I've got no research or anything to back it up, so it's based on my own suppositions, assumptions, and what seems to be common sense to me ;)

I suppose I should be more clear. I was referring to A. J. Ayer's prescriptivism in moral language. His basic contention was that to say something is good is to say "I like this and you really ought to as well." There is an obligation implied by the speaker, but the listener may not feel the obligation.
I'm not familiar with him... so my comments are limited. I suppose some speakers might view an implied obligation... but I rarely do. I don't think I've ever done so... but memory is faulty and there's always the chance that I might decide something in the future is obligatory from my perspective. If I were the queen, I'd make the world so that nobody ever implied an obligation in this sense. Prohibited and permitted only.

I am going to try and paraphrase your position. Whether or not it is true or false that moral action X is good is contingent upon a complete contextual analysis of the given state of affairs. Moral facts do exist in some sense under your metaethics.
That's a fairly good paraphrase. My only nitpick would be that moral action X is good by definition. How good is contingent upon a contextual analysis... but you can categorically say that X is good and Y is bad.

I understand, however, that most other people don't view morality in the same sort of vector format that I do, so most of them won't agree on this point ;).I think a lot more people share your beliefs than you think.
Hmm. I hope so. The few times I've mentioned it, I've gotten skeptical and/or derisive responses. I think a lot more people probably approach things this way subconsciously... but haven't formulated them in the same way. But then lots of people never bother to think about morality as a concept anyway.

[David B]

I'm with muiridi here. Most people make what are obviously moral decisions on an hour to hour, day by day, even minute to minute basis.

Without ever in their lives thinking about what the quality of a thing might mean.

But at the same time understanding that morality is broadly about acting for the best - fuzzy in its turn - and encouraging others to act for the best, and discouraging them from acting badly.

David

[Alex]

There is so much erudite controversy about the nature of moral reasoning that I've given up trying to determine the basis of my "moral sense". When deciding what's right and wrong, I rely on my intuition - though I can't defend the theory that moral truths are directly apprehended as true by a special faculty of moral knowledge.

I'm in similar predicament with regard to aesthetic judgments about what's good and what's bad. I distinguish a genuine work of art from junk on the grounds that my "gut feeling" is a reliable guide. :)

[Blueskyboris]

Moral principles are derived from experiencing other people. Actions that hurt other people are immoral, and actions that do no harm are non-moral.

[Preno]

My metaethics is basically negative: there is nothing particularly special about moral language and there is no need to have a special position on it (the fact/value dichotomy is overstated). So my position on ethics is essentially the same as my philosophy of language in general: epistemologically antifoundationalist (no set of basic principles from which we derive all others, everything potentially subject to local revision), semantically inferentialist (meaning is determined by the norms of use - rather than, say, reference or reference in 'possible worlds' - specifically by the broadly inferential norms). It's also pluralist in that it seems possible to rationally disagree about morality.

The fact that this sort of framework applies doesn't require some sort of unnatural ad hoc modifications when it comes to morality is imo evidence in support of this type of account.It looks like you are a fan of Ayer. I have to agree that the tradition of metaethics that followed from Ayer seems to be the most plausible to me.Not in the slightest. Ayer was an emotivist, I am a cognitivist. I thought that was implicit in my claim that there's nothing particularly special about moral language that would set it apart from other kinds of language.
Don't understand the question. I suppose the answer hinges on the definition of "quality", which I'm not really concerned with.If you treat moral language no differently than language in general, then it seems to matter. Is it inconsequential to say that X is morally good, or does that statement having meaning?I see. Yes, sure. Obviously, sometimes it's appropriate to call an act moral and sometimes it isn't, but how could that be so if the word was meaningless?
Insofar as the rest of language can, yes. Since asserting that a statement is true is the same asserting the statement itself, this isn't really a philosophical problem. If you mean whether they act truth-functionally under composition, they do so no more and no less than other statements.I don't mean in the sense that the T-schema applies to all statements. I'm not sure that moral language actually pertains to real states of affairs, and if it does not, then moral language is not truth apt.Truth-apt simply means capable of being true or false. It has nothing to do with metaphysical concerns with "real states of affairs". Truth is a semantic concept, not a metaphysical one.

I mean, it's true that you shouldn't hit your brother, and it's false that you should spit in people's coffee. I'm not sure what (except for bad metaphysics) would drive one to deny this.
Don't understand the term, don't think it's meaningful (except, I guess, when it means something like "mythological" vs. "non-mythological").I mean: are moral qualities a subset of, or reducible to, natural qualities or are they mind dependent and irreducible?That doesn't really clarify what you mean by "natural".

[Bane]

I tend to base mine around "do unto others", which gives me the basic code of "don't cause death or injuries", "don't lie", "don't steal" etc. I don't mean in a biblical sense, I mean in the sense that even rudimentary empathy would give a person.

I'm more like "Would I want someone to do X to me or my loved ones?" than having any kind of absolutes.

[Alethias]

I think morals are derived from the society around the individual in kind of an evolutionary, instinctual sense. In Other Words, I think there is an evolutionary advantage to modifying individual behavior so that it is less exclusively self-centered and to a greater degree beneficial to others as well as self. In that context moral actions would be those actions that either add benefit to others or add benefit to self in a way that doesn't harm others.

As such, every moral decision is context sensitive. My morals are prescriptive in that I form opinions as to what others ought to do, but I also acknowledge that those are merely my opinions; But they are not in that I don't preach them at others. I make internal judgments of the persons actions but let them act how they choose, and let them deal with the consequences of their choices, good or bad.

Phrasing all that in a different way, and using more utilitarian terms, my personal moral imperative is to 1)where possible for me, to mitigate harm for self and others and 2) bring happiness or joy for self and others. when there is a conflict, preventing harm takes priority. when there is a conflict between self and others, it is contextual. If there is a group vs individual conflict, it is entirely situational. If it is an unresolvable conflict, I make an arbitrary choice based on what feels right at the moment.

This has worked for me pretty well for a while.

For those of a fairly philosophical bent. My general philosophy is humanist, and my moral philosophy is a form of negative utilitarianism.

[Danhalen]

Not in the slightest. Ayer was an emotivist, I am a cognitivist. I thought that was implicit in my claim that there's nothing particularly special about moral language that would set it apart from other kinds of language.I think I got the impression from your "rational disagreement" portion. That's one of the parts of Ayer's argument that he makes explicit. I must have placed too much importance on your use of the phrase.

I see. Yes, sure. Obviously, sometimes it's appropriate to call an act moral and sometimes it isn't, but how could that be so if the word was meaningless?Since I mistook your position as non-cognitivist, I asked a question that was quite irrelevant to your position. Re-reading what you had initially stated, it seems that my misunderstanding was quite silly.

Truth-apt simply means capable of being true or false. It has nothing to do with metaphysical concerns with "real states of affairs". Truth is a semantic concept, not a metaphysical one.

I mean, it's true that you shouldn't hit your brother, and it's false that you should spit in people's coffee. I'm not sure what (except for bad metaphysics) would drive one to deny this.The hang up I am having on this particular point is that if a certain state of affairs obtains, then it is true that I should act in a particular way. The truth that hitting your brother is wrong follows from a metaphysical possibility that you are capable of hitting your brother. If it were not metaphysically possible to hit your brother, then the semantic value of it being true that it is wrong to do so is meaningless.

That doesn't really clarify what you mean by "natural".By "natural" I mean: subject to analysis and identification through empirical validation.

[Danhalen]

I think morals are derived from the society around the individual in kind of an evolutionary, instinctual sense. In Other Words, I think there is an evolutionary advantage to modifying individual behavior so that it is less exclusively self-centered and to a greater degree beneficial to others as well as self. In that context moral actions would be those actions that either add benefit to others or add benefit to self in a way that doesn't harm others.

As such, every moral decision is context sensitive. My morals are prescriptive in that I form opinions as to what others ought to do, but I also acknowledge that those are merely my opinions; But they are not in that I don't preach them at others. I make internal judgments of the persons actions but let them act how they choose, and let them deal with the consequences of their choices, good or bad.If reading philosophy is something you enjoy, you should read Alan Gibbard's norm-expressivism. I tend to agree with your approach, and I think Gibbard has gone a long way in justifying part of his approach to metaethics in adaptive syndromes as an evolutionary advantage.

[Pandora]

Moral principles are derived from experiencing other people. Actions that hurt other people are immoral, and actions that do no harm are non-moral.

I'd say this is pretty true. If there were no other people in the world, morality wouldn't exist. A hermit has no need of moral decisions. It's only in evaluating our interactions with others that morality comes into play.

[Alex]

A hermit has no need of moral decisions. It's only in evaluating our interactions with others that morality comes into play.

Suppose the hermit resolves to commit suicide? Isn't that a moral decision?

[Pandora]

A hermit has no need of moral decisions. It's only in evaluating our interactions with others that morality comes into play.

Suppose the hermit resolves to commit suicide? Isn't that a moral decision?

Umm... only if you believe in God's Law (TM) that suicide is a sin. Othrewise, I don't see how it could be considered a moral decision... especially not for a hermit.

[Preno]

Truth-apt simply means capable of being true or false. It has nothing to do with metaphysical concerns with "real states of affairs". Truth is a semantic concept, not a metaphysical one.

I mean, it's true that you shouldn't hit your brother, and it's false that you should spit in people's coffee. I'm not sure what (except for bad metaphysics) would drive one to deny this.The hang up I am having on this particular point is that if a certain state of affairs obtains, then it is true that I should act in a particular way. The truth that hitting your brother is wrong follows from a metaphysical possibility that you are capable of hitting your brother. If it were not metaphysically possible to hit your brother, then the semantic value of it being true that it is wrong to do so is meaningless.I'm sorry, but you're being sloppy with words again. I doubt you actually mean that "the truth that hitting your brother is wrong follows from a metaphysical possibility that you are capable of hitting your brother". I assume what you mean is that it presupposes a metaphysical possibility that ... Second, I don't understand what's metaphysical about me being able to hit my brother. What do you mean by "metaphysical possibility", as opposed to just "possibility"?
That doesn't really clarify what you mean by "natural".By "natural" I mean: subject to analysis and identification through empirical validation.The answer entirely depends on what falls under the scope of "empirical validation". Morality is certainly no less empirical than philosophy, so any problems you have with the truth-aptness of morality automatically translate into worries about the truth-aptness of philosophy, which in turn just undercuts the whole idea of metaethics.

[Danhalen]

I'm sorry, but you're being sloppy with words again. I doubt you actually mean that "the truth that hitting your brother is wrong follows from a metaphysical possibility that you are capable of hitting your brother". I assume what you mean is that it presupposes a metaphysical possibility that ... Second, I don't understand what's metaphysical about me being able to hit my brother. What do you mean by "metaphysical possibility", as opposed to just "possibility"?Your rephrasing is correct. As to your confusion: hitting your brother requires that it is possible to instantiate a particular state of affairs in which you do, in fact, hit your brother. States of affairs--the way things are--are metaphysical manifestations of facts. If it is true that "hitting your brother is wrong," then it must be possible to instantiate a state of affairs in which you hit your brother and the state of affairs exhibits the moral predicate of "wrongness." Truth-aptness does have metaphysical implications if logic is a language used to describe reality.

The answer entirely depends on what falls under the scope of "empirical validation".I would say that anything which is exclusively a posteriori knowable falls under the scope of empirical validation.

Morality is certainly no less empirical than philosophy, so any problems you have with the truth-aptness of morality automatically translate into worries about the truth-aptness of philosophy, which in turn just undercuts the whole idea of metaethics.I have no idea what you mean when you say that both morality and philosophy are equally empirical. Morality is a branch of axiology which is in turn a branch of philosophy. Empiricism is a branch of epistemology which is in turn a branch of philosophy. You may as well say that intuitionist logic is no less empirical than philosophy.

Metaethics is a branch of philosophy which brings epistemology, metaphysics/ontology, semantics and psychology to bear on the concepts employed in morality. To cast doubt on the truth-aptness of moral language does not translate across the entire philosophical project of inquiry. There are plenty of contemporary published philosophers who deny that moral language is truth-apt and still discuss the concepts of truth and falsity in other types of language.

[Alex]

A hermit has no need of moral decisions. It's only in evaluating our interactions with others that morality comes into play.

Suppose the hermit resolves to commit suicide? Isn't that a moral decision?

Umm... only if you believe in God's Law (TM) that suicide is a sin. Othrewise, I don't see how it could be considered a moral decision... especially not for a hermit.

To pursue the question about hermits and suicide might hijack this thread.

Later today, I'll start another thread on the morality of suicide.

[Preno]

I'm sorry, but you're being sloppy with words again. I doubt you actually mean that "the truth that hitting your brother is wrong follows from a metaphysical possibility that you are capable of hitting your brother". I assume what you mean is that it presupposes a metaphysical possibility that ... Second, I don't understand what's metaphysical about me being able to hit my brother. What do you mean by "metaphysical possibility", as opposed to just "possibility"?Your rephrasing is correct. As to your confusion: hitting your brother requires that it is possible to instantiate a particular state of affairs in which you do, in fact, hit your brother. States of affairs--the way things are--are metaphysical manifestations of facts. If it is true that "hitting your brother is wrong," then it must be possible to instantiate a state of affairs in which you hit your brother and the state of affairs exhibits the moral predicate of "wrongness." Truth-aptness does have metaphysical implications if logic is a language used to describe reality.This seems to be merely gratuitously introducing unclear terminology instead of actually solving anything, but be that as it may, I don't see why you couldn't say the same thing about any other kind of language, so it hardly singles out moral language as something special.
Morality is certainly no less empirical than philosophy, so any problems you have with the truth-aptness of morality automatically translate into worries about the truth-aptness of philosophy, which in turn just undercuts the whole idea of metaethics.I have no idea what you mean when you say that both morality and philosophy are equally empirical. Morality is a branch of axiology which is in turn a branch of philosophy. Empiricism is a branch of epistemology which is in turn a branch of philosophy. You may as well say that intuitionist logic is no less empirical than philosophy.Eh? I simply meant that morality is subject to empirical validation about as much as philosophy, or if you wish, the rest of philosophy.
There are plenty of contemporary published philosophers who deny that moral language is truth-apt and still discuss the concepts of truth and falsity in other types of language.So? There are "plenty of contemporary published philosophers" taking almost any position you can think of on morality.

[Danhalen]

This seems to be merely gratuitously introducing unclear terminology instead of actually solving anything, but be that as it may, I don't see why you couldn't say the same thing about any other kind of language, so it hardly singles out moral language as something special.
You could say it about any other language, but the discussion is about metaethics. So talking about language outside the scope of the discussion wouldn't be germane to the topic. I don't see why you think the language involved obfuscates the discussion. Particularly when it is a question of whether or not moral language actually describes states of affairs.

Eh? I simply meant that morality is subject to empirical validation about as much as philosophy, or if you wish, the rest of philosophy.
That simply makes no sense. Empirical validation only applies to things which affect the senses or things which can be inferred from effects which affect the senses.

So? There are "plenty of contemporary published philosophers" taking almost any position you can think of on morality.So, it goes to show that denying truth-aptness in the language of morality does not infect the whole work of philosophical inquiry, as you have suggested.

[Preno]

This seems to be merely gratuitously introducing unclear terminology instead of actually solving anything, but be that as it may, I don't see why you couldn't say the same thing about any other kind of language, so it hardly singles out moral language as something special.
You could say it about any other language, but the discussion is about metaethics. So talking about language outside the scope of the discussion wouldn't be germane to the topic. I don't see why you think the language involved obfuscates the discussion. Particularly when it is a question of whether or not moral language actually describes states of affairs.I thought the question was whether moral statements are truth-apt or not. Whether they "describe states of affairs" rather depends on what one means by describing and by states of affairs.
Eh? I simply meant that morality is subject to empirical validation about as much as philosophy, or if you wish, the rest of philosophy.That simply makes no sense. Empirical validation only applies to things which affect the senses or things which can be inferred from effects which affect the senses.Yes. So?
So? There are "plenty of contemporary published philosophers" taking almost any position you can think of on morality.So, it goes to show that denying truth-aptness in the language of morality does not infect the whole work of philosophical inquiry, as you have suggested.No, what I said was that denying the truth-aptness of moral statements on the basis that they're not "subject to empirical validation" is either false or self-undercutting (depending on what one means by "empirical validation") in that it applies to philosophy in general. Not that it isn't possible to deny the truth-aptness of morality on any grounds whatsoever (for example, because they are normative) without thereby also denying the truth-aptness of philosophy.

[Danhalen]

I thought the question was whether moral statements are truth-apt or not. Whether they "describe states of affairs" rather depends on what one means by describing and by states of affairs.The truth-aptness of language depends on states of affairs being possible. If a certain state of affairs is not possible, then it makes no say an utterance which attempts to describe the state of affairs is true or not; it's not truth-apt. Whether or not a state of affairs obtains determines if it is true that a certain state of affairs exists in the world.

Given that you have already spoken to Ayer's non-cognitivism, it seems you are fully aware of what I have been trying to articulate concerning the truth aptness of moral language.

Yes. So?So how is philosophy subject to empirical validation?

No, what I said was that denying the truth-aptness of moral statements on the basis that they're not "subject to empirical validation" is either false or self-undercutting (depending on what one means by "empirical validation") in that it applies to philosophy in general. Not that it isn't possible to deny the truth-aptness of morality on any grounds whatsoever (for example, because they are normative) without thereby also denying the truth-aptness of philosophy.First off, I never claimed that anyone denied the truth-aptness of moral statements on the basis that they are not subject to emprical validation. Secondly, to say that denying the truth-aptness of moral language based on a lack of ability to empirically validate moral language is false is a misuse of what false means (i.e. it is possible that it is the case that someone does deny truth-aptness on that basis). That you state it is self-undercutting does not make it so because it is not necessarily the case that morality and the rest of philosophy use language in the same way. Given that normativity could free someone to deny the truth-aptness of moral language, how does normativity escape the critique you have levied against empirical validation as a basis for truth-apt denial?

[Angra Mainyu]

I thought the question was whether moral statements are truth-apt or not. Whether they "describe states of affairs" rather depends on what one means by describing and by states of affairs.
It seems to me that Danhalen considers that if some statements do not describe states of affairs, they wouldn't be truth-apt.

A problem someone could raise against that view is that, perhaps, mathematical statements would be on the same boat.

However, there is the view that if statements that do not "purport to represent or describe the world’ are not truth-apt (and here, "world" would also include abstract scenarios, apparently), so that whether moral judgments are truth-apt statements would depend, on that account, on whether or not they're descriptive/representational in that sense.

And it seems that (at least, according to Terry Horgan, a philosopher who denies descriptivism) "'descriptivism’ and ‘cognitivism’ have been seen as alternative labels for the same kind of metaethical position".


Source: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~thorgan/papers/metaethics/NondescriptivistCognitivism.htm
(an update of his position (with corrections, etc.) can be found here (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~thorgan/papers/metaethics/CognitivistExpressivism.doc))

But notice that what has been taken for granted in analytic philosophy generally, and metaethics in particular, is the idea that for content to be genuinely cognitive it must be in the business of purporting to represent how the world is. And this brings us to a third notion of content—descriptive content. Descriptive content is content that purports to represent the world as being a certain way, and is characteristic of ordinary nonmoral beliefs about the world. The judgment that Clinton was impeached has as its overall cognitive content the descriptive content, Clinton’s having been impeached.[2]
Now, according to our view, moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral statements are genuine assertions. Consequently, moral judgments and statements have declarative content that is genuinely cognitive—that is, they have belief-eligible, assertible content. Cognitivism in ethics is the view that moral judgments are genuinely cognitive in their content, and so we are ethical cognitivists. Cognitive content has been assumed, by all parties in these discussions, to be the same thing as descriptive content. Thus, ‘descriptivism’ and ‘cognitivism’ have been seen as alternative labels for the same kind of metaethical position.

Horgan supports what he calls non-descriptive cognitivism, but in order to do that, he denies what he calls a "deeply embedded assumption":


This combination of cognitivism and nondescriptivism flies in the face of a deeply embedded assumption that we call the semantic assumption:
SA****** All genuinely cognitive content is descriptive content—i.e., way-the-world-might-be content. Thus, mental states like beliefs and linguistic items like sentences that have cognitive content are in the business of representing some (putative) state of affairs or stating some (putative) fact.
This assumption, we claim, is a largely unquestioned dogma of both descriptivist and nondescriptivist views in metaethics, and (we think) is the main culprit that stands in the way of developing a fully adequate metaethical account of moral thought and discourse.[3]

So, if he's right about that being a largely unquestioned position, then traditionally, "descriptivism" and "cognitivism" were labels for the same view, even though now they're not.

[Danhalen]

It seems to me that Danhalen considers that if some statements do not describe states of affairs, they wouldn't be truth-apt.That's pretty close to my position. I actually would claim that statements which cannot describe states of affairs are not truth-apt. I do not believe that moral language addresses states of affairs or that it is even an attempt at doing so. I believe that moral language expresses a disposition toward states of affairs that one finds desirable (i.e. moral language expresses dispositional attitudes).

A problem someone could raise against that view is that, perhaps, mathematical statements would be on the same boat.I think the bigger problem with my point of view is the appearance of truth-aptness in moral language; how can I explain the appearance of truth in moral modus ponens?

If lying is wrong, then getting my children to lie is wrong.
Lying is wrong.
Getting my children to lie is wrong.

If moral language is not truth-apt, then the above argument is nonsense. But, it doesn't look like nonsense, and in fact carries meaning. To this end, I have adopted Simon Blackburn's Commitment-theoretic Semantics.

Blackburn argues that all language has a surface structure which appears to be true, but that it actually has a deeper semantic structure which expresses commitments toward the propositions of sentences. What the non-cognitivist must do, according to Blackburn, is to explain how moral language has the appearance of truth-aptness, and thereby earn the right to speak of moral language as if it were truth-apt.

In any case, I thank you for the material you provided by Terry Hogan. I think I'll have to look at some more of his work. It looks interesting, to say the least.

[Preno]

I thought the question was whether moral statements are truth-apt or not. Whether they "describe states of affairs" rather depends on what one means by describing and by states of affairs.The truth-aptness of language depends on states of affairs being possible. If a certain state of affairs is not possible, then it makes no say an utterance which attempts to describe the state of affairs is true or not; it's not truth-apt. Whether or not a state of affairs obtains determines if it is true that a certain state of affairs exists in the world.So there are two distinct facts, whether "a state of affairs obtains" and whether "it's true that a state of affairs exists in the world"? So what sort of handle do we have on states of affairs, except the truth of the corresponding statements?
Yes. So?So how is philosophy subject to empirical validation?It isn't, that's my point. Philosophy is both truth-apt and non-empirical, so it's absurd to argue that moral language isn't truth-apt because it's non-empirical. (Or rather, I don't think there is some sort of clear distinction between empirical validation and non-empirical validation, but assuming that the distinction is coherent, philosophy would tend to fall on the non-empirical side of it.)
No, what I said was that denying the truth-aptness of moral statements on the basis that they're not "subject to empirical validation" is either false or self-undercutting (depending on what one means by "empirical validation") in that it applies to philosophy in general. Not that it isn't possible to deny the truth-aptness of morality on any grounds whatsoever (for example, because they are normative) without thereby also denying the truth-aptness of philosophy.First off, I never claimed that anyone denied the truth-aptness of moral statements on the basis that they are not subject to emprical validation. Secondly, to say that denying the truth-aptness of moral language based on a lack of ability to empirically validate moral language is false is a misuse of what false means (i.e. it is possible that it is the case that someone does deny truth-aptness on that basis).Huh? Of course it's possible that someone denies truth-aptness on that basis. That doesn't mean they're right. What sort of argument is that? "It's not the case that ... is false, because some people hold it to be true"?

I thought the question was whether moral statements are truth-apt or not. Whether they "describe states of affairs" rather depends on what one means by describing and by states of affairs.
It seems to me that Danhalen considers that if some statements do not describe states of affairs, they wouldn't be truth-apt.Yes, the problem is that I don't understand what "states of affairs" are, or rather how appealing to them is non-circular. What sort of handle do we have on the obtaining of a state of affairs other than the truth or falsehood of some corresponding statement?
Horgan supports what he calls non-descriptive cognitivism, but in order to do that, he denies what he calls a "deeply embedded assumption":

This combination of cognitivism and nondescriptivism flies in the face of a deeply embedded assumption that we call the semantic assumption:
SA****** All genuinely cognitive content is descriptive content—i.e., way-the-world-might-be content. Thus, mental states like beliefs and linguistic items like sentences that have cognitive content are in the business of representing some (putative) state of affairs or stating some (putative) fact.
This assumption, we claim, is a largely unquestioned dogma of both descriptivist and nondescriptivist views in metaethics, and (we think) is the main culprit that stands in the way of developing a fully adequate metaethical account of moral thought and discourse.[3]

So, if he's right about that being a largely unquestioned position, then traditionally, "descriptivism" and "cognitivism" were labels for the same view, even though now they're not.Yes, I suppose that's similar to my position, except I don't really believe in some sort of dichotomy between description and evaluation. (From my pov, however, it's a straightforward corollary to semantic inferentialism, rather than some sort of shocking revelation.)

[Preno]

If moral language is not truth-apt, then the above argument is nonsense. But, it doesn't look like nonsense, and in fact carries meaning. To this end, I have adopted Simon Blackburn's Commitment-theoretic Semantics.

Blackburn argues that all language has a surface structure which appears to be true, but that it actually has a deeper semantic structure which expresses commitments toward the propositions of sentences. What the non-cognitivist must do, according to Blackburn, is to explain how moral language has the appearance of truth-aptness, and thereby earn the right to speak of moral language as if it were truth-apt.Well, I agree with that, but I don't understand how that singles out moral language if it holds for all language? Shouldn't the task rather be to describe how language in general has "the appearance of truth-aptness"? And isn't the natural conclusion simply to revise our notion of truth-aptness rather than saying that language is not truth-apt?

[Angra Mainyu]

I think the bigger problem with my point of view is the appearance of truth-aptness in moral language; how can I explain the appearance of truth in moral modus ponens?
I meant a problem with the view that whatever does not describe states of affairs isn't truth-apt. Mathematical language may be descriptive, but perhaps not descriptive of states of affairs.

Still, as I mentioned, there is a view that non-descriptive language is not truth-apt. This view is compatible with the truth-aptness of mathematical statements.


Yes, the problem is that I don't understand what "states of affairs" are, or rather how appealing to them is non-circular. What sort of handle do we have on the obtaining of a state of affairs other than the truth or falsehood of some corresponding statement?
Yes, I think the lack of clarify of "states of affairs" is the first problem. Do mathematical statements describe states of affairs (for instance)?

But it seems a more common view among philosophers is that language that is not descriptive/representational (of something, whether or not it's a state of affairs) is not truth-apt, or something like that, avoiding that problem.

The circularity issue may be another problem, but it seems (at least on the surface) not very different from correspondence theories of truths hold that, for instance, "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white, etc.


Yes, I suppose that's similar to my position, except I don't really believe in some sort of dichotomy between description and evaluation. (From my pov, however, it's a straightforward corollary to semantic inferentialism, rather than some sort of shocking revelation.)
I'm not sure that Horgan's position would be so closed to yours, then, since he makes a strong distinction between moral language and, say, scientific language.

Horgan denies, for instance, that there are any moral facts.

[Preno]

Yes, I think the lack of clarify of "states of affairs" is the first problem. Do mathematical statements describe states of affairs (for instance)?

But it seems a more common view among philosophers is that language that is not descriptive/representational (of something, whether or not it's a state of affairs) is not truth-apt, or something like that, avoiding that problem.

The circularity issue may be another problem, but it seems (at least on the surface) not very different from correspondence theories of truths hold that, for instance, "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white, etc.Yes, correspondence theories are just as useless in explaining anything.
Yes, I suppose that's similar to my position, except I don't really believe in some sort of dichotomy between description and evaluation. (From my pov, however, it's a straightforward corollary to semantic inferentialism, rather than some sort of shocking revelation.)I'm not sure that Horgan's position would be so closed to yours, then, since he makes a strong distinction between moral language and, say, scientific language.Those aspects of his position certainly wouldn't. But the distinction between descriptivism and cognitivism is imo quite correct.

eta: to put it simply, if it walks like a truth and quacks like a truth (i.e. participates in assertions, inferences and truth-functional constructions), then denying it's a truth on the basis of some metaphysical position about "states of affairs" is just absurd. Semantic analysis comes before metaphysics (and truth is a semantic notion).

[Angra Mainyu]

Yes, correspondence theories are just as useless in explaining anything.
I tend to agree. I mean, it's true that "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white (for instance), but that's trivial and doesn't help understand anything.


Those aspects of his position certainly wouldn't. But the distinction between descriptivism and cognitivism is imo quite correct.
Okay, got it.

Regarding your view, do you agree with the position of a particular philosopher, or have your own theory?

[Preno]

Yes, correspondence theories are just as useless in explaining anything.I tend to agree. I mean, it's true that "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white (for instance), but that's trivial and doesn't help understand anything.Yeah. It may work as a clause in a recursive extensional characterization of truth (which is how Tarski originally used it), but it's a mistake to take this platitude as an expression of the correspondence theory of truth.
Those aspects of his position certainly wouldn't. But the distinction between descriptivism and cognitivism is imo quite correct.Okay, got it.

Regarding your view, do you agree with the position of a particular philosopher, or have your own theory?I'm not particularly well read in moral philosophy, because, as I said, I don't see the need for having a specifically meta-ethical view, as opposed to a general philosophy of language. As for my philosophy of language (i.e. views on meaning), basically I'm a Dummettian anti-realist and a Sellarsian inferentialist (as opposed to viewing representation as fundamental). From my pov (http://secularcafe.org/showthread.php?p=91539&#post91539), normativity is a constitutive feature of meaning in general, so I generally find arguments to the effect that moral language isn't truth-apt because it is normative / not descriptive / involves evaluation on our part / doesn't represent anything somewhat amusing.

Even if it turns out that moral language has specific characteristics that call for a meta-ethical position (in a way that economics doesn't really call for a meta-economical position), surely the right strategy is to first concentrate on what it has in common with other kinds of discourse. If one's position on the nature of meaning in general is mistaken, one cannot expect to arrive at a correct meta-ethical theory (except by sheer chance).

[Angra Mainyu]

Yeah. It may work as a clause in a recursive extensional characterization of truth (which is how Tarski originally used it), but it's a mistake to take this platitude as an expression of the correspondence theory of truth.
True, I was going with an example, but correspondence theories are much more complex, and there are plenty of variants.


I'm not particularly well read in moral philosophy, because, as I said, I don't see the need for having a specifically meta-ethical view, as opposed to a general philosophy of language. As for my philosophy of language (i.e. views on meaning), basically I'm a Dummettian anti-realist and a Sellarsian inferentialist (as opposed to viewing representation as fundamental). From my pov, normativity is a constitutive feature of meaning in general, so I generally find arguments to the effect that moral language isn't truth-apt because it is normative / not descriptive / involves evaluation on our part / doesn't represent anything somewhat amusing.
Okay, thanks.


Even if it turns out that moral language has specific characteristics that call for a meta-ethical position (in a way that economics doesn't really call for a meta-economical position), surely the right strategy is to first concentrate on what it has in common with other kinds of discourse. If one's position on the nature of meaning in general is mistaken, one cannot expect to arrive at a correct meta-ethical theory (except by sheer chance).
Right, but there are those who hold that there is no "nature of meaning" (or who just reject theories of meaning), or hold that different types of discourse are distinct and ought to be studied differently, etc.

I don't take a stance on that, but in any case, there is an issue that makes metaethics important (even if just to say that it's unimportant), and it's the fact that metaethics is used in arguments for theism, and even to deny non-theists engagement in ethical discourse - i.e., it's fairly common in my experience that when a non-theist challenges a Christian's moral judgment, or makes a moral judgment that is at odds with Christianity, the Christians swiftly switches from ethics to metaethics, telling the non-theists something like "How could you possibly make a moral judgment? On what objective grounds are you basing it?", refusing to engage the non-theist on an ethical debate, or of recognizing the non-theist as someone who can engage in meaningful moral discourse - holding that only theists can.

[JamesBannon]

I don't take a stance on that, but in any case, there is an issue that makes metaethics important (even if just to say that it's unimportant), and it's the fact that metaethics is used in arguments for theism, and even to deny non-theists engagement in ethical discourse - i.e., it's fairly common in my experience that when a non-theist challenges a Christian's moral judgment, or makes a moral judgment that is at odds with Christianity, the Christians swiftly switches from ethics to metaethics, telling the non-theists something like "How could you possibly make a moral judgment? On what objective grounds are you basing it?", refusing to engage the non-theist on an ethical debate, or of recognizing the non-theist as someone who can engage in meaningful moral discourse - holding that only theists can.
Which is essentially bollocks, since theists have no objective grounding for morality either.

[Danhalen]

Well, I agree with that, but I don't understand how that singles out moral language if it holds for all language? Shouldn't the task rather be to describe how language in general has "the appearance of truth-aptness"? And isn't the natural conclusion simply to revise our notion of truth-aptness rather than saying that language is not truth-apt?I think commitment-theoretic semantics does raise the issue you are speaking to. However, I also see there being a difference in the types of commitments one makes when using language. I think "moral language" differs from "factual language" in that "moral language" commits the utterer to make claims of desired states of affairs while "factual language" commits the utterer to commit to the possibility and/or actuality of states of affairs. I'm using the quotes as an acknowledgment of the superficial discrimination between the types of language you have pointed out--that is, I concede that your view is at least problematic for my own.