Has Dan Dennett offered a single new idea?

[BWE]

If so, can anyone summarize it? I am just finishing consciousness explained and I'm singularly impressed with the amazing knack he has for saying absolutely nothing. There is not only no single new idea in that book but he is so fuzzy with his definitions that I'm doing a satire piece on how great a troll he is.


What am I missing? Where does he offer a new idea? (if it's a different work that's fine.)

[BWE]

Even just something interesting? Slightly off the trite spectrum?

[Ronin]

Don't know a thing about him.

Should I turn in my EAC badge?

:dunno:

[BWE]

Don't know a thing about him.

Should I turn in my EAC badge?

:dunno:

might need to. He's supposed to be one of the four horsemen of the apocalypso or sumthin.

He wrote a book called 'consciousness explained' which, aside from being stupid beyond belief, is pretentious in a way that only the British royals normally can be.

[Ronin]

Don't know a thing about him.

Should I turn in my EAC badge?

:dunno:

might need to. He's supposed to be one of the four horsemen of the apocalypso or sumthin.

He wrote a book called 'consciousness explained' which, aside from being stupid beyond belief, is pretentious in a way that only the British royals normally can be.

I don't believe in apocalypticopolis or four horesemane or nuthin' like that.

Really, I've only half read Dawkins "The God Delusion" and nodded off because it was stuff I'd already said myself.

Do you think that because you already accept the premise of Dennett in consciousness explained that he appears lacking some "new" concepts?

I'd like to sample your satire in any event...nothing like a good roast (I'm hungry).

:cool:

[David B]

To address the title first, I really don't care whether he whether he is offering new ideas or not. Bringing a synthesis of old good ideas to me in particular, to a wider audience in general, is good enough for me.

And he certainly has done that, in giving a foundation for ethics naturalistically, both in Darwin's Dangerous Idea and expanded upon in Freedom Evolves.

If so, can anyone summarize it? I am just finishing consciousness explained and I'm singularly impressed with the amazing knack he has for saying absolutely nothing.[ There is not only no single new idea in that book but he is so fuzzy with his definitions that I'm doing a satire piece on how great a troll he is.

Actually I sought out Consciousness Explained after reading Darwin's Dangerous Idea, and I was disappointed in it, finding it both dry and uninformative. To the point that I now remember very little about it.

What am I missing? Where does he offer a new idea? (if it's a different work that's fine.)

What you are missing, I think, is the bringing of a synthesis of ideas - some of which may be original, others certainly not, doesn't matter - to a wider audience.

Sometimes to a target audience that makes what he says look very simplistic to someone who has thought about these issues a lot, true.

'Breaking the Spell' looks to be not a very good book to atheists who are veterans of message boards such as the ones we have frequented, but we are not it's target audience. That audience, I suggest, was less well informed. Looking at it from the POV of the nominal Christian who cannot see a foundation for morality apart from it being god given makes it a better book, I think.

But Darwin's Dangerous Idea, and Freedom Evolves are the better books, I think. Taught me a lot about evolution, which I never learnt in school.

Again, they perhaps are not books aimed at the very sophisticated, but the ideas (original or not) synthesised in them can be life changing for those who are trapped, for instance, in a 'No morality without God, morality, hence god' mind set.

Written in haste, work calls soon.

David

[DMB]

I thought Darwin's Dangerous Idea was excellent. I loved his idea of "skyhooks" and "cranes" I found Consciousness Explained turgid and boring and didn't finish it.

ETA for a philospher who writes popular books like an angel, I would recommend A.C. Grayling. In particular his historical survey of the Enlightenment, Towards the Light. Here is the link to the American version: http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Light-Liberty-Struggles-Freedom/dp/0802716369/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1238313562&sr=1-1. I see they amended the title for America.

[Febble]

I thought Consciousness Explained was pretty good, but it didn't tell me anything I didn't know, and it told me it rather slowly. I think he misses an important trick.

I think Freedom Evolves is original, though. I think it's a great book.

[Ray Moscow]

I really liked his Breaking the Spell and Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

It's the former that seems to have branded him one of the four horsemen of the "new" atheism.

[BWE]

I thought Consciousness Explained was pretty good, but it didn't tell me anything I didn't know, and it told me it rather slowly. I think he misses an important trick.

I think Freedom Evolves is original, though. I think it's a great book.

It figures. I read the wrong book. :) Dammit. Should I go with DDI or FE first?

[BWE]

I thought Consciousness Explained was pretty good, but it didn't tell me anything I didn't know, and it told me it rather slowly. I think he misses an important trick.

I think Freedom Evolves is original, though. I think it's a great book.

I think CE is actually wrong. Not just wrong but wrong and pretentious. He can't seem to get his resolution straight no matter how many times he tells you what level he is examining. I thought he explained dualism and decided I was a dualist due to his explanation! I had to go back to other, more familiar sources to realize that dennett was simply wrong and blustering. It sort of ticked me off :). That made me laugh when I realized I was ticked off by a philosophy book.

If you think about it, it's a pretty nerdy thing to be ticked at. :p

Anyway, I'm going to need to read one of his good ones to fix the black mark over his name I have in my mental card catalog.

[Febble]

I don't think Dennett is wrong in CE. And he makes a lot of points that are very much worth making.

[BWE]

He's wrong about dualism. His fireworks example is so wrong in how he uses it that I assumed he must be going to surprise us later with some gotcha moment. But, alas, he mixes resolution throughout the whole book and then chastises others for doing the same. It's pathetic if it happens to be the first dennett you've encountered.

Yes, there are several interesting tidbits about the mechanical aparatus itself, but his conclusion is utterly meaningless afaict. If you mix all possible recursive levels at which we could view brain, body and environmental activity, they each have qualities of themselves.

the end.

or perhaps...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7CclVneVpw

[BWE]

Should I read freedom evolves next?

[David B]

Should I read freedom evolves next?

That or DDI.

Reading DDI led me to anticipate what he said in FE.

DDI was published in 1995, so some things in evolutionary theory have moved on.

But, as with Origin of Species itself, the main thrust still holds.

I'd go for DDI myself. But bear in mind the audience it was intended for. Not academic philosophers. For the interested layperson, or perhaps scientist in a field outside evolutionary theory. And to give a good account, to a general readership, of how one does not need the supernatural in order to account for the existence of life, it's diversity, and phenomena that arise out of it, like peacock's tails or systems of morality.

David

[BWE]

Is that what he's on about? That we don't need supernatural forces to account for stuff?

Oh. I guess that is a fundamental assumption in my worldview. No wonder I was looking for more. Is that really what his main point is? Aaarrggghh.

My bad if that's true. I was looking for something written to people who already assumed that a supernatural explanation is unnecessary.

[David B]

Is that what he's on about? That we don't need supernatural forces to account for stuff?

Oh. I guess that is a fundamental assumption in my worldview. No wonder I was looking for more. Is that really what his main point is? Aaarrggghh.

My bad if that's true. I was looking for something written to people who already assumed that a supernatural explanation is unnecessary.

Well, it's not all of what he's on about. He's also about accounting for stuff non supernaturally.

Stuff like ability to make morally significant decisions, even in a deterministic universe. And the point that having a non deterministic universe doesn't help the ability to make morally significant decisions, which people like Penrose seem to assume. And other people who invoke quantum inderminacy, or divinely inspired morality etc to justify a meaningful morality.

David

David

[Febble]

He's wrong about dualism. His fireworks example is so wrong in how he uses it that I assumed he must be going to surprise us later with some gotcha moment. But, alas, he mixes resolution throughout the whole book and then chastises others for doing the same. It's pathetic if it happens to be the first dennett you've encountered.

Yes, there are several interesting tidbits about the mechanical aparatus itself, but his conclusion is utterly meaningless afaict. If you mix all possible recursive levels at which we could view brain, body and environmental activity, they each have qualities of themselves.

the end.

or perhaps...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7CclVneVpw

What's his "fireworks example"? I can't recall any fireworks.

Where I think he is excellent is in making the point that people who should know better fail to make, that we don't "fill in" stuff were we are lacking direct information- we simply fail to register that we lack the information. That we construct reality on the fly in such a way that we are not aware that continuity is lacking - and that we therefore perceive continuity.

So much of pop science (and even text book science) on perception is couched in language that leads one to imagine that the world is somehow being screened for us (us?). His big point, I think, is to point out that there need be no screen if there is no spectator. And given that there is no screen, there is no need to posit a spectator.

[BWE]

Is that what he's on about? That we don't need supernatural forces to account for stuff?

Oh. I guess that is a fundamental assumption in my worldview. No wonder I was looking for more. Is that really what his main point is? Aaarrggghh.

My bad if that's true. I was looking for something written to people who already assumed that a supernatural explanation is unnecessary.

Well, it's not all of what he's on about. He's also about accounting for stuff non supernaturally.

Stuff like ability to make morally significant decisions, even in a deterministic universe. And the point that having a non deterministic universe doesn't help the ability to make morally significant decisions, which people like Penrose seem to assume. And other people who invoke quantum inderminacy, or divinely inspired morality etc to justify a meaningful morality.

David

David
Where does Penrose assume that? I have Emperor's new mind on my desk if you need an exact quote. If you can summarize, I can probably find the quote.

And I guess it seems obvious that we can make morally significant decisions in our real environment, whatever that environment.

I'm still a bit grumpy that he would have the gall to create such a straw man of Descartes when there is no need to do so. Morality simply is. It needs no justification that I can see. It is simply the best rules we have for complex actions whose outcomes defy prediction.

I'm beginning to suspect Dennett is selling snake-oil. I'll get freedom evolves on Tuesday though. DDI, I'll skip unless something good comes of FE.

He might simply be de-programming a certain religious indoctrinated POV in which case I'd never get it since I didn't get one of those. Maybe I'll go back over it for that. A worthwhile task but one which wouldn't interest me. That could explain a lot.

[David B]

Is that what he's on about? That we don't need supernatural forces to account for stuff?

Oh. I guess that is a fundamental assumption in my worldview. No wonder I was looking for more. Is that really what his main point is? Aaarrggghh.

My bad if that's true. I was looking for something written to people who already assumed that a supernatural explanation is unnecessary.

Well, it's not all of what he's on about. He's also about accounting for stuff non supernaturally.

Stuff like ability to make morally significant decisions, even in a deterministic universe. And the point that having a non deterministic universe doesn't help the ability to make morally significant decisions, which people like Penrose seem to assume. And other people who invoke quantum inderminacy, or divinely inspired morality etc to justify a meaningful morality.

David

David
Where does Penrose assume that? I have Emperor's new mind on my desk if you need an exact quote. If you can summarize, I can probably find the quote.

That's a book I read long ago, and I can't recall exactly where he assumed it, but the wiki entry on him seems to me to support my view.

Penrose has written controversial books on the connection between fundamental physics and human consciousness. In The Emperor's New Mind (1989), he argues that known laws of physics are inadequate to explain the phenomenon of human consciousness. Penrose hints at the characteristics this new physics may have and specifies the requirements for a bridge between classical and quantum mechanics (what he terms correct quantum gravity, CQG). He claims that the present computer is unable to have intelligence because it is a deterministic system that for the most part simply executes algorithms, as a billiard table where billiard balls act as message carriers and their interactions act as logical decisions. He argues against the viewpoint that the rational processes of the human mind are completely algorithmic and can thus be duplicated by a sufficiently complex computer -- this is in contrast to views, e.g., Biological Naturalism, that human behavior but not consciousness might be simulated. This is based on claims that human consciousness transcends formal logic systems because things such as the insolubility of the halting problem and Gödel's incompleteness theorem restrict an algorithmically based logic from traits such as mathematical insight. These claims were originally made by the philosopher John Lucas of Merton College, Oxford.

In 1994, Penrose followed up The Emperor's New Mind with Shadows of the Mind and in 1997 with The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, further updating and expanding his theories. Penrose's views on the human thought process are not widely accepted in scientific circles. According to Marvin Minsky, because people can construe false ideas to be factual, the process of thinking is not limited to formal logic. Furthermore, he says that artificial intelligence (AI) programs can also conclude that false statements are true, so error is not unique to humans.

Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have speculated that human consciousness is the result of quantum gravity effects in microtubules, which they dubbed Orch-OR (orchestrated objective reduction)

And I guess it seems obvious that we can make morally significant decisions in our real environment, whatever that environment.

Yes it does, and I think we really can do so.

However, it could, logically, be an illusion that we can.

My experience tells me that many people hang on to religion because they falsely assume something like 'No God, no morals. Morals. Hence God.'

And that some atheists go with the (wrong, IMV) idea 'No God, no morals. No God. Hence no morals.

I'm still a bit grumpy that he would have the gall to create such a straw man of Descartes when there is no need to do so. Morality simply is

My bold.

Do you wish to imply that it is in any sort of Platonic sense? That it always did exist, and always will? In the light of the following, I'd guess not, but it sounds a bit like it.

It needs no justification that I can see. It is simply the best rules we have for complex actions whose outcomes defy prediction.[/quote]

Not necessarily the best, I, and I think Dennett, would argue.

Tending towards selection for better rules for complex actions whose outcomes can be predicted better than chance, but imperfectly, in a dynamic fitness landscape, perhaps.

I'm beginning to suspect Dennett is selling snake-oil. I'll get freedom evolves on Tuesday though. DDI, I'll skip unless something good comes of FE.

I think FE well worth reading.

He might simply be de-programming a certain religious indoctrinated POV in which case I'd never get it since I didn't get one of those. Maybe I'll go back over it for that. A worthwhile task but one which wouldn't interest me. That could explain a lot.

That, I think, is a substantial part of what he is trying to do. Not all of it, though.

David (won't reply further tonight, as he is going to have another glass of wine, thinks he has pretty much made sense so far, but doubts his capacity to do so in an hours time)

[Preno]

I haven't actually read Dennett, but the bits of Dennett that often get discussed on internet message boards have mostly been philosophically uncontroversial pretty much since Ryle and Wittgenstein. The reason why they appear to be innovative is that, obviously, many/most people still hold views that have been thoroughly discredited philosophically more than half a century ago.

No doubt he has many original points of his own, but they don't seem to be the ones that attraction the most attention on message boards.

ETA: I guess he does give them more of an evolutionary twist, though.
I'm still a bit grumpy that he would have the gall to create such a straw man of Descartes when there is no need to do so. Morality simply is. It needs no justification that I can see. It is simply the best rules we have for complex actions whose outcomes defy prediction.Are you saying that morality doesn't apply to actions which aren't complex and don't defy prediction? Defying or not defying predictions seems rather irrelevant to me when it comes to morality.

[BWE]

He's wrong about dualism. His fireworks example is so wrong in how he uses it that I assumed he must be going to surprise us later with some gotcha moment. But, alas, he mixes resolution throughout the whole book and then chastises others for doing the same. It's pathetic if it happens to be the first dennett you've encountered.

Yes, there are several interesting tidbits about the mechanical aparatus itself, but his conclusion is utterly meaningless afaict. If you mix all possible recursive levels at which we could view brain, body and environmental activity, they each have qualities of themselves.

the end.

or perhaps...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7CclVneVpw

What's his "fireworks example"? I can't recall any fireworks.
Well, there weren't really any fireworks... :D

But it was his first example regarding the continuity issue as it regards dualism. That the observer would see the flash and thhear the bang later. But then he goes from the outside stimulus to the internal mechanisms for interpreting stimuli and pretends he never shifted resolutions. He then goes looking for the 'point' where the Cartesian theater would lie. Which is either dishonest or dumb. I'm going for the latter. :)

However:

Where I think he is excellent is in making the point that people who should know better fail to make, that we don't "fill in" stuff were we are lacking direct information- we simply fail to register that we lack the information. That we construct reality on the fly in such a way that we are not aware that continuity is lacking - and that we therefore perceive continuity.

This is interesting for sure. From within the structure that our total sense of self arises, no real continuity exists. That does ( of course???) ignore the fact that the narratives (see how good I'm getting with this term :)) are told as if continuous, meaning that as we collect and organize the data we receive through our senses we replay it with continuity. ven though he discusses this at some length, he only critiques it at a deconstructed level. He doesn't fault it at the level of assembled but rather at the pre-assembled level. That is a huge flaw and one which he never overcomes afaict.

So much of pop science (and even text book science) on perception is couched in language that leads one to imagine that the world is somehow being screened for us (us?). His big point, I think, is to point out that there need be no screen if there is no spectator. And given that there is no screen, there is no need to posit a spectator.
But there is a screen. It's called imagination. It just isn't screening as the data comes in. He conflates the two ideas. If I understand what he's saying. Always a crap shoot. :/

[BWE]

I haven't actually read Dennett, but the bits of Dennett that often get discussed on internet message boards have mostly been philosophically uncontroversial pretty much since Ryle and Wittgenstein. The reason why they appear to be innovative is that, obviously, many/most people still hold views that have been thoroughly discredited philosophically more than half a century ago.
This seems to be most of my problem.


No doubt he has many original points of his own, but they don't seem to be the ones that attraction the most attention on message boards.

ETA: I guess he does give them more of an evolutionary twist, though.
I'm still a bit grumpy that he would have the gall to create such a straw man of Descartes when there is no need to do so. Morality simply is. It needs no justification that I can see. It is simply the best rules we have for complex actions whose outcomes defy prediction.Are you saying that morality doesn't apply to actions which aren't complex and don't defy prediction? Defying or not defying predictions seems rather irrelevant to me when it comes to morality.
No. Not exactly. In general, when a moral decision is obvious, it is obvious because of its value on future action though. Can you think of a counter example?

[Preno]

Well, sure, moral decisions pertain to future actions of mine. But moral statements can refer to all actions, past or present.

[David B]

No. Not exactly. In general, when a moral decision is obvious, it is obvious because of its value on future action though. Can you think of a counter example?

How about the people in place when Chernobyl blew, and worked to contain it?

Not a lot of scope for future action there, from the point of view of some of them, at least.

They really did die for the benefit of others

David

[Febble]

He's wrong about dualism. His fireworks example is so wrong in how he uses it that I assumed he must be going to surprise us later with some gotcha moment. But, alas, he mixes resolution throughout the whole book and then chastises others for doing the same. It's pathetic if it happens to be the first dennett you've encountered.

Yes, there are several interesting tidbits about the mechanical aparatus itself, but his conclusion is utterly meaningless afaict. If you mix all possible recursive levels at which we could view brain, body and environmental activity, they each have qualities of themselves.

the end.

or perhaps...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7CclVneVpw

What's his "fireworks example"? I can't recall any fireworks.
Well, there weren't really any fireworks... :D

But it was his first example regarding the continuity issue as it regards dualism. That the observer would see the flash and thhear the bang later. But then he goes from the outside stimulus to the internal mechanisms for interpreting stimuli and pretends he never shifted resolutions. He then goes looking for the 'point' where the Cartesian theater would lie. Which is either dishonest or dumb. I'm going for the latter. :)

However:

Where I think he is excellent is in making the point that people who should know better fail to make, that we don't "fill in" stuff were we are lacking direct information- we simply fail to register that we lack the information. That we construct reality on the fly in such a way that we are not aware that continuity is lacking - and that we therefore perceive continuity.

This is interesting for sure. From within the structure that our total sense of self arises, no real continuity exists. That does ( of course???) ignore the fact that the narratives (see how good I'm getting with this term :)) are told as if continuous, meaning that as we collect and organize the data we receive through our senses we replay it with continuity. ven though he discusses this at some length, he only critiques it at a deconstructed level. He doesn't fault it at the level of assembled but rather at the pre-assembled level. That is a huge flaw and one which he never overcomes afaict.

So much of pop science (and even text book science) on perception is couched in language that leads one to imagine that the world is somehow being screened for us (us?). His big point, I think, is to point out that there need be no screen if there is no spectator. And given that there is no screen, there is no need to posit a spectator.
But there is a screen. It's called imagination. It just isn't screening as the data comes in. He conflates the two ideas. If I understand what he's saying. Always a crap shoot. :/

There is no screen.

[BWE]

Not for experience.

[BWE]

No. Not exactly. In general, when a moral decision is obvious, it is obvious because of its value on future action though. Can you think of a counter example?

How about the people in place when Chernobyl blew, and worked to contain it?

Not a lot of scope for future action there, from the point of view of some of them, at least.

They really did die for the benefit of others

David
Not sure I get this. There are many things worth dying for.

[Jobar]

BWE, I'd suggest checking those works out from a library instead of purchasing them. As others have said, the focus of his popular works is on ideas which we internet intellectuals are already rather thoroughly familiar with.

I had much the same trouble with The God Delusion. I'd simply heard it all before! (I didn't have that problem with The Ancestor's Tale, though.)

[BWE]

BWE, I'd suggest checking those works out from a library instead of purchasing them. As others have said, the focus of his popular works is on ideas which we internet intellectuals are already rather thoroughly familiar with.

I had much the same trouble with The God Delusion. I'd simply heard it all before! (I didn't have that problem with The Ancestor's Tale, though.)

I costs me the same amount to buy them as it does to check them out. :) Plus, Portland has Powell's. I sell them back about once a year.
http://www.powells.com/info/places/burnsideinfo.html

That's the main store. It's pretty much like having Amazon where you can walk through the isles. There are several satellite stores for more specific genres.

ETA: Follow this link to see what I mean:
http://www.powells.com/info/citytour.html

[Febble]

Not for experience.

Meaning...?

[BWE]

Not for experience.

Meaning...?

That experience, as the evidence suggests, does not stream in via some coordinating control room. However, that only matters at the level of assembly.

Only.


As in, that is the wrong place to look for consciousness.


Else life with brains is all identical.

Which is wrong. Or else he conflates the word consciousness with the word self.


The "theater" isn't engaged in real time. And whatever metaphor we use, imagination takes cause and effect into consideration. It is wrong to say there is no theater. It is also wrong to say the theater coordinates experience.

[BWE]

Not for experience.

Meaning...?

That experience, as the evidence suggests, does not stream in via some coordinating control room. However, that only matters at the level of assembly.

Only.


As in, that is the wrong place to look for consciousness.


Else life with brains is all identical.

Which is wrong. Or else he conflates the word consciousness with the word self.


The "theater" isn't engaged in real time. And whatever metaphor we use, imagination takes cause and effect into consideration. It is wrong to say there is no theater. It is also wrong to say the theater coordinates experience.

Holy shit I sound like the time-cube guy.

Let me use subjects and objects grammatically appropriate here to explain. :)

It is accurate to say that there is no screen but misleading. In terms of true dualism, it is accurate. Experimental evidence noted by Dennett makes it clear that we create the narrative after the fact. However, the brush Dennett wrote the word with was much, much too broad. His multiple drafts hypothesis itself suggest an analog to a screen in the current narrative.

He says since we assemble the narrative, there is no narrative. Basically. And, er... that's self contradictory.

That

[BWE]

hmmm.

[Brother Daniel]

And the point that having a non deterministic universe doesn't help the ability to make morally significant decisions, which people like Penrose seem to assume. And other people who invoke quantum inderminacy, or divinely inspired morality etc to justify a meaningful morality.
Where does Penrose assume that?
That's a book I read long ago, and I can't recall exactly where he assumed it, but the wiki entry on him seems to me to support my view.
He claims that the present computer is unable to have intelligence because it is a deterministic system that for the most part simply executes algorithms, as a billiard table where billiard balls act as message carriers and their interactions act as logical decisions.
(my bolding)

The algorithmic nature of computing is the issue, for Penrose. This seems to mean something rather narrower than merely deterministic. (I'm not sure what exactly, but I'm guessing that Preno could enlighten us.)

Also, I can't recall Penrose trying to address the business of morally significant decisions at all.

[premjan]

I think a neuronal net doesn't execute algorithms in the conventional sense. At least the program changes based on the data.

[BWE]

Penrose (In Emperor's new Mind) doesn't address morality. But in this thread I was more thinking about Dennett than Penrose. I'll be back this evening to write a little more.

[Brother Daniel]

Right. I was just nitpicking a bit vs David.

Carry on.

[BWE]

Help me out? What did Dennett offer?

[Brother Daniel]

No idea. I was hoping to find out by reading this thread. :)

[BWE]

damn. That's where I'm at too.

[Philosophickle]

If so, can anyone summarize it? I am just finishing consciousness explained and I'm singularly impressed with the amazing knack he has for saying absolutely nothing. There is not only no single new idea in that book but he is so fuzzy with his definitions that I'm doing a satire piece on how great a troll he is.


What am I missing? Where does he offer a new idea? (if it's a different work that's fine.)

Consciousness Explained is notorious for explaining nearly everything but consciousness. But rather than a disappointment, this is a novel approach that follows from his philosophy. See, Dennett is a bit of a radical in the world of philosophy of mind. He is a functionalist to be sure, but also an eliminativist. The reason he doesn't explain consciousness or qualia or intentionality is because he doesn't think they are real (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm). But even more outrageous is his denial of folk psychological concepts such as beliefs, desires etc. Because of this, Dennett has a devil of a time talking about the mind in a way that doesn't make use of these terms. He ends up revealing his philosophy of mind through thought experiments and words pictures, but it seems that he is bluffing his way through the book.

The truth is, he is such a radical that the way he writes his books reveals more about his philosophy of mind (which is original, by the way) than the actual content of the book.

[Preno]

Denying qualia is hardly an original position, and I'm not sure whether or in what sense he denies beliefs (can you elaborate?). I find it more likely that he construes beliefs as roughly speaking dispositions to assent to certain sentences or act in such and such ways. Again, that's not an original/radical position, it's a perfectly ordinary position in contemporary analytic philosophy.

[Philosophickle]

Denying qualia is hardly an original position, and I'm not sure whether or in what sense he denies beliefs (can you elaborate?).

Sure. Very few people have actually denied the existence of qualia though Dennett's teacher/mentor Quine was famously skeptical of nearly every philosophical pronouncement of the mind. As far as beliefs go, Dennett is a hyper-reductionist that thinks beliefs are multiply realizable(!) descriptions of a causal state. Putnam was the first to hint at this, but Dennett blew it wide open using the empiricism of Quine.

I find it more likely that he construes beliefs as roughly speaking dispositions to assent to certain sentences or act in such and such ways.

That describes C.B. Martin, but it doesn't refer to Dennett. At least not exhaustively. A realist about beliefs will hold that there are mental states accurately referred to as 'beliefs'. Dennett denies that mental states are really mental states (eliminates them) and those that could be called genuine mental states aren't causally relevant (the humming of the machine).

Again, that's not an original/radical position, it's a perfectly ordinary position in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Different parts of his radical functionalism are held by different people, but few can emulate the breadth of his theory. The Churchlands are about the closest.

[Preno]

Sure. Very few people have actually denied the existence of qualia though Dennett's teacher/mentor Quine was famously skeptical of nearly every philosophical pronouncement of the mind. As far as beliefs go, Dennett is a hyper-reductionist that thinks beliefs are multiply realizable(!) descriptions of a causal state. Putnam was the first to hint at this, but Dennett blew it wide open using the empiricism of Quine.And Sellars. And, in effect, Ryle and Wittgenstein (they may not have used the word "qualia", but their opposition to such concepts is apparent nonetheless).
That describes C.B. Martin, but it doesn't refer to Dennett. At least not exhaustively. A realist about beliefs will hold that there are mental states accurately referred to as 'beliefs'. Dennett denies that mental states are really mental states (eliminates them) and those that could be called genuine mental states aren't causally relevant (the humming of the machine).I haven't actually read Dennett's books, so I don't wanna make any substantial positive claims about his views, but in what sense does he deny that mental states are mental states? I mean, this whole "intentional stance" thing entails accepting beliefs, doesn't it?

[Philosophickle]

And Sellars. And, in effect, Ryle and Wittgenstein (they may not have used the word "qualia", but their opposition to such concepts is apparent nonetheless).


I would stutter a bit before calling Wittgenstein and Ryle Dennettian fuctionalists. Obviously Ryle dabbled in computationalism, but I would still classify both of those two as identity theorists.

I had forgotten about Sellars, and I'll just have to concede that one. He was ahead of his time by leaps and bounds, and I am ashamed to say that I only discovered him recently.

I haven't actually read Dennett's books, so I don't wanna make any substantial positive claims about his views, but in what sense does he deny that mental states are mental states? I mean, this whole "intentional stance" thing entails accepting beliefs, doesn't it?

He accepts beliefs (and other mental states) as heuristic devices. Intentionality is a great example. Dennett denies the existence of intentionality, or at least genuine intentionality. He has a pretty dense view, but he thinks intentionality is merely derived such that all our intentionality is on par with the intentionality of something like a map or sign.

[Preno]

I would stutter a bit before calling Wittgenstein and Ryle Dennettian fuctionalists. Obviously Ryle dabbled in computationalism, but I would still classify both of those two as identity theorists.I didn't mean they were functionalists, I simply meant that they both in effect deny qualia (even if they didn't use that exact term).
He accepts beliefs (and other mental states) as heuristic devices. Intentionality is a great example. Dennett denies the existence of intentionality, or at least genuine intentionality. He has a pretty dense view, but he thinks intentionality is merely derived such that all our intentionality is on par with the intentionality of something like a map or sign.I see.

Actually, no, I probably don't, but I'll grant your point until I read more Dennett.

[Oolon Colluphid]

I had much the same trouble with The God Delusion. I'd simply heard it all before!
It was worth it for the Edgardo Mortara story though.

[JamesBannon]

I haven't read anything by any of them, so I'm totally clueless (not that this is an unusual state of affairs).

[Steviepinhead]

I'm rereading Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

I like the way Dennett extends Darwinian selection into realms beyond the obviously biological...

[BWE]

I'm rereading Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

I like the way Dennett extends Darwinian selection into realms beyond the obviously biological...

I've got to read that one.

[Oolon Colluphid]

I liked his description of what Dawkins called 'animal space' as the Library of Mendel.

[Febble]

And Sellars. And, in effect, Ryle and Wittgenstein (they may not have used the word "qualia", but their opposition to such concepts is apparent nonetheless).


I would stutter a bit before calling Wittgenstein and Ryle Dennettian fuctionalists. Obviously Ryle dabbled in computationalism, but I would still classify both of those two as identity theorists.

I had forgotten about Sellars, and I'll just have to concede that one. He was ahead of his time by leaps and bounds, and I am ashamed to say that I only discovered him recently.

I haven't actually read Dennett's books, so I don't wanna make any substantial positive claims about his views, but in what sense does he deny that mental states are mental states? I mean, this whole "intentional stance" thing entails accepting beliefs, doesn't it?

He accepts beliefs (and other mental states) as heuristic devices. Intentionality is a great example. Dennett denies the existence of intentionality, or at least genuine intentionality. He has a pretty dense view, but he thinks intentionality is merely derived such that all our intentionality is on par with the intentionality of something like a map or sign.

What do you mean by "genuine intentionality"? And "merely derived"?

And as far as I can tell, Dennett dispenses with any need for the word "qualia" - he doesn't deny any of the attributes qualia are supposed to have.

[Philosophickle]

What do you mean by "genuine intentionality"? And "merely derived"?

And as far as I can tell, Dennett dispenses with any need for the word "qualia" - he doesn't deny any of the attributes qualia are supposed to have.

Intentionality is usually split up into three different kinds- original, derived and as-if. Original intentionality imbues intentionality, like a map-reader makes the symbols on a map meaningful. The map is an example of derived intentionality. As-if intentionality is just something that acts "as if" it had intentionality but doesn't, like a thermostat or, more controversially, a CPU.

Dennett does dispense with some of the attributes that many would give qualia. It isn't non-physical, for example, nor does it have any ontological significance. Qualia is a side-effect for Dennett, which is quite contrary to the central location most give it.

[BWE]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation
Gregory Bateson, in "Form, Substance and Difference," from Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), elucidates the essential impossibility of knowing what the territory is, as any understanding of it is based on some representation:

We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the territory? Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. […] Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps, ad infinitum.

hmmm

[Febble]

What do you mean by "genuine intentionality"? And "merely derived"?

And as far as I can tell, Dennett dispenses with any need for the word "qualia" - he doesn't deny any of the attributes qualia are supposed to have.

Intentionality is usually split up into three different kinds- original, derived and as-if. Original intentionality imbues intentionality, like a map-reader makes the symbols on a map meaningful. The map is an example of derived intentionality. As-if intentionality is just something that acts "as if" it had intentionality but doesn't, like a thermostat or, more controversially, a CPU.

Well, that doesn't exactly answer my question! What do you mean by intentionality? (pick any kind)

I think it's crucial (hint: I think divorcing intentionality from intention is a mistake).

Dennett does dispense with some of the attributes that many would give qualia. It isn't non-physical, for example, nor does it have any ontological significance. Qualia is a side-effect for Dennett, which is quite contrary to the central location most give it.

Well "non-physical" isn't an attribute, it's an absence of an attribute, no? Can you explain more fully what you think qualia are? And what you think it is about qualia that Dennett dispenses with?

[Philosophickle]

What do you mean by "genuine intentionality"? And "merely derived"?

And as far as I can tell, Dennett dispenses with any need for the word "qualia" - he doesn't deny any of the attributes qualia are supposed to have.

Intentionality is usually split up into three different kinds- original, derived and as-if. Original intentionality imbues intentionality, like a map-reader makes the symbols on a map meaningful. The map is an example of derived intentionality. As-if intentionality is just something that acts "as if" it had intentionality but doesn't, like a thermostat or, more controversially, a CPU.

Well, that doesn't exactly answer my question! What do you mean by intentionality? (pick any kind)

Intentionality is the directedness of thought. It's being about something.



Non-physical is a property. You may not think it is an instantiated property- that is, there may be no non-physical things- but nevertheless it is a coherent property.

A quale is a particular feel of any conscious experience. Some think it is central to any theory of mind, while others (Dennett most famously) think it is a side issue. It's the humming of the machine and nothing else.

[Febble]

Intentionality is usually split up into three different kinds- original, derived and as-if. Original intentionality imbues intentionality, like a map-reader makes the symbols on a map meaningful. The map is an example of derived intentionality. As-if intentionality is just something that acts "as if" it had intentionality but doesn't, like a thermostat or, more controversially, a CPU.

Well, that doesn't exactly answer my question! What do you mean by intentionality? (pick any kind)

Intentionality is the directedness of thought. It's being about something.





OK, so, substituting:

He accepts beliefs (and other mental states) as heuristic devices. Intentionality Directed thought is a great example. Dennett denies the existence of intentionality directed thought, or at least genuine intentionality directed thought. He has a pretty dense view, but he thinks intentionality directed thought is merely derived such that all our intentionality directed thought is on par with the intentionality directed thought of something like a map or sign.

:dunno:

Non-physical is a property. You may not think it is an instantiated property- that is, there may be no non-physical things- but nevertheless it is a coherent property.

OK.

A quale is a particular feel of any conscious experience. Some think it is central to any theory of mind, while others (Dennett most famously) think it is a side issue. It's the humming of the machine and nothing else.

In what way do the words "a particular feel" qualify "conscious experience"? Indeed in what way does the word "conscious" qualify "experience"?

Is not all experience conscious? And does not all experience have "a particular feel"? What would an unconscious experience without a particular feel be like?

In other words, what properties of experience are captured by the word "qualia" that are not denoted simply by the word "experience" alone?

And, while we are on the subject of words, what does "directed thought" or "intentionality" capture that "attention" does not?

Because Dennett certainly does not deny attention. It's one of the best-studied aspects of cognition, after all.

[BWE]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation
Gregory Bateson, in "Form, Substance and Difference," from Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), elucidates the essential impossibility of knowing what the territory is, as any understanding of it is based on some representation:

We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the territory? Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. […] Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps, ad infinitum.

hmmm

Is this saying that not only is there a cartesian theater but that it actually does suffer from the flaw that cases Dennett to dismiss it? (infinitely recursive)

[Febble]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation
Gregory Bateson, in "Form, Substance and Difference," from Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), elucidates the essential impossibility of knowing what the territory is, as any understanding of it is based on some representation:

We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the territory? Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. […] Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps, ad infinitum.

hmmm

Is this saying that not only is there a cartesian theater but that it actually does suffer from the flaw that cases Dennett to dismiss it? (infinitely recursive)

I don't think Dennett dismisses it because it's infinitely recursive. He dismisses it because it isn't necessary. No user interface is required because the user is the thing being used.

[BWE]

Is this saying that not only is there a cartesian theater but that it actually does suffer from the flaw that cases Dennett to dismiss it? (infinitely recursive)

I don't think Dennett dismisses it because it's infinitely recursive. He dismisses it because it isn't necessary. No user interface is required because the user is the thing being used.

Here are a few things he says in his article on himself in scholarpedia:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model:
Escape from the Cartesian theater

Why is the Cartesian Theater such a seductive idea? Mainly, Dennett thinks, because since we become conscious of various features of our experience, there must be some kind of transition: if not arrival at a place or crossing of a boundary or translation into a new format, then a change of functional state of one sort or another. Our conscious experience is of events that can usually be objectively timed quite precisely; lights going on, words being spoken, clock chimes, and gunshots are salient examples, and in general we believe, for good reason, that our conscious, subjective experience tracks objective events with impressive temporal accuracy. It seems at first that there must be a quite specific moment at which each item makes its entrance in our experience. If there is no such second transduction, occurring at a particular time and place in the brain shortly after the objective event has been transduced by our peripheral sense organs, how can we understand the difference between those brain processes that involve contents but are somehow “outside of consciousness” and those that somehow subserve conscious experience? The short answer is that if we scrupulously honor the distinction between the timing represented in consciousness and the timing of the conscious representing, we can see that the difference between unconscious and conscious is, like the difference between night and day, huge but gradual. A temporally punctate event need not make the transition from unconsciously discriminated to consciously experienced in a temporally punctate moment. The multiple drafts model is an attempt to show how this can be true, and how it makes sense of otherwise paradoxical findings. Since it is primarily concerned with subverting the powerful intuition that no possible model could avoid a commitment to a Cartesian Theater, it is a deliberately noncommittal sketch–not tied to the specifics of neuroanatomy yet to be determined. A wide variety of quite different specific models of brain activity could qualify as multiple drafts models of consciousness if they honored its key propositions:


1. The work done by the imaginary homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be broken up and distributed in time and space to specialized lesser agencies in the brain.
2. Once these specialists have done their work, that work doesn’t have to be done again in a central re-presentation process. That means that the content involved doesn’t have to be perceived again, discriminated again, enjoyed again, abhorred again (if it is, for instance, a pain) nor does it have to be moved somewhere and presented again in order to be stored in memory.
3. There is a massively parallel process in the brain–in the cortices and subcortical structures they interact with–in which multiple (and often incompatible) streams of content fixation, transformation, influence, suppression, enhancement, “binding”, memory-loading, etc., take place simultaneously (and asynchronously). These are the multiple drafts out of which the appearance of a ‘final draft’–the imagined draft of consciousness enacted on the imagined stage of the Cartesian Theater–is created by the occurrence of “probes” that retrospectively elevate some drafts at the expense of others. In the absence of such probes, the question of whether or not a content was conscious is ill-posed. (This will be explained below.)
4. “Since you are nothing beyond the various subagencies and processes in your nervous system that compose you, the following question is always a trap: ‘Exactly when did I (as opposed to various parts of my brain) become informed, aware, conscious, of some event?’ (Dennett, 1998, p105) It is a trap in the sense that it may not have, or need, an answer because it has false presuppositions.

My bold.

The error I see is in #1. Only if the homunculus models in real time.

Anyway, does he deny the map? The model? Does your understanding of the MD hypothesis disagree with the map-territory problem as stated above?

here is the multiple drafts theory as originally published by dennett:
http://www.consciousentities.com/multiple.htm

[Febble]

Is this saying that not only is there a cartesian theater but that it actually does suffer from the flaw that cases Dennett to dismiss it? (infinitely recursive)

I don't think Dennett dismisses it because it's infinitely recursive. He dismisses it because it isn't necessary. No user interface is required because the user is the thing being used.

Here are a few things he says in his article on himself in scholarpedia:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model:

This URL doesn't seem to go to what you quote. And is what you quote by Dennett?

Escape from the Cartesian theater

Why is the Cartesian Theater such a seductive idea? Mainly, Dennett thinks, because since we become conscious of various features of our experience, there must be some kind of transition: if not arrival at a place or crossing of a boundary or translation into a new format, then a change of functional state of one sort or another. Our conscious experience is of events that can usually be objectively timed quite precisely; lights going on, words being spoken, clock chimes, and gunshots are salient examples, and in general we believe, for good reason, that our conscious, subjective experience tracks objective events with impressive temporal accuracy. It seems at first that there must be a quite specific moment at which each item makes its entrance in our experience. If there is no such second transduction, occurring at a particular time and place in the brain shortly after the objective event has been transduced by our peripheral sense organs, how can we understand the difference between those brain processes that involve contents but are somehow “outside of consciousness” and those that somehow subserve conscious experience? The short answer is that if we scrupulously honor the distinction between the timing represented in consciousness and the timing of the conscious representing, we can see that the difference between unconscious and conscious is, like the difference between night and day, huge but gradual. A temporally punctate event need not make the transition from unconsciously discriminated to consciously experienced in a temporally punctate moment. The multiple drafts model is an attempt to show how this can be true, and how it makes sense of otherwise paradoxical findings. Since it is primarily concerned with subverting the powerful intuition that no possible model could avoid a commitment to a Cartesian Theater, it is a deliberately noncommittal sketch–not tied to the specifics of neuroanatomy yet to be determined. A wide variety of quite different specific models of brain activity could qualify as multiple drafts models of consciousness if they honored its key propositions:


1. The work done by the imaginary homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be broken up and distributed in time and space to specialized lesser agencies in the brain.
2. Once these specialists have done their work, that work doesn’t have to be done again in a central re-presentation process. That means that the content involved doesn’t have to be perceived again, discriminated again, enjoyed again, abhorred again (if it is, for instance, a pain) nor does it have to be moved somewhere and presented again in order to be stored in memory.
3. There is a massively parallel process in the brain–in the cortices and subcortical structures they interact with–in which multiple (and often incompatible) streams of content fixation, transformation, influence, suppression, enhancement, “binding”, memory-loading, etc., take place simultaneously (and asynchronously). These are the multiple drafts out of which the appearance of a ‘final draft’–the imagined draft of consciousness enacted on the imagined stage of the Cartesian Theater–is created by the occurrence of “probes” that retrospectively elevate some drafts at the expense of others. In the absence of such probes, the question of whether or not a content was conscious is ill-posed. (This will be explained below.)
4. “Since you are nothing beyond the various subagencies and processes in your nervous system that compose you, the following question is always a trap: ‘Exactly when did I (as opposed to various parts of my brain) become informed, aware, conscious, of some event?’ (Dennett, 1998, p105) It is a trap in the sense that it may not have, or need, an answer because it has false presuppositions.

My bold.

The error I see is in #1. Only if the homunculus models in real time.

I'm not sure in what sense "#1" is an error. Or even what it means, actually. I'd like to see the source, if they are Dennett's words.

Anyway, does he deny the map? The model? Does your understanding of the MD hypothesis disagree with the map-territory problem as stated above?

here is the multiple drafts theory as originally published by dennett:
http://www.consciousentities.com/multiple.htm

I don't know what you mean by "does he deny the map?" Depends what kind of map you think he might deny. The brain is full of quite literal maps, but there are many senses in which they are maps, and some senses in which they are not.

Can you tell me what it is that you think that Dennett unjustifiably denies?

[BWE]

sorry. the other link was wrong too. Duh. Too many tabs.

Here:
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/multdrft.htm
eta: first link has an extra colon on the end

[BWE]

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model
sorry. extra one of these-> :

It's his article on his multiple drafts model.

[dug_down_deep]

It seems to me that Dennett invented an atom of consciousness - one of many drafts, and characterized these many atoms as little nuggets of physical functioning, such as binding, suppression, transformation, etc., so that they easily made the leap from physical functioning to quality of experience and he wipes away the dualist divide. But there seems no good reason to believe that things like binding and suppression are atoms of consciousness in the first place. It seems to be begging the question.

[Febble]

It seems to me that Dennett invented an atom of consciousness - one of many drafts, and characterized these many atoms as little nuggets of physical functioning, such as binding, suppression, transformation, etc., so that they easily made the leap from physical functioning to quality of experience and he wipes away the dualist divide. But there seems no good reason to believe that things like binding and suppression are atoms of consciousness in the first place. It seems to be begging the question.

atoms of consciousness? Dennett?
:dunno:

[dug_down_deep]

yup :)

Not in his terms, probably, but a little lure to trap qualophiles with.

[BWE]

I don't know what you mean by "does he deny the map?" Depends what kind of map you think he might deny. The brain is full of quite literal maps, but there are many senses in which they are maps, and some senses in which they are not.

Can you tell me what it is that you think that Dennett unjustifiably denies?

Is Dennett consistent with the Global Workspace model? Does he think that we construct maps from sense data at all? Does he think that we compare those maps with each other for consistency?

[Philosophickle]

:dunno:

What? Are you disagreeing? That is exactly what intentionality is.

In what way do the words "a particular feel" qualify "conscious experience"? Indeed in what way does the word "conscious" qualify "experience"?

I don't know what you're asking. Qualia is the subjective feel of any experience.

In other words, what properties of experience are captured by the word "qualia" that are not denoted simply by the word "experience" alone?

Who knows. But experience has a convoluted meaning in philosophy, particularly with regards to sense-data, so qualia is meant to skip over that confusion. Besides, qualia is used to denote subjective first-person feelings, and it isn't clear that experience works for that. The American people are experiencing bad economic times, but that isn't a quale.

And, while we are on the subject of words, what does "directed thought" or "intentionality" capture that "attention" does not?

Those are completely different things.

[Febble]

I don't know what you mean by "does he deny the map?" Depends what kind of map you think he might deny. The brain is full of quite literal maps, but there are many senses in which they are maps, and some senses in which they are not.

Can you tell me what it is that you think that Dennett unjustifiably denies?

Is Dennett consistent with the Global Workspace model? Does he think that we construct maps from sense data at all? Does he think that we compare those maps with each other for consistency?

Well, I think posing the question in term of what "we" do with "sense data" in itself assumes a cartesian homunculus. It's OK as a shorthand, but we have to remember it's only a shorthand.

I'm not speaking for Dennett here, but I would myself find it easier to talk in terms of maps emerging from sense data, and even then, I'd want to put scare quotes round "maps" because maps are something that represents something (a landscape, say) to something else (a person). And as you have pointed out, for a brain, the mapper is also the mapped.

I don't think Dennett's view is inconsistent with the Global Workspace Model. I don't find it a terribly helpful model myself (I think we are moving beyond Black Box models). I like his pan-demonium image. That seems to be a better metaphor for what we observe IMO.

[Febble]

:dunno:

What? Are you disagreeing? That is exactly what intentionality is.

Attention?

In what way do the words "a particular feel" qualify "conscious experience"? Indeed in what way does the word "conscious" qualify "experience"?

I don't know what you're asking. Qualia is the subjective feel of any experience.

And what is left of experience minus the "subjective feel"?

What I am questioning here is what the notion of qualia adds to the notion of experience. Why not simply use the word experience?

In other words, what properties of experience are captured by the word "qualia" that are not denoted simply by the word "experience" alone?

Who knows. But experience has a convoluted meaning in philosophy, particularly with regards to sense-data, so qualia is meant to skip over that confusion. Besides, qualia is used to denote subjective first-person feelings, and it isn't clear that experience works for that. The American people are experiencing bad economic times, but that isn't a quale.

But what would any feeling be if not first-person?

And, while we are on the subject of words, what does "directed thought" or "intentionality" capture that "attention" does not?

Those are completely different things.

So tell me the difference between "directed thought" and "attention".

Thanks :)

[dug_down_deep]

And what is left of experience minus the "subjective feel"?
Wouldn't that be the stuff you look at on fMRIs and such?

[Febble]

And what is left of experience minus the "subjective feel"?
Wouldn't that be the stuff you look at on fMRIs and such?

Not really. We might look at correlates of experience. We might also experience looking at correlates of experience :)

But I don't see that the word has any meaning once you subtract the first-person-ness from it.

Unless it is merely used metaphorically: the moon has experienced numerous meteor impacts. But even the metaphor implies a first-person perspective - an anthropomorphisation of the moon.

[BWE]

And what is left of experience minus the "subjective feel"?
Wouldn't that be the stuff you look at on fMRIs and such?

you mean during an autopsy?

[BWE]

I don't know what you mean by "does he deny the map?" Depends what kind of map you think he might deny. The brain is full of quite literal maps, but there are many senses in which they are maps, and some senses in which they are not.

Can you tell me what it is that you think that Dennett unjustifiably denies?

Is Dennett consistent with the Global Workspace model? Does he think that we construct maps from sense data at all? Does he think that we compare those maps with each other for consistency?

Well, I think posing the question in term of what "we" do with "sense data" in itself assumes a cartesian homunculus. It's OK as a shorthand, but we have to remember it's only a shorthand.
Within the totality of the system, can one set of sense data be compared somehow with another after the fact? What happens when we try to solve a puzzle?



I'm not speaking for Dennett here, but I would myself find it easier to talk in terms of maps emerging from sense data, and even then, I'd want to put scare quotes round "maps" because maps are something that represents something (a landscape, say) to something else (a person). And as you have pointed out, for a brain, the mapper is also the mapped.

I don't think Dennett's view is inconsistent with the Global Workspace Model. I don't find it a terribly helpful model myself (I think we are moving beyond Black Box models).
I hope I didn't suggest it was a model of the system. I do understand that it isn't the system. I mean does he allow that the system is capable of processing in a global workspace style.


I like his pan-demonium image. That seems to be a better metaphor for what we observe IMO.

Hmm. Just when I think I understand what you are describing, you say things like this^^ and beyond black box. :p My head is spinning.

Is there an emergent system at all?

[Febble]

Is Dennett consistent with the Global Workspace model? Does he think that we construct maps from sense data at all? Does he think that we compare those maps with each other for consistency?

Well, I think posing the question in term of what "we" do with "sense data" in itself assumes a cartesian homunculus. It's OK as a shorthand, but we have to remember it's only a shorthand.
Within the totality of the system, can one set of sense data be compared somehow with another after the fact? What happens when we try to solve a puzzle?

I don't think I understand your question. Can you rephrase?


I'm not speaking for Dennett here, but I would myself find it easier to talk in terms of maps emerging from sense data, and even then, I'd want to put scare quotes round "maps" because maps are something that represents something (a landscape, say) to something else (a person). And as you have pointed out, for a brain, the mapper is also the mapped.

I don't think Dennett's view is inconsistent with the Global Workspace Model. I don't find it a terribly helpful model myself (I think we are moving beyond Black Box models).
I hope I didn't suggest it was a model of the system. I do understand that it isn't the system. I mean does he allow that the system is capable of processing in a global workspace style.

How would you characterise a "global workspace style"? Baars' model has been useful, I would say, but some interpretations of it are misleading, I think. For example "spotlight" models of attention can lead us in the wrong direction, I think - "salience" models are much more fruitful, IMO, and essentially Dennett's "pandemonium" model is a salience model. I'm not sure what Baar's current formulation of the model is. I'd certainly agree (and I guess Dennett would) with Edelman's model of consciousness as a "dynamic core" (though its a somewhat oxymoronic pair of words - the point of the thing being dynamic to my mind is that there is no "core", or not anything I would envisage as a core).

I like his pan-demonium image. That seems to be a better metaphor for what we observe IMO.

Hmm. Just when I think I understand what you are describing, you say things like this^^ and beyond black box. :p My head is spinning.

Is there an emergent system at all?

Sure. But it's dynamic. As I'm sure you agree. Consciousness has to be considered (IMO) of what we are conscious of and that will vary from moment to moment, and the content may itself be different members moments, as when we remember the past, or imagine the future. Or, as Edelman put it, consciousness itself is the Remembered Present.

[BWE]

Well, I think posing the question in term of what "we" do with "sense data" in itself assumes a cartesian homunculus. It's OK as a shorthand, but we have to remember it's only a shorthand.
Within the totality of the system, can one set of sense data be compared somehow with another after the fact? What happens when we try to solve a puzzle?

I don't think I understand your question. Can you rephrase?
can the memory of a texture be associated with a memory of a sound or color or whatever and a future scenario be extrapolated fr4om those separate bits of sense data? Does that happen at all or is that an illusory convenience of description?


How would you characterise a "global workspace style"? Baars' model has been useful, I would say, but some interpretations of it are misleading, I think. For example "spotlight" models of attention can lead us in the wrong direction, I think - "salience" models are much more fruitful, IMO, and essentially Dennett's "pandemonium" model is a salience model.
Hmmm. This is a tough one. Yes I mean a salience model. But I don't actually mean a model of consciousness, I mean a model of how we make decisions. A model that doesn't have any requirement to be how we do it, just what we do. Does our process of decision making involve multiple resolutions being weighed against each other?


I'm not sure what Baar's current formulation of the model is. I'd certainly agree (and I guess Dennett would) with Edelman's model of consciousness as a "dynamic core" (though its a somewhat oxymoronic pair of words - the point of the thing being dynamic to my mind is that there is no "core", or not anything I would envisage as a core).As long as core occupies enough space to house the whole organism you're ok with it though?

I like his pan-demonium image. That seems to be a better metaphor for what we observe IMO.

Hmm. Just when I think I understand what you are describing, you say things like this^^ and beyond black box. :p My head is spinning.

Is there an emergent system at all?

Sure. But it's dynamic. As I'm sure you agree. Consciousness has to be considered (IMO) of what we are conscious of and that will vary from moment to moment, and the content may itself be different members, as when we remember the past, or imagine the future. Or, as Edelman put it, consciousness itself is the Remembered Present.
different members?

If my resolution level stops at the outside of the skin, am I talking about a single emergent system?

If it weren't dynamic, life would be pretty boring. :p

[Febble]

Within the totality of the system, can one set of sense data be compared somehow with another after the fact? What happens when we try to solve a puzzle?

I don't think I understand your question. Can you rephrase?
can the memory of a texture be associated with a memory of a sound or color or whatever and a future scenario be extrapolated fr4om those separate bits of sense data? Does that happen at all or is that an illusory convenience of description?

Well, certainly the memory of a texture can be associated with the memory of a sound or color. Intimately in fact. It's all part of object recognition. And yes, you can extrapolate objects into the past and future. You can even bind attributes of objects that don't (and can't!) exist. Clearly. So I'm still not understanding your question. Unless you are referring to the "binding problem" and we know a bit now about how attributes are bound to objects, probably through synchronous neural firing.

Hmmm. This is a tough one. Yes I mean a salience model. But I don't actually mean a model of consciousness, I mean a model of how we make decisions. A model that doesn't have any requirement to be how we do it, just what we do. Does our process of decision making involve multiple resolutions being weighed against each other?

Yup. That seems pretty clear and measurable.

As long as core occupies enough space to house the whole organism you're ok with it though?

Not quite sure what you mean here (again) I'm afraid.



Hmm. Just when I think I understand what you are describing, you say things like this^^ and beyond black box. :p My head is spinning.

Is there an emergent system at all?

Sure. But it's dynamic. As I'm sure you agree. Consciousness has to be considered (IMO) of what we are conscious of and that will vary from moment to moment, and the content may itself be different members, as when we remember the past, or imagine the future. Or, as Edelman put it, consciousness itself is the Remembered Present.
different members?

D'oh. Different moments is what I meant to type. Sorry.

If my resolution level stops at the outside of the skin, am I talking about a single emergent system?

If it weren't dynamic, life would be pretty boring. :p


What do you mean by "resolution level"?

I'm not trying to be difficult, I'm just trying to make sure we are clear :)

[BWE]

Well, certainly the memory of a texture can be associated with the memory of a sound or color. Intimately in fact. It's all part of object recognition. And yes, you can extrapolate objects into the past and future. You can even bind attributes of objects that don't (and can't!) exist. Clearly. So I'm still not understanding your question. Unless you are referring to the "binding problem" and we know a bit now about how attributes are bound to objects, probably through synchronous neural firing.





I'm not sure what Baar's current formulation of the model is. I'd certainly agree (and I guess Dennett would) with Edelman's model of consciousness as a "dynamic core" (though its a somewhat oxymoronic pair of words - the point of the thing being dynamic to my mind is that there is no "core", or not anything I would envisage as a core).

As long as core occupies enough space to house the whole organism you're ok with it though?

Not quite sure what you mean here (again) I'm afraid.

Let's try the old car analogy. Car has an engine made of moving parts, a body built to house things and various moving part to utilize energy and propel the vehicle. The total system has quite a few unique qualities that are inappropriate to apply to any of the parts individually.

The tires do not need to present their position to the motor in order to grip the road and respond in a predictable way.

I don't want to talk about the parts.

When you combine the system, and use words like 'self'

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/originss.htm

the word does not apply to the amygdala. It does not apply to a big toe or a spinal chord. It applies to the interactions between the systems regardless of the mechanics within the system.

Transporting does not apply to the steering wheel nor to the gearshift not to the seat that carries the load. It applies to the whole system.

It is trivially obvious to say the mind is what the brain does although dreadfully complex to actually provide an accurate shop manual for the machine.

Is that the common view or is that in error?


different members?

D'oh. Different moments is what I meant to type. Sorry.:D Freudian?

If my resolution level stops at the outside of the skin, am I talking about a single emergent system?



What do you mean by "resolution level"?



I'm not trying to be difficult, I'm just trying to make sure we are clear :)

I mean resolution of totality of an organism. That is a pixel. Indivisible. (For the resolution level I'm looking at. ) if something inside makes a map of some sort, great, how does that manefest in the system as an individual unit?

Not how but what the system, fully assembled and running, can be said to do. No words about acquiring the sense data. No neural this or that. Nothing about which part does which thing. It's all one part that produces many observable macro phenomena for this thought experiment. What is the observed phenomena that can only be ascribed to the totality of the system? Absolutely and completely independently of what the system does to initiate and sustain that set of phenomena.

[Febble]

Well, certainly the memory of a texture can be associated with the memory of a sound or color. Intimately in fact. It's all part of object recognition. And yes, you can extrapolate objects into the past and future. You can even bind attributes of objects that don't (and can't!) exist. Clearly. So I'm still not understanding your question. Unless you are referring to the "binding problem" and we know a bit now about how attributes are bound to objects, probably through synchronous neural firing.





I'm not sure what Baar's current formulation of the model is. I'd certainly agree (and I guess Dennett would) with Edelman's model of consciousness as a "dynamic core" (though its a somewhat oxymoronic pair of words - the point of the thing being dynamic to my mind is that there is no "core", or not anything I would envisage as a core).



Not quite sure what you mean here (again) I'm afraid.

Let's try the old car analogy. Car has an engine made of moving parts, a body built to house things and various moving part to utilize energy and propel the vehicle. The total system has quite a few unique qualities that are inappropriate to apply to any of the parts individually.

The tires do not need to present their position to the motor in order to grip the road and respond in a predictable way.

I don't want to talk about the parts.

When you combine the system, and use words like 'self'

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/originss.htm

the word does not apply to the amygdala. It does not apply to a big toe or a spinal chord. It applies to the interactions between the systems regardless of the mechanics within the system.

Transporting does not apply to the steering wheel nor to the gearshift not to the seat that carries the load. It applies to the whole system.

It is trivially obvious to say the mind is what the brain does although dreadfully complex to actually provide an accurate shop manual for the machine.

Is that the common view or is that in error?

I don't know how common it is, but I don't think it's an error :)

:D Freudian?

Geez, I dread to think.

If my resolution level stops at the outside of the skin, am I talking about a single emergent system?



What do you mean by "resolution level"?



I'm not trying to be difficult, I'm just trying to make sure we are clear :)

I mean resolution of totality of an organism. That is a pixel. Indivisible. (For the resolution level I'm looking at. ) if something inside makes a map of some sort, great, how does that manefest in the system as an individual unit?

Sorry, still not receiving you. I don't think "something inside makes a map of some sort". So I don't think there's an "individual unit". I think a really key concept, which Dennett explains nicely IMO, is the idea that consciousness (hate the noun) is constructed "on the fly" on a "need to know" basis. What we think of as a map as persisting through time, and consulted occasionally, is constructed from scratch each time we consult it. This is literally true when we consider the "map" of the visual field. We only "see" a tiny part of it at a time, in the sense that only a tiny part of the visual scene is actually clear during any one fixation. But we are convinced that we "see" a wide field. The old-fashioned view was that we "build up" a visual scene through lots of saccades, rather like making a brass-rubbing. But that doesn't fit the data. So the current view is, as Dennett describes, that we simply don't register the lack of information. We don't need to, because as soon as we want it, we can have it. That's why our eyes are so beautifully engineered.

What we think of as a map is a system of motor programs that provide us with the information we need when we need it. Consciousness, IMO, crucially depends on the fact that every new set of data results in a search for new data - determines what data we search for, in fact.

Not how but what the system, fully assembled and running, can be said to do. No words about acquiring the sense data. No neural this or that. Nothing about which part does which thing. It's all one part that produces many observable macro phenomena for this thought experiment. What is the observed phenomena that can only be ascribed to the totality of the system? Absolutely and completely independently of what the system does to initiate and sustain that set of phenomena.

OK, accidentally had a go at the how anyway.

What the system does is navigate space for the purposes of sustaining (and reproducing!) itself.

It's no coincidence that consciousness evolved in things that move. And that the most elaborate forms of consciousness evolved in things that hunt.

IMO.

[BWE]

Let's try the old car analogy. Car has an engine made of moving parts, a body built to house things and various moving part to utilize energy and propel the vehicle. The total system has quite a few unique qualities that are inappropriate to apply to any of the parts individually.

The tires do not need to present their position to the motor in order to grip the road and respond in a predictable way.

I don't want to talk about the parts.

When you combine the system, and use words like 'self'

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/originss.htm

the word does not apply to the amygdala. It does not apply to a big toe or a spinal chord. It applies to the interactions between the systems regardless of the mechanics within the system.

Transporting does not apply to the steering wheel nor to the gearshift not to the seat that carries the load. It applies to the whole system.

It is trivially obvious to say the mind is what the brain does although dreadfully complex to actually provide an accurate shop manual for the machine.

Is that the common view or is that in error?

I don't know how common it is, but I don't think it's an error :)



I mean resolution of totality of an organism. That is a pixel. Indivisible. (For the resolution level I'm looking at. ) if something inside makes a map of some sort, great, how does that manefest in the system as an individual unit?

Sorry, still not receiving you. I don't think "something inside makes a map of some sort". So I don't think there's an "individual unit". I think a really key concept, which Dennett explains nicely IMO, is the idea that consciousness (hate the noun) is constructed "on the fly" on a "need to know" basis. What we think of as a map as persisting through time, and consulted occasionally, is constructed from scratch each time we consult it.
OK. I see your objection. But it is accurate to say that a map is constructed moment by moment. The map is dynamic. Sure. There isn't a map housed just behind the frontal lobes like the one in the glove box of the car to be pulled out and consulted at random intervals.

I thought that was a given. My error. But the organism constructs maps. Just that they are always new. Right?

This is literally true when we consider the "map" of the visual field. We only "see" a tiny part of it at a time, in the sense that only a tiny part of the visual scene is actually clear during any one fixation. But we are convinced that we "see" a wide field. The old-fashioned view was that we "build up" a visual scene through lots of saccades, rather like making a brass-rubbing. But that doesn't fit the data. So the current view is, as Dennett describes, that we simply don't register the lack of information. We don't need to, because as soon as we want it, we can have it. That's why our eyes are so beautifully engineered.


What we think of as a map is a system of motor programs that provide us with the information we need when we need it. Consciousness, IMO, crucially depends on the fact that every new set of data results in a search for new data - determines what data we search for, in fact.
What about a priori knowledge? We may not see the whole elephant at once but we know what to expect on the other side. No?

Not how but what the system, fully assembled and running, can be said to do. No words about acquiring the sense data. No neural this or that. Nothing about which part does which thing. It's all one part that produces many observable macro phenomena for this thought experiment. What is the observed phenomena that can only be ascribed to the totality of the system? Absolutely and completely independently of what the system does to initiate and sustain that set of phenomena.

OK, accidentally had a go at the how anyway.

What the system does is navigate space for the purposes of sustaining (and reproducing!) itself.

It's no coincidence that consciousness evolved in things that move. And that the most elaborate forms of consciousness evolved in things that hunt.

IMO.
:p hmmm.

[Febble]

Let's try the old car analogy. Car has an engine made of moving parts, a body built to house things and various moving part to utilize energy and propel the vehicle. The total system has quite a few unique qualities that are inappropriate to apply to any of the parts individually.

The tires do not need to present their position to the motor in order to grip the road and respond in a predictable way.

I don't want to talk about the parts.

When you combine the system, and use words like 'self'

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/originss.htm

the word does not apply to the amygdala. It does not apply to a big toe or a spinal chord. It applies to the interactions between the systems regardless of the mechanics within the system.

Transporting does not apply to the steering wheel nor to the gearshift not to the seat that carries the load. It applies to the whole system.

It is trivially obvious to say the mind is what the brain does although dreadfully complex to actually provide an accurate shop manual for the machine.

Is that the common view or is that in error?

I don't know how common it is, but I don't think it's an error :)



Sorry, still not receiving you. I don't think "something inside makes a map of some sort". So I don't think there's an "individual unit". I think a really key concept, which Dennett explains nicely IMO, is the idea that consciousness (hate the noun) is constructed "on the fly" on a "need to know" basis. What we think of as a map as persisting through time, and consulted occasionally, is constructed from scratch each time we consult it.
OK. I see your objection. But it is accurate to say that a map is constructed moment by moment. The map is dynamic. Sure. There isn't a map housed just behind the frontal lobes like the one in the glove box of the car to be pulled out and consulted at random intervals.

I thought that was a given. My error. But the organism constructs maps. Just that they are always new. Right?

Well, I'm just a bit leery of the metaphor. We are able to function as though we have a map. And we tend to represent that capacity to ourselves as though it were a map. I'm not going to be pushed any further mapwards than that!

I'd say we never have a whole map. Perhaps I'll agree if the map is like Google Earth. There is no Google Earth inside the computer. But the computer will construct the bit of Earth we need to know about as soon as we need to know about it, and as soon as we need to know about the next bit, it will construct that too, so smoothly that it looks as though the whole map is there, inside our screens, and our screen is a moving window that looks out on to it. Whereas in fact, the screen makes the map, a tiny piece at a time.

But even mentioning screens makes me uneasy. There is no screen. Just knowledge of where to go next to do what, and what we will see when we get there.

What about a priori knowledge? We may not see the whole elephant at once but we know what to expect on the other side. No?

Absolutely. Expectation is key. Forward models. We've had this conversation before! The visual system actually anticipates what the world will look like after the eyes have made their next move. It's cool.

Not how but what the system, fully assembled and running, can be said to do. No words about acquiring the sense data. No neural this or that. Nothing about which part does which thing. It's all one part that produces many observable macro phenomena for this thought experiment. What is the observed phenomena that can only be ascribed to the totality of the system? Absolutely and completely independently of what the system does to initiate and sustain that set of phenomena.

OK, accidentally had a go at the how anyway.

What the system does is navigate space for the purposes of sustaining (and reproducing!) itself.

It's no coincidence that consciousness evolved in things that move. And that the most elaborate forms of consciousness evolved in things that hunt.

IMO.
:p hmmm.

This forum needs a ninewands smiley :)

[dug_down_deep]

Your head is there to move you around, is what I think she's saying.

I can verify that when your head isn't working, you don't move around. Not a proof, but pretty suggestive evidence. ;)

[Steviepinhead]

Febble:
That's why our eyes are so beautifully engineered.

As long as we don't let Dave Hawkins in on this statement, I'm okay with it.

[BWE]

Sorry, still not receiving you. I don't think "something inside makes a map of some sort". So I don't think there's an "individual unit". I think a really key concept, which Dennett explains nicely IMO, is the idea that consciousness (hate the noun) is constructed "on the fly" on a "need to know" basis. What we think of as a map as persisting through time, and consulted occasionally, is constructed from scratch each time we consult it.

OK. I see your objection. But it is accurate to say that a map is constructed moment by moment. The map is dynamic. Sure. There isn't a map housed just behind the frontal lobes like the one in the glove box of the car to be pulled out and consulted at random intervals.

I thought that was a given. My error. But the organism constructs maps. Just that they are always new. Right?

Well, I'm just a bit leery of the metaphor. We are able to function as though we have a map. And we tend to represent that capacity to ourselves as though it were a map. I'm not going to be pushed any further mapwards than that!

I'd say we never have a whole map. Perhaps I'll agree if the map is like Google Earth. There is no Google Earth inside the computer. But the computer will construct the bit of Earth we need to know about as soon as we need to know about it, and as soon as we need to know about the next bit, it will construct that too, so smoothly that it looks as though the whole map is there, inside our screens, and our screen is a moving window that looks out on to it. Whereas in fact, the screen makes the map, a tiny piece at a time.

That's all I wanted to confirm. Right there. Now I guess it's off Dennett but I definitely understand what people mean when they say dualism.

But even mentioning screens makes me uneasy. There is no screen. Just knowledge of where to go next to do what, and what we will see when we get there.
Absolutely. The screen is purely metaphorical but the only metaphor we have of dynamic processes being modeled is a screen so with the appropriate caveats, it is the metaphor we are stuck with. No? Just that it arises out of the functioning of the brain rather than before it.




OK, accidentally had a go at the how anyway.

What the system does is navigate space for the purposes of sustaining (and reproducing!) itself.

It's no coincidence that consciousness evolved in things that move. And that the most elaborate forms of consciousness evolved in things that hunt.

IMO.
:p hmmm.

This forum needs a ninewands smiley :)
Febble, thank you.

[Steviepinhead]

Ain't she a peach? ;)

[BWE]

That ranks up in the top few threads I've ever participated in.

Just for learning how to see other ships in the night so to speak. In my cozy BWEian theater.

Yes she is.

[trendkill]

It has never occurred to me to care whether what Dennett says is new; insofar as I am interested in his pronouncements, I'm mainly concerned with whether or not he's right.

[Febble]

It has never occurred to me to care whether what Dennett says is new; insofar as I am interested in his pronouncements, I'm mainly concerned with whether or not he's right.

And do you think he is?

[trendkill]

I lean toward "yes" but I'm not quite sure.

[Rilx]

The one thing I've learned from Dennett (Consciousness Explained) is what colours are. Generally I found DD concentrating on the physical/mental boundary, where mental phenomena can be explained by relatively direct evolutionary reasoning. This trait supports survival in that situation, etc. Higher cognitive processes were left to rely on induction: they just evolved same way.

[premjan]

Dennett's view of consciousness is that it is the apparently serial account for the brain's underlying parallelism.
From the Wiki of Dennett's book this seems pretty interesting and apt - consciousness is a summary, story, description or account. But it still doesn't seem to explain why experience would arise from such an account. I think Dennett believes that experience is a phantom and not something real though it forms the basis of all things mental. I found this somewhat persuasive: he says that phenomenal consciousness has no properties so in effect it doesn't exist. It is simply a total experience. It can't be analyzed or divided in any useful way.
The origin of this operationalist approach can be found in Dennett's immediately preceding work. Dennett (1988) explains consciousness in terms of access consciousness alone, denying the independent existence of what Ned Block has labeled phenomenal consciousness. [3] He argues that "Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties". Having related all consciousness to properties, he concludes that they cannot be meaningfully distinguished from our judgements about them. He writes:

[BWE]

Ok. I've been meaning to get back to this thread for some time now because I figured out where my confusion comes from. Don't get me wrong, I'm still confused :p, but at least now I know what I'm confused about.

Dennett dances around the resolution issue so much that I couldn't get it straight what he meant in any given frame of reference. He takes apart the organism and says that's it. That's what it is. The parts are laid out in front of me and that's the organism. But he doesn't put it back together to look at the emergent system itself as an individual system. He says it's multiple systems that don't form a single system basically. His idea is that the feeling that it is a single system is an artifact.

It's hyper reductionism.

[Ray Moscow]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

[BWE]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

It's a bit like saying that you have carrots, potatoes celery, onions, ginger, tomatoes and beef all boiled together for dinner.


...But there is no stew.

[Febble]

Ok. I've been meaning to get back to this thread for some time now because I figured out where my confusion comes from. Don't get me wrong, I'm still confused :p, but at least now I know what I'm confused about.

Dennett dances around the resolution issue so much that I couldn't get it straight what he meant in any given frame of reference. He takes apart the organism and says that's it. That's what it is. The parts are laid out in front of me and that's the organism. But he doesn't put it back together to look at the emergent system itself as an individual system. He says it's multiple systems that don't form a single system basically. His idea is that the feeling that it is a single system is an artifact.

It's hyper reductionism.

I don't think that's what he's doing.

[Febble]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

It's a bit like saying that you have carrots, potatoes celery, onions, ginger, tomatoes and beef all boiled together for dinner.


...But there is no stew.

I think he's saying that's what stew is. Which it is.

[BWE]

What does he put together? What is the role of the imagination in Dennetts view of consciousness?

[BWE]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

It's a bit like saying that you have carrots, potatoes celery, onions, ginger, tomatoes and beef all boiled together for dinner.


...But there is no stew.

I think he's saying that's what stew is. Which it is.
No. It manifestly is NOT what stew is. Stew is the boiled together concoction, the emergent property of the ingredients in the environment.

You can't just put those things on a countertop and call it stew.

[Febble]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

It's a bit like saying that you have carrots, potatoes celery, onions, ginger, tomatoes and beef all boiled together for dinner.


...But there is no stew.

I think he's saying that's what stew is. Which it is.
No. It manifestly is NOT what stew is. Stew is the boiled together concoction, the emergent property of the ingredients in the environment.

You can't just put those things on a countertop and call it stew.

Sure. But you specified that they were all boiled together, not just put on a countertop.

And I think that's what Dennett is saying - that this is what stew is: it's what you get when you take these ingredients and follow this recipe. There is no secret additional ingredient.

That's not reductionist. He isn't saying there is no stew. He's saying - look here's this amazing thing called stew. This is how is how it is made.

[BWE]

I haven't read this book, but elsewhere (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea) Dennett just shrugs off the "hyper" bit. He likes breaking complex things down to simple algorithms, which although simple in principle can over time create great complexity.

There's no need to bring in any explanation other than the simple bits that make up the exceedingly complex whole.

It's a bit like saying that you have carrots, potatoes celery, onions, ginger, tomatoes and beef all boiled together for dinner.


...But there is no stew.

I think he's saying that's what stew is. Which it is.
No. It manifestly is NOT what stew is. Stew is the boiled together concoction, the emergent property of the ingredients in the environment.

You can't just put those things on a countertop and call it stew.

Sure. But you specified that they were all boiled together, not just put on a countertop.

And I think that's what Dennett is saying - that this is what stew is: it's what you get when you take these ingredients and follow this recipe. There is no secret additional ingredient.

That's not reductionist. He isn't saying there is no stew. He's saying - look here's this amazing thing called stew. This is how is how it is made.

Ok. If that's what he's saying then I missed it.

I got him saying, look, there's this thing called stew. Here's what it is, carrots potatoes and this other stuff. In the old days people used to think stew was a thing. But look. It's really all these things. Really there is no such thing as stew. It's just a word these people made up for these things all together.

Which misses the point that it becomes stew when the bits, though still mostly distinguishable, no longer fully exist as they did alone, that they have been altered to be stewed. The stew is the mixing of flavors, the looping of the blending of constituent parts into each other. It's a resolution issue.

When looking at it as a stew, you are not looking at the parts.

Perhaps an anthill is a better analogy. It seems like he says, look! Don't be fooled, it's really just a bunch of ants.

[Ray Moscow]

Dennett battles the leap that most people make -- that there MUST be something needed to make a mind besides a brain consisting of neurons, or needed to make an animal other than the algorithms of evolution. No, this leap is not needed, and it's a mistake to take it.

[BWE]

OK. I figured that out. He kind of belabored the point. But I don't think he ever came back around to remind people that emergent properties are more than the sum of their parts without needing other inputs. Consciousness, I'm pretty sure he says this, is not an emergent property at all. It's actually attention shifting back and forth between several discrete processes.

ETA, meaning, that either the discrete processes are not part of consciousness or that the unit, the whole process that is an organism, shouldn't be considered as a unit but as its subunits.

[Febble]

OK. I figured that out. He kind of belabored the point. But I don't think he ever came back around to remind people that emergent properties are more than the sum of their parts without needing other inputs. Consciousness, I'm pretty sure he says this, is not an emergent property at all. It's actually attention shifting back and forth between several discrete processes.

ETA, meaning, that either the discrete processes are not part of consciousness or that the unit, the whole process that is an organism, shouldn't be considered as a unit but as its subunits.

I don't think those things are contradictory. Consciousness can emerge from the shifting of attention back and forth. Not happy with the end of your sentence there, though - I think you are confusing process with content. We do not (usually) attend to our attentional processes. We attend to interesting stuff. And our attention shifts back and forth between different stuff. And that means that the attentional processes also shift back and forth between different functional "modes". For example I am sitting here right now trying to write a paper on the Default Mode Network - a network of brain regions that appear to be implicated in attention to our inner "world" as opposed to attention to the external world. At rest we cycle between the DMN and external attentional processes every few seconds. When engaged in a task, our attention is grabbed by task-relevant events in the external world, and our DMN "switched off" briefly, so instead of spontaneously flipping between modes, the mode-switching is at least partially stimulus-driven.

(It's cool.)

[BWE]

It takes a village to raise a child?

I'm busy for a while but I'll get back to this.

I think Dennett forgets that it really does take the whole organism to be conscious. That the processes individually are not doing what he is defining as consciousness. That it is the coordination of them that is the emergent phenomenon.

[Febble]

It takes a village to raise a child?

I'm busy for a while but I'll get back to this.

I think Dennett forgets that it really does take the whole organism to be conscious. That the processes individually are not doing what he is defining as consciousness. That it is the coordination of them that is the emergent phenomenon.

Did you mean to say that the phenomenon emerges from the coordination? In which case I, and I think Dennett, would agree.

[BWE]

It takes a village to raise a child?

I'm busy for a while but I'll get back to this.

I think Dennett forgets that it really does take the whole organism to be conscious. That the processes individually are not doing what he is defining as consciousness. That it is the coordination of them that is the emergent phenomenon.

Did you mean to say that the phenomenon emerges from the coordination? In which case I, and I think Dennett, would agree.

I know you would agree. I'm not sure Dennett would. Not to my wording anyway. You read I am a Strange Loop. I think Dennett says the careenium is full of simms. Simballs don't exist. They are simply a bunch of simms.

Which is ridiculous framed that way. It's the same as saying rocks don't exist they are merely molecules or molecules are merely atoms or atoms are merely particals and down through the turtles. I don't think He ever really addresses the turtle that is the phenomenon we call consciousness. I think he looks at the one below and says "it's that one!"

Maybe thinking it's Yertle on top.

[Febble]

It takes a village to raise a child?

I'm busy for a while but I'll get back to this.

I think Dennett forgets that it really does take the whole organism to be conscious. That the processes individually are not doing what he is defining as consciousness. That it is the coordination of them that is the emergent phenomenon.

Did you mean to say that the phenomenon emerges from the coordination? In which case I, and I think Dennett, would agree.

I know you would agree. I'm not sure Dennett would. Not to my wording anyway. You read I am a Strange Loop. I think Dennett says the careenium is full of simms. Simballs don't exist. They are simply a bunch of simms.

Which is ridiculous framed that way. It's the same as saying rocks don't exist they are merely molecules or molecules are merely atoms or atoms are merely particals and down through the turtles. I don't think He ever really addresses the turtle that is the phenomenon we call consciousness. I think he looks at the one below and says "it's that one!"

Maybe thinking it's Yertle on top.

I think the Simms thing was written to make precisely the opposite point of the one you are taking from it.

The domino example was nice, too, IMO - and he points out the absurdity of identifying a "grandmother domino" (IIRC, which I may not be).

In fact the whole point of Dennett's "levels" - the physical, design, and intentional levels - is that some things are best understood in terms of what they are at a higher level, than at a low. Hence we understand stew more usefully as stew than we do as bits of stew (unless we are making trying to make stew).

That doesn't stop stew consisting of ingredients assembled by processes. It just means that to regard it in that way is to adopt a physical stance. An intentional stance is just as valid, often more useful, and no less true.

[BWE]

I think the Simms thing was written to make precisely the opposite point of the one you are taking from it.


This might present a problem for me. :p
The domino example was nice, too, IMO - and he points out the absurdity of identifying a "grandmother domino" (IIRC, which I may not be).

In fact the whole point of Dennett's "levels" - the physical, design, and intentional levels - is that some things are best understood in terms of what they are at a higher level, than at a low. Hence we understand stew more useful as stew than we do as bits of stew (unless we are making trying to make stew).

Hmm. Maybe I got too hung up on his dualism jag. Maybe he really is saying that. But I don't know what part of the story he goes into the level looking down on consciousness itself. What does it look like from above? Without that view, I don't know how he could draw a line around it to delineate it. It looked to me like he didn't. What I saw is an argument against there being a screen which ignores that there is a screen in the replay and imagine feature of the brain. Because that isn't real-time. I don't know why he needs consciousness to be real time.

It looked to me like he started at the consciousness level and pushed several times but popped a few less and I'm not sure he recorded his stack so well.



That doesn't stop stew consisting of ingredients assembled by processes. It just means that to regard it in that way is to adopt a physical stance. understanding. An intentional stance is just as valid, often more useful, and no less true.
I heard him say we can dispense with epiphenomenal concepts by knowing the deeper units. That there is no screen like Descartes would have it so there is no screen. That there is no map but that we map.

Which is simply compressing the timescale of 'a map' to the verb 'map'.

I think.

[BWE]

I'm about 15 pages into darwin's dangerous idea. Much better.

His snark/content ratio is still a little high but at least this time I don't pick up the intense mean-spirited vibe I got from CE.

Also his referents are more concrete. I haven't noticed a bait and switch yet. :)

[Febble]

Freedom Evolves is the best one, IMO.

[BWE]

Freedom Evolves is the best one, IMO.

I don't have it. He's done it to me again though.

I had to go back to CE to check the opening lines of the multiple drafts section. I suspect I'm just not the right audience. I may just not be clever enough to follow him. I suppose.

Damn screens. What does he call the imagination?

[Febble]

Freedom Evolves is the best one, IMO.

I don't have it. He's done it to me again though.

I had to go back to CE to check the opening lines of the multiple drafts section. I suspect I'm just not the right audience. I may just not be clever enough to follow him. I suppose.

Damn screens. What does he call the imagination?

Well what do you mean by the word? The creative process? The mind's eye?

[BWE]

:) I mean, the ability to imagine things. The mind's eye primarily.

[Febble]

:) I mean, the ability to imagine things. The mind's eye primarily.

Well, you might have meant: dream up something that doesn't exist. Or you might mean: imagine something that isn't in front of you.

Well, I can't recall exactly how Dennett deals with this, but IIRC, the latter was fairly standard modern vision science, and the former would have been something to do with his "pandemonium".

[BWE]

:) I mean, the ability to imagine things. The mind's eye primarily.

Well, you might have meant: dream up something that doesn't exist. Or you might mean: imagine something that isn't in front of you.

Well, I can't recall exactly how Dennett deals with this, but IIRC, the latter was fairly standard modern vision science, and the former would have been something to do with his "pandemonium".

Damn scientists always wanting exact terms. :) Sorry. And thanks. This has been a good conversation.

[BWE]

I want to start a business doing home electronics and call my flagship product "The Cartesian Home-Theater".

[dug_down_deep]

Here's a challenge: Build it with beer cans.